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I. INTRODUCTION 
The problem of who watches the watchers is as old as government, 
and not much more tractable for corporate than for government orga-
nizations. In theory, the shareholders of public companies elect direc-
tors, who watch corporate officers, who manage/watch the company 
on the shareholders' behalf. But since Berle and Means, we have un-
derstood that this theory is a fiction. The managers - the current 
officers and directors - pick the directors, and the shareholders rub-
berstamp the managers' choices. I Perhaps thrice in a thousand cases, 
unhappy shareholders mount a proxy fight. About one fourth of the 
time, they win. 2 
1. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
2. See R. SCHRAGER, CoRPORATE CONFLICTS: PROXY FIGHTS IN THE 1980s 11 (Investor 
Responsibility Research Center 1986) (reporting data from 1981-1985); Seligman, Equal Protec-
tion in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 687, 711 (1986) (reporting data from 1956-1977). 
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Most modern corporate scholars, especially those with a law-and-
economics bent, accept shareholder passivity as inevitable. They rely 
on market forces, especially takeovers, to limit managerial discretion. 
The critics' claim, stripped to its essentials, is that shareholders don't 
care much about voting except in extreme cases and never will. Col-
lective action problems, which arise because each shareholder owns a 
small fraction of a company's stock, explain why shareholders can't be 
expected to care. I will call this view the "passivity story." 
Takeovers have their place, but they are a costly and imperfect 
way to discipline wayward managers. Only a badly mismanaged tar-
get can justify the typical 50% takeover premium. Hostile takeovers 
also face strong legal obstacles, notably poison pills and state antitake-
over laws, that didn't exist a few years ago. And for companies with 
competent managers who just need closer oversight, the takeover rem-
edy, which usually involves kicking out the old managers, is dispro-
portionate to the problem, and adds large disruption and transaction 
costs. So it's important to know whether shareholder voice can't 
work, as the critics claim, or whether it just hasn't been tried.3 
This article attempts, from within the law-and-economics tradi-
tion, to resurrect shareholder voice as a constraint on corporate man-
agers. I argue that the critics' legal analysis is misdirected; their 
factual assumptions about shareholder size are obsolete; and their col-
lective action explanation for passivity is superficial. Shareholder vot-
ing, historically only a minor nuisance to corporate managers, can 
become an important part of the multistrand web of imperfect con-
straints on managers, if legal rules permit. My emphasis is on the 
formal act of voting. Much actual oversight undoubtedly will be infor-
mal, but meaningful informal oversight will take place only if the for-
mal power is available should it be needed. 
This article focuses on shareholder voting short of a full-scale 
proxy fight, in which dissidents seek majority control of a company's 
board of directors. Proxy fights are in important ways more closely 
akin to hostile takeovers than to shareholder action that isn't directed 
at replacing particular corporate officers. Proxy fights also raise con-
cerns about the abuse of power by dissident shareholders if they win, 
concerns that are weaker when control is not at stake. I will try to 
indicate where my analysis applies to proxy fights, but I will not ex-
3. I use "shareholder voice" broadly to mean any formal or informal effort to monitor corpo· 
rate managers or to communicate a desire for change in a company's management or policies. 
See generally A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, v OICE, AND LOY AL TY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
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plore the special issues that proxy fights raise. 4 
The passivity story assumes a benign legal environment. It sees 
shareholders as passive despite legal efforts, through the proxy rules, to 
facilitate shareholder voice. The failed legal efforts to help sharehold-
ers become evidence that shareholders don't care about voting. In 
fact, institutional shareholders are hobbled by a complex web of legal 
rules that make it difficult, expensive, and legally risky to own large 
percentage stakes or undertake joint efforts. Legal obstacles are espe-
cially great for shareholder efforts to nominate and elect directors, 
even to a minority of board seats. The proxy rules, in particular, help 
shareholders in some ways, but mostly hinder shareholder efforts to 
nominate and elect directors. Over the last 25 years, as institutional 
ownership has grown to levels that make shareholder activism feasible, 
legal obstacles have grown as well, often as byproducts of rules aimed 
at controlling takeovers. Cultural norms for proper and improper be-
havior by money managers reinforce these legal obstacles. 
For the most part, no one legal barrier is insurmountable. The 
problem, instead, is the total burden imposed by many rules, including 
legal risk in the many areas where the law is uncertain. Institutional 
fiduciaries have strong incentives to avoid legal risk, because they face 
personal exposure if the risk comes to pass, while their beneficiaries 
get most of the upside. They care less about the conduct that legal 
rules, read narrowly, might permit, than about what those rules, read 
broadly, might prohibit. 
The passivity story also assumes a company with thousands of 
anonymous shareholders, each owning a tiny fraction of the com-
pany's voting stock. That assumption, never wholly true, is increas-
ingly obsolete. Institutional investors have grown large enough so that 
a limited number of institutions own a sizeable percentage of the 
shares of.most public companies. Moreover, the fastest growing insti-
tutions are public pension funds and mutual funds, which face fewer 
direct conflicts of interest in monitoring corporate managers than the 
corporate pension funds and bank trust departments who were for-
merly the principal institutional shareholders. Large institutions can 
combine forces, form trade groups to represent their collective inter-
est, and one way or another act as monitors of corporate managers, if 
4. For a recent discussion of proxy fights, see Bebchuk & Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing 
Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 1071 (1990). I will use the term "proxy 
fight" or "control contest" to refer to a contest for corporate control; the term "proxy campaign" 
to refer to a contest not involving control; and the term "proxy contest" to refer to both proxy 
fights and proxy campaigns. 
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they see profit in doing so. Legal obstacles notwithstanding, some in-
stitutions are trying to do just that. 
The passivity story treats the collective action problems that result 
from fractional share ownership as an overwhelming barrier to share-
holder activism. I model the incentives of shareholder proponents, 
who must decide whether to make voting proposals. The model sug-
gests that at current levels of institutional ownership, collective action 
problems, while important, are not insuperable for a broad range of 
issues. A central factor in the model is economies of scale. An institu-
tion that owns stakes in a number of companies enjoys economies of 
scale when it presses common issues at those companies. These econo-
mies can offset the incentives for passivity created by partial ownership 
of any one company. Thus, shareholder voice holds more promise for 
process and structural issues than for company-specific concerns. Ex-
amples of such issues include the process by which directors are nomi-
nated, dual-class recapitalizations, poison pills and other antitakeover 
measures, confidential voting, management compensation, and choice 
of state of incorporation. 
The passivity story also predicts that nonproponents will be ration-
ally apathetic - not even bothering to become informed, perhaps fol-
lowing a simple voting rule like "always vote with management." I 
model the incentives of nonproponent shareholders to become in-
formed, and conclude that while many small shareholders will remain 
uninformed, apathy makes exponentially less sense as shareholdings 
grow, as long as there is a critical mass of other large shareholders. 
Increased stake in the outcome, increased probability that their vote 
will affect the outcome, increased ease of coordinated voting among 
institutions, and scale economies combine to create substantial incen-
tives for institutions to become informed voters. 
An additional important dimension of shareholder voting is 
agenda control. For the most part, managers control what sharehold-
ers vote on, how proposals are packaged, when the shareholders vote, 
and when the shareholders find out what they're voting on. Public 
choice theory teaches that she who sets the agenda can often control 
the substantive outcome. Legal rules could, but today do not, make it 
easier for shareholders to define their own agenda. 
Conflicts of interest matter too. Institutional investors are the only 
viable watchers of corporate managers, but are themselves managed 
by money managers who have imperfect incentives at best, and signifi-
cant conflicts of interest at worst. Different institutions have different 
incentives and conflicts. The public pension funds have the weakest 
promanager conflicts, but no institution is conflict free. These con-
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:flicts, rather than rational apathy, may explain why many institutions 
vote promanager on proposals that are likely to reduce share price. 
Legal rules aren't very effective at constraining conflicts of interest, 
and some rules make the incentive problem worse. 
Shareholder passivity, in sum, may be both legally and historically 
contingent. It may reflect less the inexorable logic of collectiv~ ac-
tion, 5 than a combination of legal obstacles to shareholder action, 
shareholder conflicts of interest, managers' agenda control, and more 
dispersed and conflicted ownership in the past than today. The way to 
see if shareholder voting can matter is to change the legal rules that 
obstruct individual and collective shareholder action, adopt new rules 
that facilitate collective shareholder action, and develop an institu-
. tional and legal environment that more effectively controls money 
manager conflicts of interest. Piecemeal change, though, such as re-
cent proposals to reform the proxy rules, has only limited promise. 
There are many obstacles to shareholder voice, and their burden is 
cumulative. Changing only the proxy rules won't have dramatic 
results. 
This article argues that shareholder monitoring is possible: It's an 
idea that hasn't been tried, rather than an idea that has failed. I defer 
to a second article currently in draft the question of whether more 
monitoring by institutional shareholders is desirable. Will direct 
shareholder oversight, or indirect oversight through shareholder-nom-
inated directors, improve corporate performance, prove counter-
productive, or, perhaps, not matter much one way or the other? What 
are the benefits and risks in giving money managers - themselves im-
perfectly monitored agents - more power over corporate managers? 
If more shareholder voice is desirable, how much more and for what 
issues? Which of the many relevant rules ought to be loosened, which 
tightened, and by how much, in light of the various purposes - often 
unrelated to shareholder voting - that those rules serve? For all of 
these questions, the answers may well be different for different 
institutions. 6 
This article proceeds as follows. Part II summarizes the views of 
the naysayers who invoke collective action problems to explain why 
shareholders will rarely do anything. Part III reviews the principal 
state and federal rules that affect, and mostly obstruct, shareholder 
5. The phrase "logic of collective action" comes, of course, from Mancur Olson's book of 
that title. M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF CoLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC Goons AND THE THEORY 
OF GROUPS (2d ed. 1971). 
6. See B. BLACK, STREAMLINING THE PROXY PROCESS: THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF 
SHAREHOLDER VOICE (Colum. L. School Working Paper, 1990). 
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activism. Part IV discusses recent developments in institutional stock 
ownership and voting behavior that make the passivity story obsolete. 
These developments include rapid growth in ownership by less-con-
flicted public pension funds and mutual funds, increasing shareholder 
activism with public funds as the most visible actors, and the forma-
tion of trade groups that can facilitate collective shareholder action. 
Part V presents a theoretical model of the incentives of shareholder 
proponents that sheds light on shareholder incentives to remain pas-
sive, and the importance of scale economies in reducing those incen-
tives. Part VI models the incentives of nonproponent shareholders to 
become informed or remain rationally apathetic. Part VII addresses 
the importance of agenda control in determining substantive out-
comes. Part VIII examines the incentives of the major types of institu-
tional investors, and the conflicts of interest that they face. Part IX is 
a conclusion. 
II. THE PASSIVITY STORY AND THE PROXY RULES 
This Part briefly describes the passivity story and surveys recent 
writing recognizing the growing role of institutional shareholders in 
proxy contests. 
A. The Passivity Story 
In 1932, Berle and Means told the world that managers of big 
companies were powerful; their shareholders powerless. 7 That picture 
was not, then or now, true of all firms. Some, especially smaller firms, 
have significant insider holdings. 8 But it described most large public 
companies. Partly in response, Congress in 1934 adopted section 14 of 
the Securities Exchange Act (Exchange Act),9 which authorizes the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to develop rules to govern 
the solicitation of proxies (Proxy Rules). Better disclosure, Congress 
hoped, would protect shareholders against manager overreaching. 
Passivity story advocates believe that Congress and the SEC 
shouldn't have bothered. Collective action problems make share-
holder passivity inevitable, and we must rely on other constraints, es-
pecially takeovers, to keep managerial discretion within reasonable 
bounds.10 The modem, law-and-economics rendition of the passivity 
7. A. BERLE & G. MEANS (1932), supra note 1. 
8. For recent data on insider holdings, see Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the 
Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 375, 387-90 (1983); Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, Management 
Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. EcoN. 293, 297 (1988). 
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988). 
10. Representative critiques include Baysinger & Butler, Revolution versus El•olution in Car-
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story developed in response to the rarity of successful proxy fights and 
the corporate social responsibility movement ofJhe l 970s.11 We see so 
few proxy fights, the story runs, because most companies run fine 
without them and even when performance lags, proxy fights are not 
economically viable. And the low support for social responsibility 
proposals shows that most shareholders aren't interested in the pro-
posals.12 Passivity story advocates have special disdain for the SEC's 
shareholder proposal rule. Allowing shareholders to include propos-
als in company proxy statements, they argue, imposes costs on the 
company, borne by all shareholders, to permit a few activists to ad-
vance their political agendas. 
Moreover, collective action problems make manager proposals un-
likely to fail and shareholder proposals unlikely to succeed, almost re-
gardless of the merits of the proposals. The act of voting, and 
becoming informed enough to vote intelligently, requires an invest-
ment of time, which is a scarce resource. Yet a shareholder's vote is 
unlikely to affect whether a proposal wins or loses. The cost and futil-
ity of becoming informed leads shareholders to choose rational apathy: 
They don't take the time to consider particular proposals, and instead 
adopt a crude rule of thumb like "vote with management." 
Collective action theory also tells us, the critics argue, that share-
holders won't make economically motivated proposals or actively op-
pose manager proposals unless the potential gains are much larger 
than the cost of the effort. A shareholder proponent bears most of the 
poration Law: The ALi's Project and the Independent Director, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 557 
(1984); Dent, SEC Rule Ua-8: A Study in Regulatory Failure, 30 N.Y. L. ScH. L. REv. 1 (1985); 
Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & EcON. 395 (1983); Liebeler, A Propo-
sal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. I.:. REv. 425 (1984); Manne, Shareholder 
Social Proposals Viewed by an Opponent, 24 STAN. L. R.Ev. 481 (1972); Manne, Some Theoretical 
Aspects of Share Voting: An Essay in Honor of Adolf A. Berle, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 1427 (1964); 
Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 
251 (1977); N. WOLFSON, THE MODERN CORPORATION: FREE MARKETS VERSUS REGULA-
TION (1984); see also Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477 (1958). For general discussions 
of collective action theory, see, for example, A. DOWNS, AN EcoNOMIC THEORY OF DEMOC-
RACY (1957); M. OLSON (1971), supra note 5; R. HARDIN, CoLLECTIVE ACTION (1982). 
11. The modern corporate social responsibility movement had its genesis in "Campaign 
GM" in 1970-1971. Its supporters include Curzan & Pelesh, Revitalizing Corporate Democracy: 
Control of Investment Managers' Voting on Social Responsibility Proxy Issues, 93 HARV. L. REv. 
670 (1980); R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); 
Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REv. 
419 (1971); C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CoNTROL OF CORPORATE BE-
HAVIOR (1975). 
12. Prior to the 1970s, shareholder proposals were more likely to be related to corporate 
governance and financial matters, such as cumulative voting and dividend levels, but were no 
more likely than social responsibility proposals to succeed. See F. EMERSON & F. LATCHAM, 
SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A BROADER OUTLOOK FOR CoRPORATIONS 103-04, 112 (1954); 
Ryan, Rule Ua-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. 
R.Ev. 97, 116-18, 120 (1988). 
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cost of a proxy campaign, but receives only a pro rata share of the 
gains from success, while other shareholders free ride on her efforts. 
Free-rider problems work in tandem with the rational apathy of the 
free riders to discourage shareholder proposals from being made. •3 
Scholars who see shareholder voting as unimportant rely instead 
on market forces, especially takeovers, to limit managers' discretion. 
Indeed, voting serves primarily to allow shareholders to sell their votes 
along with their shares in a takeover. Frank Easterbrook and Dan 
Fischel state the critics: position with customary clarity: 
[C]ollective choice problems ... suggest that voting would rarely have 
any function except in extremis ... . 
These collective action problems may be overcome by aggregating 
the shares (and the attached votes) through acquisitions, such as mergers 
and tender offers. We expect voting to serve its principal role in permit-
ting those who have aggregated equity claims to exercise control. 14 
The shareholder impotence argument has been widely accepted by 
both academics and regulators. To take a recent example, scholars on 
all sides of the multifaceted debate over the one share, one vote rule 
shared the belief that shareholders were relatively powerless to oppose 
dual-class recapitalizations.15 The SEC relied on collective action 
problems to justify the rule. 16 Scholars have also invoked collective 
action problems to explain why shareholders approve charter amend-
ments against their own interest.17 In recent years, a number of writ-
ers, taking passivity as inevitable, have tried to explain why the 
13. I will generally use the terms "shareholder proposal" and "shareholder proponent" to 
refer to a shareholder effort either to present a proposal or actively oppose a manager proposal. 
14. Easterbrook & Fischel (1983), supra note 10, at 402. More recently, see Easterbrook & 
Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1416, 1443 (1989) ("[i]nvestors are ration· 
ally uninterested in votes, [in part] because no investor's vote will change the outcome of the 
election"); Butler & Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Con· 
tractarians, 65 WASH. L. REv. 1, 25 (1990) ("shareholder voting rights .•• , in light of share-
holder passivity, must be largely explicable in terms of the market for corporate control"). 
15. See, e.g., Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock. 
54 U. CHI. L. REv. 119, 134 (1987) (one·share, one-vote rule needed because of collective action 
problems "any attempt by shareholders to monitor managers is likely to fail"); Gilson, Evaluat-
ing Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807, 832-40 (1987) 
(developing collective action explanation for why shareholders may approve a recapitalization 
against their self interest); Seligman (1986), supra note 2, at 723-24 (one-share, one-vote rule 
needed because of management's "immense funding advantages" and the lack of "organized 
[shareholder] opposition" to dual-class proposals). 
16. See Exchange Act Release No. 25,891, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 84,247, at 89,216 (July 13, 1988). 
17. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Con· 
straints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1839 (1989) ("[T]he main reason 
why shareholders might approve a value-decreasing amendment is their [rational] lack of infor-
mation •... "); Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1478-79 
(1989) (advocating the continued use of mandatory legal rules for publicly held corporations 
because of problems with relying on shareholder consent to proposals to waive various rules); 
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separation of ownership and control may be efficient after all. 18 More 
generally, the assumed weakness of shareholder oversight underlies 
the central importance of takeovers in both public debate and aca-
demic commentary. 
B. Views Recognizing the Growing Role of Institutions 
A number of commentators have recognized the growing role of 
institutions in shareholder voting. Some have observed the impedi-
ments to shareholder voice created by various legal rules. Mark Roe 
describes the formal and informal barriers to banks, insurance compa-
nies and mutual funds owning large stakes in individual companies.19 
Al Conard discusses some of the obstacles to shareholder action under 
the federal securities laws.20 John Pound stresses the costs of comply-
ing with the proxy rules. 21 This work obviously overlaps with the dis-
cussion of legal rules in Part III of this article. 
Other observers, skeptical about the value of takeovers, see share-
holder activism as an alternative to takeovers, but don't explain how 
greater activism is to be achieved. For example, Jonathan Charkham, 
relying on Albert Hirschman's dichotomy between exit and voice, 
hopes that "[i]f takeovers were more difficult or impossible, would not 
investors be more inclined to use VOICE as an instrument for improv-
ing poor management?"22 Lou Lowenstein proposes a tax on short-
term trading profits, in the hope that long-term shareholders will be 
Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 1549, 1575-77 (1989) 
("[r]ational apathy is the indicated course" in voting on charter amendments). 
18. See, e.g., Demsetz (1983), supra note 8; Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the 
Firm, 88 J. POL. EcoN. 288 (1980); Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control. 26 J.L. 
& EcoN. 301 (1983); Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 267 (1988); cf 
Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REv. 
738, 787-91 (1978) (weakness of shareholder oversight may justify regulating manager actions); 
Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 68-73 
(1982) (creditors may supply some of the monitoring that common stockholders can't). 
19. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (forthcom-
ing 1991); M. ROE, KEEPING MUTUAL FUNDS OUT OF THE CoRPORATE BOARDROOM: THE 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT (Colum. L. School Working Paper, 1990). 
20. Conard, Beyond Manageria/ism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 117, 152-
53 (1988); see also Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972 
DUKE L.J. 895, 917-18. 
21. J. POUND, PROXY VOTING AND THE SEC: DEMOCRATIC IDEALS VERSUS MARKET EF-
FICIENCY (Kennedy School of Govt. Working Paper No. 39, 1990). Brief discussions of legal 
obstacles to shareholder action can also be found in Dent, Toward Unifying Ownership and Con-
trol in the Public Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REv. 881, 904-05; Johnson, An Insider's Call for 
Outside Direction, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 46, 52; Yoran, Restraints on Incumbent 
Directors in Intracorporate Battles/or Control. 7 U. RICH. L. REv. 431, 449-53 (1973); A. Som-
mer, Jr., Corporate Governance in the Nineties: Managers vs. Institutions, 24-27 (unpublished 
paper, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1990). 
22. J. CHARKHAM, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE MARKET FOR CONTROL OF CoM-
PANIES 11 (Bank of England Panel Paper No. 25, 1989); see A. HIRSCHMAN (1970), supra note 3. 
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more active, and suggests that institutional shareholders be entitled to 
nominate a minority of public company directors.23 
Other commentators see little need for legal reform. Patrick Ryan, 
for example, sees Rule 14a-8 as a "relatively neutral regulatory de-
vice" in no need of reform. 24 Ron Gilson and Reinier Kraakman ar-
gue that institutional shareholders should nominate and elect a new 
class of professional directors, but downplay legal barriers and express 
puzzlement as to why shareholders don't now do as they suggest.25 
Mel Eisenberg has suggested that shareholders already have the power 
under state corporate law to, for example, include director nominees 
in company proxy statements.26 Finally, Edward Rock notes that 
growing institutional concentration reduces collective action 
problems, but doesn't expect money managers to devote much effort to 
monitoring, partly because of conflicts of interest.27 
III. THE RULES GOVERNING SHAREHOLDER VOTING 
This Part surveys the legal rules that govern shareholder voting, 
and the advantages for managers 'and obstacles to shareholder action 
that the rules create. My focus is on the rules that may affect a proxy 
campaign not directed at taking control by nominating and electing a 
majority of the board. For a control contest, the analysis is much sim-
pler - the rules all apply and the target will almost certainly sue. 
To summarize: Legal rules make it hard and sometimes impossi-
ble for a single shareholder to own a large stake in a single company, 
especially if the shareholder is active on corporate governance issues. 
Owning 5% is easy if you're passive; hard if you're active. Owning 
10% is hard even if you're passive, but much harder if you're active. 
Going beyond the threshold for triggering a company poison pill, 
often only 10-15%, is impossible without the company's approval. 
Particular institutions face additional legal limits on their ability to 
own large stakes. Thus, legal rules largely foreclose institutional abil-
23. L. LoWENSfEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAIN AND THE 
ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER 202-18 (1988). 
24. Ryan (1988), supra note 12, at 103. 
25. Gilson & Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional In· 
vestors, 43 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 1991). 
26. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CoRPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 111-27 
(1976). Eisenberg's rosy view of shareholder power under state law is, at least as much today as 
when it was written, more a wish about what courts might do than a description of actual 
practice. 
27. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 19 
GEO. L.J, (forthcoming 1991). 
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ity to own a large stake, which is the direct way to mitigate collective 
action problems. . 
Nor can shareholders who individually own smaller stakes readily 
act together on a voting matter. A group that together owns a 5%, 
10%, or larger stake faces essentially the same legal obstacles as a sin-
gle active shareholder who owns the same percentage stake. The need 
to coordinate compliance among a number of independent institutions 
magnifies the legal burden. Thus, legal rules also foreclose share-
holder ability to form an effective voting coalition. 
Probably the single most important shareholder task is nominating 
and electing directors. Electing good directors is especially important 
for diversified institutions, who can't watch any one company closely 
and probably aren't competent to do so anyway. Yet legal obstacles 
are especially great for shareholder efforts to nominate and elect direc-
tors, even for a minority of board seats. The Proxy Rules, for exam-
ple, offer shareholders limited help on some matters, but provide 
mostly obstacles for director elections. And under the insider trading 
rules, electing a director has consequences comparable to owning a 
10% stake. 
Even when legal rules permit shareholder action, they raise costs. 
Those costs are important because a shareholder proponent bears most 
of the costs of her actions, receives a fraction of the benefits, and faces 
an opponent who has the enormous advantage of being able to spend 
other people's money. The obstacles to forming groups magnify these 
cost barriers by discouraging cost-sharing among shareholders. 
Moreover, legal uncertainty abounds. Legal risk adds to the ex-
pected cost that a shareholder must consider in deciding whether to 
act. Legal uncertainty also facilitates tactical lawsuits by company 
managers, who may not expect to win, but can increase shareholder 
costs by trying. Institutional fiduciaries are especially unlikely to take 
legal risks, because they face personal risk on the downside, while 
their beneficiaries get most of the upside. A pension fund manager or 
other fiduciary can't take a calculated risk of subjecting herself to 
short-swing trading liability or triggering a vaguely worded poison 
pill. For many institutions, the adverse publicity from a possible law-
suit is an important deterrent by itself. 
For a cautious fiduciary, legal risk involves not just the conduct 
that the rules clearly cover, but also the broader sphere of conduct 
that the rules, read expansively, might cover. That outer sphere is 
often very broad indeed. The SEC, in particular, is notorious for re-
fusing to define the scope of its rules and instead issuing "menacing 
releases" which "hint[ ] that the laws and rules may proscribe much 
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more than they appear to."28 For some rules, the SEC staff will give 
limited guidance through no-action letters; for others, the staff won't 
even do this much. 
Finally, perversity abounds. Shareholders who succeed at the bal-
lot box face greater risk of being deemed control persons under the 
securities laws, triggering a poison pill, or losing voting power under a 
control share antitakeover law, by virtue of their success. Shareholders 
who nominate and elect directors must be careful whom they elect, 
and how often they talk to the directors, lest the shareholders be 
deemed control persons or face short-swing profit forfeiture under the 
deputization principle. 
Cultural factors reinforce the legal obstacles to shareholder action. 
Money managers operate with a developed sense of proper and im-
proper behavior that is as much culturally as legally defined. They 
compete on the basis of trading strategies, not on their skill as corpo-
rate monitors. They expect to take market risk, but legal risk is be-
yond the pale. Iflegal rules changed, cultural norms might follow, but 
only slowly. 
Section A of this Part reviews the basic state rules that govern 
what matters the shareholders are entitled to vote on and many of the 
procedural rules for shareholder voting. Section B reviews the Proxy 
Rules, which govern the mechanics of soliciting shareholder votes, the 
information that shareholders must receive when their votes are solic-
ited, and shareholder rights to include proposals in a company's proxy 
statement. 
This Part also surveys the many other state and federal rules that 
restrict shareholder action. These include: disclosure requirements 
for 5% shareholders and shareholder groups under Exchange Act sec-
tion 13(d) (section C); prohibitions on insider trading and short-swing 
trading under Exchange Act sections lO(b) and 16(b) (section D); 
rules imposing liability on persons who "control" a company (section 
E); state-authorized flip-in poison pills (section F); limits on how 
much stock particular institutions can own in a single company (sec-
tion G); fiduciary duty rules (section H); state antitakeover laws (sec-
tion n; antitrust laws (section J); and various rules that can lead to 
tainted promanager votes (section K). Section L considers cultural 
barriers to shareholder action and section M discusses the political 
economy of the rules governing shareholder voting. Part VII will dis-
28. Conard, An Overview of the Laws of Corporations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 621, 664, 666 
(1973). 
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cuss the managers' agenda control advantages, many of which are also 
a product of legal rules. 
This Part is long and full of regulatory detail. The length, how-
ever, is part of the message. The obstacles faced by shareholders who 
would be active are many. No single rule is a show stopper, but their 
cumulative impact is large. The message that the rules convey to 
shareholders is: Be quiet, and no one will bother you. Be too active, 
and you'll pay the price. 
A. State Corporate Law 
This section reviews the basic state rules governing shareholder 
voting and the procedural and cost-bearing advantages they provide 
for corporate managers. Additional state rules that create obstacles to 
shareholder action are discussed in section III.E (poison pills), section 
III.I (antitakeover laws), section III.K (tainted votes), and Part VII 
(managers' agenda control). 
SU!te corporation statutes establish the basic structure of corporate 
governance: shareholders elect directors and vote on a limited set of 
important matters; directors watch officers and approve major corpo-
rate decisions; officers run companies on a day-to-day basis. For the 
most part, I take that structure as given and examine the procedural 
rules that affect how shareholders carry out their voting role. The 
distinction between structural rules that establish voting roles, and 
procedural rules for how voting takes place, is necessarily fuzzy at the 
margin. 
In not focusing on structural rules, I don't mean to suggest that 
they are optimal. For example, we might want shareholders to be able 
to redefine what matters deserve a shareholder vote. Also, managers 
will fight shareholder power both at the polls and in state legislatures. 
If shareholder proposals begin to win with any frequency, managers 
will press state lawmakers to change the structural rules in the manag-
ers' favor, and the states may well respond. Antitakeover laws show 
this process at work: shareholders voted with their feet in favor of 
hostile takeovers; managers, aided by unions worried about jobs and 
local officials worried about local communities, ran to state lawmakers 
for protection; the lawmakers limited shareholder power so to vote. 
There is some evidence, discussed in section III.I, of a similar trend for 
voting rights. 
1. Substantive Rules 
The matters on which shareholders vote under state law typically 
include electing directors, amending the corporate charter, reincorpo-
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rating in another state, merger with another company, sale of substan-
tially all assets, and liquidation.29 The charter may, but for public 
companies rarely does, specify other matters that require a share-
holder vote. State law also typically sets forth a few matters on which 
the shareholders can act unilaterally, such as removing directors from 
a nonclassified board and amending bylaws.30 On the large class of 
matters where a shareholder vote isn't required, the shareholders can 
pass a precatory resolution asking the directors to take certain actions, 
but the directors need not accede to the request. Most state statutes 
let companies specify in their charters which shares are entitled to 
vote. Nevertheless, most public companies have a single class of com-
mon stock, with each share entitled to one vote. In this article, I as-
sume a one share, one vote structure. 
The matters on which shareholders vote can be roughly divided 
into three areas. First, shareholders can indirectly control the com-
pany's management by electing directors. Second, shareholders must 
approve major changes in the "contract" between managers and 
shareholders through their vote on charter amendments. Third, the 
shareholders must approve major changes in the company's structure, 
such as a merger, sale of substantially all assets, or liquidation. 
The shareholders' actual control in each of these areas is much less 
than recitation of their rights would suggest. Apart from the rare 
proxy fight, directors run unopposed and invariably win. Moreover, 
most directors have closer ties to a company's officers than to its 
shareholders: some are officers themselves; others have business ties to 
the company that make them reluctant to disagree with the CEO; even 
"independent" directors generally serve at the CEO's pleasure. And 
while the Wall Street Rule (if you don't like the management, sell your 
stock) may be gradually dying for shareholders, what can be called the 
"Wall Street Rule for Directors" (if you don't like the management, 
resign) is alive and well.31 
Most charter amendments are routinely approved. In recent years, 
the principal nonroutine proposals have been antitakeover amend-
ments designed to further insulate the directors from shareholder 
oversight. For a merger, the buyer can usually avoid a shareholder 
vote by having the target merge with a subsidiary of the buyer. On the 
29. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211 (election of directors), 242 (charter amend-
ments), 251 (merger), 271 (sale of assets), 275 (liquidation) (1983 & Supp. 1988). 
30. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109(a) (bylaw amendments), 141(k) (removal of 
directors) (1983). 
31. See generally M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971); J. LORSCH & E. 
MACLVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 
(1989). 
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target's side, the shareholders almost always approve a merger or sale 
of assets unless there's a better offer outstanding from a third party.32 
2. Procedural and Cost-Bearing Rules 
In addition to specifying the matters that shareholders vote on and 
the vote required for passage, state law specifies procedural rules for 
conducting the vote. Companies must hold an annual meeting at 
which the shareholders elect directors and vote on any other proper 
business. Directors and, in some states, large shareholders can also 
call a special meeting at any time. 33 State law also establishes mini-
mum notice period (typically 10 days) and quorum (typically one third 
of the outstanding shares) requirements. Most shareholders don't at-
tend the meeting and instead vote by proxy. Proxies are generally rev-
ocable at any time before the vote is taken. 34 
Votes by proxy generally aren't confidential. Thus, a company's 
managers will know who has voted in their favor, subject to any inabil-
ity to trace beneficial holders, and can resolicit shareholders who ha-
ven't voted promanager. Dissidents who use a separate proxy card 
and proxy statement can also identify supporters. But neither side will 
be sure until the meeting is held how any shareholder will vote, be-
cause shareholders can change their votes at any time. Nor will a con-
testant know whether failure to receive a proxy from a particular 
shareholder means that the shareholder has voted against the contest-
ant, or has simply abstained. 
Most state laws give shareholders the right to inspect and copy 
shareholder lists for a "proper purpose." Electing directors or voting 
on other matters germane to the company's business qualifies as such a 
purpose.35 However, companies often contest a dissident share-
holder's right to inspect the list, in an effort to delay release of the list. 
This increases the dissident's costs, and reduces the list's value. 36 
. 32. Section IV.B discusses recent trends away from routine approval of antitakeover 
amendments. 
33. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 21 l(b) (annual meetings), 21 l(d) (special meetings) 
(1983); REv. MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. Acr § 7.02(a)(2) (1984) (ten percent shareholder can call 
a special meeting). 
34. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 212(c) (revocation of proxies), 213 (record date), 216 
(quorum) (1983 & Supp. 1988). 
35. See, e.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1983); General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 240 
A.2d 755 (Del. 1968); Hatleigh Corp. v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 428 A.2d 350 (Del. Ch. 1981). 
36. See, e.g., Trans World Corp. v. Odyssey Partners, 561 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); 
Note, Protecting the Shareholders' Right to Inspect the Share Register in Corporate Proxy Contests 
far the Election of Directors, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 1273 (1977); cases cited infra note 64. In states 
such as New York, which require the requesting shareholder to have a minimum percentage 
holding, see N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 624(b) (McKinney 1986), the Proxy Rules complicate the 
task of obtaining a shareholder list. A request that other shareholders endorse a list request is a 
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A key factor in the frequency with which proxy campaigns are 
begun, and how vigorously they are conducted, is expense reimburse-
ment. The company's board of directors decides, within broad limits, 
which expenses will be reimbursed from the company treasury. The 
board invariably reimburses its own expenses, and never reimburses a 
losing dissident. 37 If the dissident wins a proxy fight at a company 
without a staggered board, the new board will pay the dissident's ex-
penses. 38 If the dissident wins on another matter, the board may, but 
rarely will, pay some or all of the dissident's expenses.39 
B. The Proxy Rules 
The Proxy Rules govern disclosure when proxies are solicited; es-
tablish procedures for proxy solicitation; provide limited access to 
company annual proxy statements for shareholder proposals; and re-
quire companies to mail a dissident's proxy materials to their share-
holders at the dissident's cost or else give the dissident a shareholder 
list. 40 The rules are usually seen as helping shareholders by correcting 
state failure to protect shareholder voting rights.41 That picture, how-
ever, is only a partial one. The Proxy Rules ensure that shareholders 
receive information about voting proposals and provide some valuable 
procedural protections. But they also impose costs, delays, and legal 
risks on shareholder efforts to communicate with each other, if the 
communication is even loosely tied to the prospect of a shareholder 
vote. This section complements the usual picture of the Proxy Rules 
by reviewing the obstacles to shareholder action the Rules create, and 
proxy solicitation, which requires a full proxy statement that must be cleared by the SEC before 
use. Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966). 
37. In theory, managers· can spend corporate funds to inform shareholders of the managers' 
views on a policy conflict, but not to preserve their own positions. In practice, a policy conflict 
can always be found. See M. EISENBERG (1976), supra note.26, at 105-10. 
38. In some states, the board may need shareholder approval to reimburse shareholder ex-
penses, see, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 
(1955); Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (Delaware law), but the approval is 
easy to obtain. 
39. See, e.g., Penn Central Agrees to Pay Former Dissidents $975,000, Wall. St. J., Apr. 23, 
1982, at 24, col. 1 (partial reimbursement of dissidents' expenses for successful opposition to 
Penn Central's proposed acquisition of Colt Industries). 
40. See Exchange Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988); Rules 14a-1 to 14b-2, 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 240.14a-1 to 14b-2 (1990); Schedules 14A, 14B, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-101 to -102 (1990). 
41. See, e.g., w. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIAIS ON CORPORATIONS 278 
(6th ed. 1988) ("Abuses [before adoption of the Exchange Act] were notorious and wide-
spread."); J. CHOPER, J. CoFFEE & c. MORRIS, CASES AND MATERIAIS ON CORPORATIONS 543 
(3d ed. 1989) (noting "enforced ignorance and 'blank check' authorizations" prior to adoption of 
Proxy Rules); 2 L. Loss, SECURmES REGULATION 1027 (2d ed. 1961) ("proxy rules are very 
likely the most effective disclosure device in the SEC scheme"); von Mehren & Mccarroll, The 
Proxy Rules: A Case Study in the Administrative Process, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 728 
(1964). 
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the limited benefits they offer.42 
1. Disclosure and Voting Procedures 
The Proxy Rules require anyone who "solicits" "proxies" from 
shareholders to give each solicitee a written proxy statement contain-
ing various specific disclosures and to clear the proxy statement with 
the SEC before use. There is a narrow exception for solicitations 
by someone other than the company directed to 10 or fewer 
shareholders. 43 , 
The broad reach of the Proxy Rules begins with expansive defini-
tions of "proxy" and "solicitation." The SEC defines "proxy" 
grandly, if none too clearly, as "every proxy, consent or authorization 
within the meaning of section 14(a) of the [Exchange] Act."44 The 
courts have construed this definition expansively to include such 
things as an authorization to request a shareholder list and a request 
for funds by a shareholder committee which, if it gathers enough 
money, may then solicit proxies.45 
The SEC also defines "solicitation" in sweeping terms to include 
not only a request that someone execute, not execute, or revoke a 
proxy, but also "[t]he furnishing of a form of proxy or other communi-
cation to security holders under circumstances reasonably calculated 
to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy."46 
The courts have expansively construed the open-ended terms "other 
communication" and "reasonably calculated." A communication that 
doesn't solicit anything can still be a "solicitation"! The test is 
whether the communication is "part of a continuous plan ending in 
solicitation and which prepare[s] the way for its success."47 The solic-
itation need not be targeted directly at shareholders nor written by the 
solicitor: advertisements urging state takeover of a public utility and 
42. A few commentators, especially J. POUND (1990), supra note 21, have noted the costs 
that the proxy system imposes on shareholders. Easterbrook & Fischel (1983), supra note 10, at 
422-23, note that proxy compliance costs may discourage proxy fights, but their basic view is that 
shareholders are passive, so the Proxy Rules don't matter much one way or the other. Jarrell & 
Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & 
EcoN. 371, 371 n.l (1980), speculate that expanded SEC regulation of proxy fights, beginning in 
1956, made them less viable as a way to change corporate control. 
43. Rule 14a-2(b)(l), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(l) (1990). 
44. Rule 14a-l(f), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-l(f) (1990). Exchange Act§ 14(a) is no more pre-
cise. It tells the SEC to write rules governing how persons may "solicit any proxy or consent or 
authorization in respect of any [registered] security." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988). 
45. See Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966); Canadian Javelin Ltd. v. 
Brooks, 462 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
46. Rule 14a-l(l)(iii), 17 C.F.R. § 240-14a-l(l)(iii) (1990) (emphasis added). 
47. SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1943). 
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story ideas given to the financial press can qualify.48 Nor are the 
Proxy Rules limited to communications by the contestants. A third 
party who proffers voting advice is "soliciting" votes. 49 The cost and 
delay of preclearing such advice effectively bars third parties from pro-
viding voting advice to shareholders. Thus, shareholders can't share 
information gathering costs by buying information from a central 
provider. 
The Proxy Rules can also chill presolicitation efforts by a share-
holder proponent to gauge whether a solicitation is worthwhile. There 
is a "fine line between gauging the market pulse and drumming up 
proxy support," and the company's managers can sue claiming the 
line was crossed before the proponent cleared her proxy materials. so 
Similarly, there is risk in forming a shareholder group with a view to a 
later solicitation, lest the organizing efforts be deemed a solicitation.st 
The preclearance requirements include filing a preliminary proxy 
statement with the SEC at least 10 days before the proposed mailing 
date, to give the SEC staff time to review and, if necessary, object to, 
the proxy materials. Any subsequent written proxy materials must be 
filed with the SEC at least two days before use. Written instructions 
for personal or telephone solicitation must be filed five days in ad-
vance. The written text of speeches, press releases, and radio or TV 
scripts must be filed on the day first made or issued. s2 In general, a 
full proxy statement must precede or accompany any other solicitation 
materials. 53 
For a routine company proxy solicitation, these rules are a minor 
nuisance; indeed, the SEC neither reviews nor requires prefiling of sev-
eral broad categories of routine proxy statements. But for a share-
48. See Long Island Lighting Co. v: Barbash, 779 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1985) (advertisements): 
Trans World Corp. v. Odyssey Partners, 561 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (story ideas). 
49. See Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1964): Broker-
Dealer Participation in Proxy Solicitations, Exchange Act Release No. 7208, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 24,104 (Jan. 7, 1964). Rule 14a-2(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(2) (1990), exempts 
financial advisors who give voting advice to their clients. No major stockbroker gives such ad-
vice, however, perhaps because of the conflicts of interest discussed in section VIII.F. 
SO. Pantry Pride, Inc. v. Rooney, 498 F. Supp. 891, 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also Plant 
Indus. v. Bregman, 490 F. Supp. 265, 267-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
51. Cases involving this issue include Cook United, Inc. v. Stockholders Protective Comm. of 
Cook United, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 96,875 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 
1979); Calumet Indus. v. MacClure, 464 F. Supp. 19, 32 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Scott v. Multi-Amp 
Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 73 (D.N.J. 1974). 
52. Rule 14a-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1990). The time limits can generally be shortened by 
the SEC for "good cause." 
53. Rule 14a-3(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a) (1990). For election contests and solicitations in 
opposition to a prior solicitation, limited solicitation materials can precede the proxy statement, 
but must be filed with the SEC in preliminary form five business days before use. Rules 14a-
ll(e), 14a-12, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-ll(e), 12 (1990). 
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holder proponent, preclearance can be a significant source of delay and 
expense, particularly for a director election campaign, which requires 
special disclosures. Preclearance also injects the SEC staff into the 
middle of a proxy campaign, as arbiter of the information that propo-
nents must include and the truth of the assertions made by the parties. 
Practitioners commonly complain about extensive nitpicking by the 
SEC staff. 54 Some also believe that the staff "approves proxy materials 
for incumbents that a dissident would be unable to clear."55 
Preclearance delay is especially important for a shareholder who 
wants to oppose a management proposal. She must decide to oppose 
the proposal, prepare and preclear proxy materials, mail the materials, 
and get votes back, all in the 30 days or so between the date of the 
company proxy statement and the shareholder meeting date. This is 
no mean feat in the best of circumstances, since 30 days is a practical 
minimum time for beneficial owners to receive proxy materials, often 
through multiple layers of record holders, and send voting instructions 
back through the same channels. 56 
No solicitation, within or without the formal proxy statement, 
written or oral, may 
contain[] any statement which, at the time and in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to 
any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary 
to correct any [prior] statement ... which has become false or 
misleading. 57 
Securities lawyers are so accustomed to this antifraud language that its 
chilling effect on communication gets overlooked. But imagine a polit-
ical campaign where each contestant, and each newspaper comment-
ing on the campaign, had to state a long list of prescribed facts, 
including all "material" facts, avoid misleading anyone, correct any 
prior statements which were no longer accurate, .and preclear every-
thing with a government agency, in an environment where the central 
54. See, e.g., Kempf, Proxy Contest Rules-of-the-Road: A Somewhat Contrarian View (un-
published paper presented at Practising Law Inst., 22d Annual Institute on Securities Regula-
tion, Nov. 2, 1990) (SEC review"ofproxy materials is "little more than officious intermeddling" 
that "stifle[s] legitimate debate"). 
55. Koether, Proxy Contests: Strategies, Tactics and Implications for Investors, in THE FIDU-
CIARY R.EsPONSIBILmES OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (A. Sametz ed. forthcoming 1991) 
[hereinafter FIDUCIARY R.EsPONSIBILITIES]. 
56. Proxy fights aside, the only recent proxy solicitation in opposition to a manager proposal 
was at Honeywell in 1989. The opponents' proxy materials were cleared by the SEC a scant 
seven days before the meeting. See K. v AN NUYS, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN PROXY VOTING: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE 1989 HONEYWELL PROXY FIGHT 4 (University of Rochester Working 
Paper, 1990). 
57. Rule 14a-9(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1990). 
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concept of materiality has only the vaguest of definitions and incum-
bent officials can use public funds to sue their opponents claiming fail-
ure to do any of the above, with no requirement that they show any 
concrete harm. The antifraud proscription may have its place, at least 
for company proxy statements. But it seems serious overkill as ap-
plied to shareholder proponents, when company managers stand ready 
and eager to correct any misstatements that a shareholder might 
make, and overkill especially when applied not just to the core proxy 
statement, but to all written and oral communications. Whether on 
balance the rule is desirable or not, its chilling effect cannot be seri-
ously doubted. 
The cumulation of the broad scope of the Proxy Rules; the re-
quired disclosure items; often unwritten lore on the types of state-
ments to which the SEC staff will object; the antifraud proscription; 
and complex rules, discussed below, on when and how a shareholder 
proposal can be included in the company's proxy statement, makes 
expert (and expensive) legal counsel a must for any shareholder con-
templating any action remotely connected with voting. 
It is a measure of the burden imposed by the Proxy Rules that only 
one independent source, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), pub-
lishes proxy voting advice on a large number of companies, and that 
ISS, having tried and failed to obtain SEC concurrence that its advice 
is exempt from the preclearance rules, has chosen not to preclear its 
materials. 58 Analysis Group also doesn't preclear the voting advice it 
gives to shareholder clients. 59 ISS and Analysis Group are taking the 
risk that the SEC or someone else will sue; they hope, with some rea-
son for optimism, that a court will find preclearance to be an unconsti-
tutional restriction on free speech or, mindful of the constitutional 
issue, will stretch the relevant exemption to cover their conduct. 60 
United Shareholders Association goes even further: it doesn't preclear 
the press releases and newsletters to members its sends out in support 
of its own proposals, made as part of its Target 50 Campaign. 61 
S8. ISS sought SEC staff concurrence that its voting advice was excluded from the Proxy 
Rules underthe Rule 14a-2(b)(2) exemption for voting advice by financial advisors. See Letter 
from SEC Special Counsel Cecelia Blye to ISS General Counsel Nell Minow (Dec. lS, 1988) 
(ISS's voting advice is not exempt from preclearance); Letter from Nell Minow to Cecelia Blye 
(Apr. 4, 1989) (advising the SEC of ISS's intent not to preclear). 
S9. Telephone conversation with James Heard of Analysis Group, Dec. 20, 1989. 
60. For discussion of the tension between the Proxy Rules and the first amendment, see, for 
example, Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L. REV. 223 (1990); 
Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, SS BROOKLYN 
L. REv. S (1989); Wolfson, The First Amendment and the SEC, 20 CONN. L. REV. 26S (1988). 
61. Telephone conversation with United Shareholders Association economic advisor Wayne 
Marr, Nov. lS, 1990. 
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For the most part, we can only speculate about the burden that 
various legal rules place on shareholder action. But the conscious de-
cisions by ISS, Analysis Group, and United Shareholders not to com-
ply with the preclearance rules show that, at least for the Proxy Rules, 
the burden is substantial. That message is reinforced by recent pro-
posals by the California Public Employees' Retirement System 
(CalPERS) and United Shareholders seeking rule changes that would 
reduce proxy compliance costs for shareholder proponents. 62 
2. Shareholder Proposals 
The shareholder proposal rule, Rule 14a-8, gives shareholders 
some rights to use a company's proxy statement to offer proposals for 
other shareholders to vote on at the annual shareholder meeting. 63 
The various limits on shareholder access, however, prevent the rule 
from living up to its potential as a way to reduce and spread the costs 
of collective shareholder action. 
A shareholder proponent can offer only one proposal per year, and 
must submit the proposal to the company about five months before the 
next annual meeting. A proposal must also meet substantive require-
ments, the most important of which are that it must: involve a proper 
subject for shareholder action; not relate to ordinary business opera-
tions or the election of directors; and not conflict with a manager pro-
posal. The net effect of the exclusions is that politically motivated 
shareholders can offer a wide variety of social responsibility proposals 
that most shareholders don't care about, while access is sharply lim-
ited for issues that affect the corporation as a profitmaking institution. 
Rule 14a-8 bars access in three key areas - director nominations; 
statements in opposition to management proposals; and alternatives to 
management proposals. We bear the costs of the social responsibility 
proposals, without the corporate governance benefits that a less re-
strictive rule might bring. 
The niggardliness of Rule 14a-8 doesn't stop with the substantive 
prohibitions. A qualifying proposal must be listed on the company's 
proxy card, and the proponent has 500 words in the proxy statement 
to present a supporting statement. She won't know until after the 
meeting how many votes the proposal has received. In contrast, the 
62. Letter from CalPERS General Counsel Richard Koppes to Linda Quinn, Director, SEC 
Division of Corporation Finance (Nov. 3, 1989), reprinted in 1 PRACTISING LAW INST., 220 
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 298 (1990) [hereinafter CALPERS PROPO-
SAL]; Letter from United Shareholders Assn. Director Ralph Whitworth to SEC Chairman Rich-
ard Breeden (Mar. 20, 1990), reprinted in 1 PRACTISING LAW INST., supra, at 333. 
63. Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8 (1990). Ryan (1988), supra note 12, at 112-18, reviews 
the history of the rule. 
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company's managers can make an opposing statement of any length, 
note their opposition in bold print on the proxy card, spend corporate 
funds to solicit votes against the proposal, and review the ballots as 
they come in and resolicit shareholders who vote for the proposal. 
3. Access to Shareholder Lists 
An important part of any shareholder campaign is identifying the 
shareholders. Here, unfortunately, the Proxy Rules offer little help. 
Rule 14a-7 embodies a "disclose or mail" principle: a company must 
mail a dissident's proxy materials to its shareholders at the dissident's 
expense, or give the dissident a list of record holders. Companies inva-
riably mail the materials themselves~ to avoid disclosing shareholder 
names. Even if a company were to release a shareholder list, the list 
would include neither shareholdings nor the company's list of the 
names and addresses of beneficial owners who haven't objected to hav-
ing their identity disclosed to the company (NOBO list). 64 
For shareholder lists, Rule 14a-7 can fairly be called a "nonaccess" 
rule. It doesn't obstruct shareholder collective action, as such. And 
the SEC's Form 13F disclosure rules for large institutions enable 
shareholder proponents to identify some of their fellow shareholders. 
But Rule 14a-7 represents a missed opportunity for the SEC to level 
the playing field by requiring company managers to share their knowl-
edge of shareholder identities and shareholdings, without the delay 
and lawsuit expense needed to obtain a list under state law. 
C. Disclosure Under Section 13(d) 
Exchange Act section 13(d) and the related SEC rules (13(d) 
Rules) require any person or "group" which beneficially owns more 
than 5% of a public company's stock to file a Schedule 13D containing 
disclosure about the person or group, its stock ownership, its plans 
with respect to the company, and various other matters. A propo-
nent's plans for a voting initiative must be disclosed in a Schedule 13D 
when formed, which will often be before the proxy campaign has be-
gun. Beneficial ownership is defined broadly to include sole or shared 
power to sell or direct the sale of securities, or to vote or direct the 
64. Rules 14a-7, 14b-1, 14b-2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-7, .14b-l, .14b-2 (1990). The states gen-
erally require companies to release NOBO lists in their possession to shareholders, but don't 
require companies to obtain the lists. See, e.g., In re Bohrer v. International Banknote Co., 150 
A.D.2d 196, 540 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1989); Shamrock Assocs. v. Texas Am. Energy Corp., 517 A.2d 
658 (Del. Ch. 1986); Cenergy Corp. v. Bryson Oil & Gas P.L.C., 662 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Nev. 
1987) (Nevada law). See generally Brown, The Shareholder Communication Rules and the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission: An Exercise in Regulatory Utility or Futility?, 13 J. CORP. L. 
683 (1988). 
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voting of securities. 65 
The 13(d) Rules impose a disclosure obligation with attendant cost 
and, more importantly, create legal risk. The company's managers 
can and often will sue claiming misdisclosure of one sort or another, 
usually that the shareholder has concealed her true intent. 66 Mere al-
legation of a concealed intent is usually enough to warrant court-or-
dered discovery.67 Under the 13(d) Rules, like the Proxy Rules, the 
managers need show no concrete harm from the alleged misdisclosure. 
The judicial remedy is often no more than corrective disclosure, but 
the SEC or other shareholders can also seek profit disgorgement, and 
the cost of the suit must be borne win or lose. 6s 
It's unfortunately all too clear that a shareholder consortium 
formed to influence company policy through the voting process is a 
13(d) "group." Congress required 13(d) reporting by "two or more 
persons [who] act as a ... group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, 
or disposing of securities of an issuer."69 This language needs stretch-
ing to reach a consortium formed solely to solicit votes, but the SEC 
has so stretched it. The Commission defines "group" to include "two 
or more persons [who] agree to act together for the purpose of acquir-
ing, holding, voting, or disposing of equity securities. "70 The courts 
have allowed the stretch and have also construed the group concept 
broadly. A group can be formed informally, without written docu-
mentation, and its existence can be proved by circumstantial evi-
dence. 71 A subsidiary question is when a group is formed. Courts 
65. See Exchange Act§ 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988); Rules 13d-l to 13d-7, 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 240.13d-I to 13d-7 (1990); Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1990). The Schedule 
must be filed within 10 days after a shareholder crosses the 5% threshold. Material changes in 
the disclosed information, including a 1 % increase or decrease in percentage ownership, must be 
reported promptly in an amended Schedule 13D. 
66. Macey & Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Process, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 131, 
151-53 (1987), catalog the types of 13(d) claims made by company managers. 
67. See, e.g., Rose, Decision by Federal Judge Stn'/ces Down Much of Chevron '.r Suit Against 
Pennzoil, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1990, at B4, col. 5 (pretrial order allows Chevron to continue 
discovery in its 13(d) suit against Pennzoil "on the chance that [Chevron] may unearth evidence 
of [concealed intent]"). 
68. See, e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1975) (corrective disclo-
sure is adequate remedy); Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 367-68 (1982) (finding violation 
but awarding no damages); SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1229-32 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) (ordering disgorgement). 
69. Exchange Act § 13(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (1988). 
70. Rule 13d-5(b)(l), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(l) (1990) (emphasis added). 
71. On the informal nature of a group, see, for example, Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 
355, 363 (2d Cir. 1982); SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
440 U.S. 913 (1979). On the SEC's power to interpret§ 13(d) to cover voting, see, for example, 
Portsmouth Square, Inc. v. Shareholders Protective Comm., 770 F.2d 866, 871 (9th Cir. 1985); 
Jacobs v. Pabst Brewing Co., 549 F. Supp. 1050, 1065 (D. Del. 1982); Comment, Section 13(d) 
and Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 853 (1971). ' 
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have struggled, with predictable lack of articulable standards, to dis-
tinguish informal formation of a group from preliminary discussions 
over whether to form a group. 72 
The 13(d) Rules thus create a double bind for shareholders who 
own modest individual stakes. If they don't organize, they're unlikely 
to succeed. Organizing also allows cost-sharing, which can reduce the 
incentives for passivity created ·by fractional ownership. If sharehold-
ers do organize, they've formed a group, with attendant reporting re-
quirements and litigation risk. The larger and thus potentially more 
effective the group is, the more burdensome the reporting require-
ments will be. The members of a loose group formed to cosponsor a 
voting proposal may not know each other's goals, nor when other 
members are buying or selling shares. Each member can file its own 
Schedule 13D, but each filing must identify all other group members 
and disclose all information about other filers which "the filing person 
knows or has reason to know."73 
Shareholders who stop short of cosponsorship must still be wary of 
the 13(d) Rules. If a proponent seeks indications of support from a 
few other shareholders before beginning a proxy campaign, has she 
unwittingly formed a group? The only sensible answer legal counsel 
could give is "maybe," which means "don't risk it."74 A proponent 
can safely contact 10 other shareholders under the Proxy Rules, but 
not under the 13(d) Rules. 
There's no hard evidence on how burdensome the 13(d) Rules are 
to institutional shareholders. The Schedule 13D isn't unduly complex, 
so litigation risk is probably a greater concern than direct compliance 
costs. To date, however, institutional shareholders generally haven't 
cosponsored resolutions if doing so would subject them to the 13(d) 
Rules, thus forgoing the cost-sharing benefits that a consortium could 
provide. The College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), say, will 
sponsor a poison pill resolution at Company A, and the Wisconsin In-
vestment Board will sponsor an similar resolution at Company B, but 
CREF and Wisconsin typically won't cosponsor each other's resolu-
tions if their combined holdings exceed 5%. 
Institutions who acquire a 5% stake without "the purpose ... [or] 
effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer" can file 
72. See, e.g., Pantry Pride, Inc. v. Rooney, 598 F. Supp. 891, 899-900 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Scott 
v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 70-72 (D.N.J. 1974). 
73. Rule 13d-l(f)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(f)(2) (1990). 
74. See Connolly & Martin, Legal Restraints Governing Group Activity: Part Il INSIGHTS, 
Apr. 1990, at 16, 19 ("whether activity ..• short of co-sponsoring ••• would constitute group 
activity will depend upon the specific facts and circumstances"). 
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Schedule 13G instead of Schedule 130.75 Schedule 13G calls for less 
information than Schedule 13D and does not need to be filed as 
promptly or amended as often. The Schedule 13G option offers scant 
comfort, however, even for qualifying institutions. The SEC has of-
fered no guidance on what the elastic concept of "influencing control" 
means. Much of what shareholders might want to do, especially any 
.effort to nominate and elect directors, could arguably bar use of 
Schedule 13G.76 There are no cases construing the Schedule 13G eli-
.gibility requirements because when in doubt, shareholders haven't 
tried to use the schedule. But that nonuse only confirms the dubious 
benefits it offers. 
D. Insider Trading Reporting and Liability 
There are two principal sources of insider trading restrictions. Ex-
change Act section 16 requires officers, directors, and 10% beneficial 
owners of public companies to report purchases and sales to the SEC 
and to forfeit any ''.short-swing" profits. And case law under Ex-
change Act section lO(b) prohibits anyone fi;om trading while in pos-
session of material nonpublic information that the person has a duty 
not to disclose or trade on. 
Consider first the 10% shareholder. The shareholder must report 
her purchases and sales every month. Any profits from selling shares 
purchased within 6 months, or repurchasing shares sold within 6 
months, must be forfeited to the company. Onerous matching rules 
can result in forfeiture from a series of trades that, taken together, 
produce no profit. 77 These rules create a strong incentive not to cross 
the 10% threshold. The forfeiture rules greatly reduce a shareholder's 
Jiquidity, and the reporting burden is substantial, especially for a large 
institution which is frequently buying and selling. 
Special factors increase the incentive for particular institutions to 
stay under 10%. Open-end mutual funds must redeem shares on a 
daily basis, and thus need liquidity for much of their portfolios. Pen-
sion fund managers may worry that holding a large illiquid position 
75. Rule 13d-l(b)(l), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(b)(l) (1990); see Exchange Act § 13(g), 15 
U.S.C. § 78m(g) (1988); Schedule 13G, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-102 (1990). 
76. See Connolly & Martin (1990), supra note 74, at 20 (offering the cautious advice that an 
effort to solicit proxies will "generally prevent" use of Schedule 13G, regardless of the purpose of 
the solicitation); Letter from Arthur Loring, General Counsel, Fidelity Investments, to Linda 
Quinn, Director, SEC Div. of Corp. Fin. (July 18, 1990) (proposing that the SEC exclude 13G-
eligible institutions who engage in non-control-related voting activities from 13(d) definition of 
"group"). 
77. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943). 
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could be deemed a breach of fiduciary duty. And pension plan spon-
sors may want to be free to move funds from one asset type to another. 
Uncertainty about who "beneficially owns" shares within the 
meaning of section 16(b) increases the section's chilling effect. Must a 
mutual fund group combine the shares held by individual funds to 
determine if the 10% threshold has been crossed? If a fund group's 
total ownership exceeds 10%, will informationless trading by an index 
fund within the group trigger forfeiture? Must a pension plan sponsor 
that uses several money managers combine the shares held by those 
managers? The SEC has unhelpfully advised investors that beneficial 
ownership depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, and 
warned that "the right to vote or control the voting" of shares is a 
factor tending to show beneficial ownership.78 
A shareholder or group that seeks to nominate and elect directors 
faces obstacles comparable to a 10% shareholder. The SEC, stretch-
ing the case law as is its usual wont, takes the view that an institution 
that has "expressly or impliedly 'deputized' an individual to serve as 
its representative on a company's board of directors" is deemed to be a 
director for both reporting and profit-forfeiture purposes. 79 The Com-
mission hasn't defined how or when deputization takes place, instead 
leaving that "fact-intensive analysis" to case-by-case determination. 80 
If a shareholder group nominates and elects a director, each group 
member risks being deemed to have deputized the director. The mere 
78. Rules Applicable to Insider Reporting and Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 18,114, 4 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1126,062, at 19063-7 (Sept. 23, 1981). The SEC has proposed a complex 
definition of beneficial ownership under § 16 that is better for shareholders in some ways and 
worse in other ways than the current uncertainty. See Exchange Act Release No. 27,148, [1989 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 84,439 (Aug. 18, 1989); Proposed Rule 16a-l, Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 26,013 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l). The proposed rules 
would use the broad 13(d) definition to determine who must file§ 16 reports. Thus, most mutual 
fund groups and pension plan sponsors would have to aggregate their holdings. The rule ex-
cludes, however, shares held in fiduciary accounts by an institution that can file Schedule 13G. 
Thus, an institution can avoid § 16 reporting by remaining passive, thus qualifying to use Sched-
ule 13G. For purposes of profit forfeiture and reporting of individual transactions, as opposed to 
reporting at all, the proposed rules limit beneficial ownership to persons who have a "direct or 
indirect pecuniary interest" in securities. Money manager fees are deemed not a pecuniary inter-
est if they are based on "overall performance over a period of one year or more" and stock in the 
subject company represents 10% or less of the manager's portfolio. Thus, a money manager 
could avoid short-swing liability, and reduce but not eliminate its reporting burden, by diversify. 
ing and structuring its fees properly. 
79. Exchange Act Release No. 26,333, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
11 84,343, at 89,602 (Dec. 2, 1988). The courts have applied the deputization concept for profit 
forfeiture, see, e.g., Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 
396 U.S. 1036 (1970); Lowey v. Howmet Corp., 424 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), but not for 
transaction reporting, see Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 382 F. Supp. 1146, 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), 
affd. on basis of opinion below, 516 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1975). 
80. Exchange Act Release No. 26,333, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
11 84,343, at 89,602 (Dec. 2, 1988). 
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fact that an institution or group nominates a director could suffice to 
establish deputization; we simply don't know, for lack of decided 
cases. 
The deputization principle makes it risky for an institution to nom-
inate anyone as a director, and highly risky to nominate a director 
with a prior connection to the institution. If deputization is found, 
profit forfeiture is automatic: a firm can't avoid liability by insulating 
the director from the people who make investment decisions. The 
principle is also perverse: we presumably want shareholders to talk to 
the directors that they nominate, but if they do, the contacts become 
evidence of deputization. 
A shareholder who nominates and elects directors also faces in-
sider trading risk under section lO(b ). The directors will sometimes be 
privy to material nonpublic information, knowledge of which can be 
imputed to the shareholder. The shareholder can't trade the stock un-
til the nonpublic information is disclosed, and thus loses much of its 
liquidity. A shareholder who violates the trading ban is liable for pri-
vate damage actions and for civil penalties of up to three times its 
profits.81 Under section lO(b), unlike section 16, an institution can try 
to build a Chinese wall between the director and the people making 
buy-sell decisions. But there is no safe harbor that will ensure that the 
wall can withstand a lawsuit. Nor does the wall shield an institution 
from the adverse publicity of being sued. 
An institution may also be liable for insider trading by its employ-
ees. A broker-dealer or investment adviser is liable as a controlling 
person for improper trades by an employee unless it has established 
and enforced "written policies and procedures reasonably designed ... 
to prevent the misuse ... of material, nonpublic information."82 The 
SEC, unhelpful as usual, has offered no guidance on what such policies 
and procedures must include. 
An anecdote may illustrate the burden of the insider trading rules 
for institutional shareholders. Fidelity Investments has generally been 
a leader on corporate governance issues. But Fidelity representatives 
don't sit on corporate boards because this would "cause[ ] a lot oflegal 
problems."83 When Peter Lynch, a Fidelity director and the manager 
of the Fidelity Magellan mutual fund, became a director of W.R. 
81. See Exchange Act §§ 20A, 21A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t-l, 78u-1 (1988). 
82. Exchange Act § 15(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(f) (1988) (broker-dealers); Investment Advisers 
Act § 204A, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4a (1988) (investment advisers); Exchange Act §§ 20(a), 21A, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78t(a), 7~u-1 (1988) (control person liability). 
83. Cowan, A Savvy Outsider Ventures Inside, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1989, at DS, col. 3 (re-
porting views of Fidelity managing director Robert Pozen); see also Clark, Taking a Big Bite, 
INST. INVESTOR, Aug. 1990, at 67, 70 (CalPERS structured its 20% stake in Santa Fe Realty as 
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Grace, Fidelity required all of its funds, not just Magellan, to sell their 
Grace stock. 84 To avoid any risk of short-swing liability, Fidelity also 
keeps the aggregate stock positions of its many funds below 10%. 
E. Liability of Controlling Persons 
Shareholders face additional legal obstacles should they exercise 
"control," often vaguely defined, over corporations. The securities 
laws are a principal but not the only source of these barriers. First, a 
shareholder or group which controls a public company can sell its 
shares only through a registered offering or the "dribble out" provi-
sions of Securities Act Rule 144.85 Registration involves delay, ex-
pense, strict liability for material misstatements, and no assurance that 
registration is even possible, since the company's assistance is needed 
and may not be forthcoming. 
Second, the controlling shareholder is liable for the company's se-
curities law violations. 86 The Securities Act provides an exemption 
from liability if the shareholder "had no knowledge of or reasonable 
ground to believe in the existence of the facts [which create liabil-
ity],"87 and the Exchange Act provides an exemption if the share-
holder "acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce 
the ... violation,"88 but these exemptions offer scant comfort. Both 
are highly context specific, and the shareholder's knowledge or good 
faith will always be judged in hindsight, after a violation has taken 
place. 
The SEC expansively defines control as the ''power to direct ... the 
management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of 
voting securities . . . or otherwise. "89 This definition goes well beyond 
actual control. It's especially perverse for shareholder efforts to nomi-
nate and elect directors. Success in that endeavor can show power to 
direct the company's management and policies, and thus lead to con-
trol person liability. Frequent contact between the director and the 
a limited partnership interest to avoid legal risk from having its own nominees sit on the Santa Fe 
board). 
84. See Cowan (1989), supra note 83. 
85. See Securities Act §§ 2(11), 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(ll), 77d(l) (1988); Rule 144(e)(I), 17 
C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(l) (1990). 
86. In most circuits, this liability is nonexclusive, and a controlling person may also be liable 
for its agents' acts under the common law of agency. See, e.g., In re Atlantic Fin. Mgmt., 784 
F.2d 29, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1986) (collecting cases). 
87. Securities Act § 15, 15 U.S.C.§ 770 (1988). 
88. Exchange Act § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988). 
89. Securities Act Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1990); Exchange Act Rule 12b-2, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1990) (emphasis added). 
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shareholders who nominated her enhances that risk, because it is evi-
dence that the shareholders are exercising, or at least could exercise, 
that power. 
The SEC having defined control broadly, its staff interprets it more 
broadly still. The stanc:Iard practitioner's advice is that a 10% holding 
"should create caution" and might even "creat[e] a rebuttable pre-
sumption of control, especially if such holdings are combined with ex-
ecutive office, membership on the board, or wide dispersion of the 
remainder of the stock."90 Thus, control person liability adds an addi-
tional strong impediment to a shareholder or group owning more than 
10% of a company's stock; doubly so if the 10% shareholders seek to 
nominate and elect directors.91 
Shareholders who are also creditors (banks, insurers, pension 
funds, investment banks) face additional risks if they even arguably 
control a debtor company. Their claims can be subordinated in bank-
ruptcy, or the debtor can sue claiming improper influence over the 
business. 92 Practitioners advise that a claim of control can be founded 
on "holding a significant equity stake in the debtor."93 To determine 
how large a stake represents control, a bankruptcy judge could well 
adopt the 10% or so threshold used in the securities laws. Even a 
small risk of subordination will affect a creditor's negotiating strength. 
Active shareholders face additional risks under the Superfund law, 
which imposes cleanup liability on every "owner or operator" of a 
hazardous waste facility. The term owner or operator isn't defined, 
except to exclude a person who "without participating in the manage-
ment of a ... facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect 
his security interest in the ... facility."94 This implies that sharehold-
90. Sommer, Who's "in Control"?-S.E.C, 21 Bus. LAW. 559, 568 (1966); see also Enstam & 
Kamen, Control and the Institutional Investor, 23 Bus. LAW. 289, 315 (1968) (10% is "rule of 
thumb" for the potential existence of working control). The SEC recently noted the "widely held 
belief that the ownership of 20% ... voting power in a widely held company in most instances 
constitutes control." Exchange Act Release No. 27,035, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,490, 30,492 n.23 (July 
14, 1989). 
91. Investment banks have special reason to avoid even arguable control over a public com-
pany. If the investment bank underwrites the securities of such a company, it loses its due dili-
gence defense and becomes strictly liable for material misstatements. See Securities Act§ ll(b), 
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1988). 
92. On subordination in bankruptcy, see 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1988); Clark, The Duties of the 
Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REv. 505, 517-36 (1977). On creditor liability 
outside bankruptcy, see, for example, Comment, Insights into Lender Liability: An Argument for 
Treating Controlling Creditors as Controlling Shareholders, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1321 (1987); 
Fischel, The Economics of Limited Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131 (1989). 
93. Ranney-Marinelli & Marafioti, Related Legal Issues in Troubled Companies Purchased 
Through LBO's, in FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND HIGHLY LEVERAGED TRANSACTIONS 2 
(1990 Infocast Conference). . 
94. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988) (emphasis added). 
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ers and lenders are liable for Superfund cleanup if they "participate in 
management," whatever that means.95 Finally, various statutes re-
quire regulatory permission before anyone can acquire control of an 
air, rail, or water carrier or a broadcast TV, cable TV, or radio com-
pany, or a 10% interest in an electric or gas utility or an insurer.96 
F. Poison Pills 
Flip-in poison pills with low percentage thresholds are a recent and 
important addition to the obstacles to shareholder voice. Pills are 
adopted by individual companies, but I treat them as a legal restriction 
because state lawmakers have granted corporate managers the unilat-
eral power to adopt pills. It matters little whether state lawmakers 
restrict shareholder action directly or, knowing that corporate manag-
ers will accept the invitation, empower corporate managers to adopt 
restrictions without shareholder approval.97 Almost half of the major 
public companies have adopted pills,98 and the rest can put one in 
place on short notice if the need arises. 
A typical flip-in pill works as follows.99 If any person or group 
acquires beneficial ownership of more than a threshold percentage of a 
company's stock, every other shareholder can buy a large amount of a 
common stock equivalent from the company for a low price. This de-
stroys most of the value of the large shareholder's investment. Com-
95. On shareholder liability, see, for example, New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 
1032, 1042-45 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 
F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); Note, Interpreting the Meaning of 
Lender Management Participation under Section 101 (20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J. 925 
(1989). On lender liability, see, for example, United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 
(11th Cir. 1990). 
96. Enstam & Kamen (1968), supra note 90, collect some of the relevant statutes. For a 
typical insurance law, see N.Y. INS. LAW§§ 1501(a)(2), 1506(a)(2) (McKinney 1985) (control 
presu!lled at 10% ownership; acquisition of control requires superintendent's prior approval). 
97. In about half of the states, corporate statutes have been amended to permit poison pills. 
See Lieberman & Bartell, The Rise in State Anti-Takeover Laws, 23 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES 
REG. 149, 154 n.23 (1990) (compiling statutes). In others, state judges have construed the law to 
permit poison pills. In the few states where judges have disallowed poison pills, legislators have 
quickly overruled them. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-7 (West Supp. 1990) (overruling 
Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., 644 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), ajfd., 825 F.2d 634 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 992 (1987)); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 505(a)(2) (McKinney 
Supp. 1990) (overruling Bank of New York v. Irving Bank, 142 Misc. 2d 145, 536 N.Y.S.2d 923 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.), ajfd. mem., 143 A.D.2d 1075, 533 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1st Dept. 1988)); W1s. STAT. 
ANN. § 180.155 (West Supp. 1990) (rejecting dictum in R.D. Smith & Co. v. Preway Inc., 644 F. 
Supp. 868 (W.D. Wis. 1986)). 
98. See INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR., INC., CORPORATE TAKEOVER DE-
FENSES 1989, at 1447 (1989). 
99. The discussion in text is based on a form of poison pill recommended by Skadden, Arps, 
Slate, Meagher & Flom for consideration by clients. Differences among pills drafted by different 
law firms are usually minor, because the pills are public documents and innovations are quickly 
copied. 
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panies commonly use a 20% threshold percentage, and some go as low 
as 10%, with a strong trend over time to lower thresholds.100 Compa-
nies can also quickly lower the threshold if a large shareholder 
emerges. Moreover, some pills let the company's board of directors 
retroactively reduce the threshold, commonly to 10%, by declaring a 
shareholder to be an "adverse person."101 Institutional fiduciaries 
can't take even a small risk of triggering a poison 'pill. The downside 
risk is simply too great. Thus, the pill is a near-absolute barrier to 
forming a shareholder group larger than the threshold percentage for 
any voting purpose. 
Pills define beneficial ownership and "group" status at least as 
broadly as the 13(d) Rules. Beneficial ownership includes the right to 
vote shares, except pursuant to a revocable proxy given in response to 
a public solicitation that complies with SEC rules. The company's 
board of directors, hardly a disinterested body, decides questions 
about a shareholder's level of beneficial ownership or the existence of a 
group. Delaware case law permits use of a pill against a group formed 
solely to conduct a proxy contest, so long as the target's board "could 
... have reasonably concluded" that the pill wouldn't "materially im-
pair" the dissidents' chances.102 
Poison pills put even shareholder proponents who stay below the 
threshold percentage at risk. Proponents must be doubly careful to 
comply with the Proxy Rules and the 13(d) Rules, lest the proxies they 
receive count toward the pill's threshold percentage. The judicial rem-
edy for violating the Proxy Rules or the 13(d) Rules is often only cor-
rective disclosure. The pill dramatically escalates the cost of a 
violation, or a decision to test the outer limits of the SEC's broad defi-
nitions of solicitation, proxy, or group. 
G. Ownership Limits 
In a variety of ways, banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, 
and investment banks - most of the major categories of institutional 
investors - are limited in how much of a company's stock they can 
own. Mark Roe has catalogued most of these restrictions, so a brief 
100. Of333 poison pills adopted or amended in 1989, 25 had a 10% threshold, 53 had a 15% 
threshold, 200 had a 20% threshold, and 55 had a 25% or higher threshold (all percentages 
rounded to nearest 5%). CORP. CONTROL ALERT, Dec. 1989, at 10-26; cf. N.Y. Bus. CORP. 
LAW§ 505(a)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1990) (minimum 20% threshold). 
101. See CORP. CONTROL ALERT, Dec. 1989, at 10-26 (71 of 333 pills contain adverse person 
provision). 
102. Stahl v. Apple Bancorp., 1990 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 95,412 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 
1990) (emphasis added). 
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summary should suffice.103 
Banks face tight restrictions on stock ownership. Outside of their 
trust departments, they can't own stock at all, and bank holding com-
panies can own only 5% of the voting stock of an operating company. 
As a result, banks own puny amounts of stock. Citicorp, with total 
assets of over $200 billion, holds about $1 billion in equities, including 
preferred stock and nonvoting common stock. Other banks own even 
less.104 Savings and loans are forbidden to own any common stock. 105 
Bank trust departments aren't directly barred from holding large 
stakes. No more than 10% of a bank's trust funds can be invested in 
the stock of a single company, but the trust would surely be this diver-
sified anyway. The prohibition on direct bank control, however, limits 
what the bank can do with a large stake, and thus reduces incentives 
to acquire such a stake. The common use of a Chinese wall between a 
bank's loan and trust departments protects the trust department 
against conflict of interest and insider trading risk, but further reduces 
the bank's influence and thus its incentives to take a major position. 
For insurance companies, common stock typically does not count 
toward required regulatory capital or surplus at all. 106 Insurers can 
purchase stock out of excess capital and surplus but face limits on the 
percentage of these funds that they can invest in stocks, and tighter 
limits on how much they can invest in the stock of a single company. 
Mutual funds face tough conflict of interest rules if they exceed 5% 
ownership of a company or put a representative on a company's board 
of directors. Moreover, to call itself diversified and retain critical tax 
advantages, a mutual fund cannot, for 75% of its assets, put over 5% 
of total assets into the stock of a single company, nor own more than a 
10% stake in a company. Open-end funds must also stand ready to 
redeem shares on short notice, which limits their ability to take con-
centrated, illiquid positions. 107 
Investment banks can own stock, even a control block. But their 
broker-dealer subsidiaries, which hold most of their capital, face SEC 
103. Roe (forthcoming 1991), supra note 19. I will give citations only for rP.Strictions not 
documented by Roe. 
104. See Guenther, Breaking Barriers: Bankers Trust Leads Way for Major Banks in Im•est-
ment Banking, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1989, at Al, col. 6. 
105. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. 
101-73, §§ 222 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 183le), 301 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1464), 103 Stat. 183, 
269, 277 (1989). 
106. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 1402 (McKinney (1985); CAL. INS. CODE § 1170 (West 
1972). 
107. Investment Company Act § 22(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (1988), requires redemption 
within 7 days, but most mutual funds promise in their prospectus to redeem securities on a daily 
basis. 
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net capital rules that require a 30% "haircut" from market value for 
all common stocks, a 45% haircut on positions in a single company 
that exceed 10% of net capital, and a 100% haircut on a block that 
has no ready market.108 Broker-dealers are usually highly leveraged 
off a limited net capital base, so these haircuts sharply limit their eq-
uity investments. 
Pension funds, alone of the major financial institutions, have no 
direct limit on how much stock they can own, nor on the percentage 
stake they can have in a particular institution. They are limited in 
other ways, however, as discussed in the next section. 
H. Fiduciary Liability 
The liability of corporate pension plan fiduciaries under the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (BRISA), 109 and of public 
pension plan fiduciaries under the common law of trusts, affect share-
holder action in a number of intersecting ways. The prevailing watch-
word, though, is caution. Broad diversification and passivity are safe; 
concentrated ownership and activism are dangerous. 110 
Under BRISA, pension plan managers must act for the exclusive 
benefit of plan participants, or face civil and criminal liability. They 
are enjoined to exercise "the care, skill, prudence, and diligence . . . 
[of] a prudent man acting in a like capacity," and to "diversify[] ... so 
as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless ... it is clearly prudent 
not to do so."111 Diversifying widely, owning small percentage stakes 
in hundreds or even thousands of companies, is safe, since it is what 
others "in a like capacity" are doing. In contrast, owning large stakes 
in a smaller number of companies, which could increase the gains 
from monitoring, is risky because it isn't what others are doing, and 
doesn't "minimize" the risk of "large losses." 
Finance texts teach that 95% of the value of diversification is 
gained by owning only 20 properly chosen stocks; 99% by owning 100 
stocks.112 A large loss on one investment will likely be offset by a large 
108. Rule 15c3-l(c)(2)(vi)-(vii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-l(c)(2)(vi)-(vii) (1990). 
109. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988); see also I.R.C. §§ 401-419A (1988). 
110. See generally B. KRIKORIAN, FIDUCIARY STANDARDS IN PENSION AND TRUST FUND 
MANAGEMENT (1989); Krikorian, Fiduciary Standards for Institutional Investors: Overview and 
Current Issues, in FIDUCIARY REsPONSIBILmES (forthcoming 1991), supra note 55; B. LoNG-
STRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE (1986). Ex-
cept where specifically noted, I treat both corporate and public pension plans as subject to the 
same rules, because BRISA borrows heavily from the common law of trusts and because public 
plan managers, though not formally subject to BRISA, will be reluctant to depart from ERISA's 
codification of fiduciary duties. 
111. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988). 
112. See, e.g., R. BREALEY & s. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 156 (3d ed. 
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gain on another. But that may not matter to a court or agency which, 
with selective hindsight, sees only the large loss. Indeed, the common 
law of trusts traditionally applied the prudence standard to each indi-
vidual investment, not to the portfolio as a whole, and is only now 
beginning to recognize portfolio investing.113 Under BRISA, Labor 
Department rules require fiduciaries to consider portfolio diversifica-
tion in making investment decisions. But the Department gives diver-
sification its "customary meaning" as a means for "reducing the risk 
of large [individual] losses," not its modern meaning as a way to re-
duce portfolio risk. 114 In practice, courts haven't always offset losses 
against gains.115 
As for passivity, the Labor Department insists that BRISA fiducia-
ries treat voting rights as a plan asset. This requires that the pension 
plan vote its shares, instead of abstaining, and do so for the exclusive 
benefit of plan beneficiaries. 116 But the Department has not en-
couraged shareholders to make their own proposals, as opposed to 
merely voting on proposals made by others. Assistant Secretary of 
Labor David Walker recently warned: 
[P]roactive efforts by pension plans should be pursued with caution. 
They must also be in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries, 
cost beneficial, and otherwise consistent with BRISA .... Any attempts 
on behalf of shareholders to micromanage would likely be counter-pro-
ductive and normally would not be cost-beneficial in any event. 117 
The Labor Department has been silent on the basic question of 
whether an BRISA fiduciary can ever spend plan money to promote a 
1988); T. CoPELAND & J. WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE POLICY 185-86 (3d 
ed. 1988). 
113. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 213 (1959) (gain from one breach of 
trust should not be offset against loss from another "distinct" breach) with RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227(a) (Proposed Final Draft Apr. 6, 1990) (prudent investor standard 
should be applied to trust portfolio, not to individual investments seen in isolation); see also 
Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52, 
66-67 (1987) (traditional trust law requires that "each investment •.. measured in isolation" be 
safe). 
114. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,221, 37,223 (1979); see also id. at 37,224 n.7 (index funds must use a 
"screen or filter process" to exclude companies that have suffered "significant, adverse financial 
developments," even if the companies are still in the index). The portfolio diversification rules 
are in 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l(b) (1990). 
115. See Leigh v. Engle, 858 F.2d 361, 367-68 (7th Cir. 1988). 
116. See Letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor Alan Lebowitz to Helmuth Fandl, 
Avon Products Inc., 15 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 391 (Feb. 23, 1988) [hereinafter Avon Products Let-
ter]; Letter from Alan Lebowitz to Institional Shareholder Services President Robert Monks, 17 
Pens. Rep. (BNA) 244 (Jan. 23, 1990) [hereinafter Monks Letter]; accord, O'Neill v. Davis, 721 
F. Supp. 1013 (N.D. Ill. 1989). The SEC is considering similar rules for mutual funds. See 
Kathryn McGrath, Remarks to the 1989 Mutual Funds and Investment Management Conference 
15 (SEC News Release, Mar. 13, 1989). 
117. Walker, A Public Interest Perspective, in PROXY VOTING OF PENSION PLAN EQUITY 
SECURITIES 122, 125 (D. McGill ed. 1989). 
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shareholder proposal. The danger that a court might find the cam-
paign cost to be money imprudently spent may explain why no BRISA 
fiduciary, to my knowledge, has ever offered a proposal. Public pen-
sion funds have made proposals, but they aren't governed by BRISA. 
Nor do we know whether a fund can spend money to defend a lawsuit 
by the company, sue the company if need be in furtherance of a propo-
sal, or, worse yet, pay an adverse judgment out of plan assets. Yet 
litigation is always a risk for an active shareholder. 
A further obstacle to owning a large stake in a single company or 
actively monitoring company managers is the received trust law wis-
dom that active management of an operating business violates the pru-
dent investor rule. 118 It isn't clear that oversight of someone else's 
management violates this rule, or even that the rule is still good law.119 
But counsel can't advise pension trustees how much involvement is 
safe. 
If an BRISA fiduciary loses a fiduciary duty lawsuit, she must pay 
the loss personally, including legal fees; the plan can neither reimburse 
nor insure against these costs. 120 The fiduciary can insure separately, 
but this is small comfort to individuals who may lack the wherewithal 
to do so. Criminal liability for willful violation of any provision of 
BRISA provides an additional reason for caution, 121 though the risk of 
actual prosecution is low. 
Bank trust officers are bound by the common law of trusts, and 
thus have incentives for caution similar to pension plan managers. 
Moreover, if a bank lends funds to a company in which it owns stock 
as a trustee, a trust beneficiary can claim that the bank's voting actions 
were tainted by a conflict of interest, and benefited the bank's loan 
position rather than its stock position. To avoid this risk, as well as 
claims that the bank, as lender, was privy to inside information that 
informed its stock trading decisions, b~nks commonly build a Chinese 
wall between the lending and trust departments. The wall, however, 
interferes with effective monitoring and doesn't offer complete protec-
118. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 Comment f (1959) ("the following are 
not proper trust investments: ... employment of trust property in the carrying on of trade or 
business"). 
119. The REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (Proposed Final Draft Apr. 6, 1990) 
does not include the ban on active management found in the Restatement (Second). 
120. See 29 U.S.C. § 1110 (1988); Leigh v. Engle, 858 F.2d 361, 369 (7th Cir. 1988). In a 
suit by the Labor Department for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, there is also a (proba-
bly uninsurable) penalty of20% of the amount recovered, whether through settlement or judicial 
decree. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(/) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 2101, 101 Stat. 2123 (1990)). 
121. See 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (1988). 
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tion. Passivity is safer: It's easier to find a conflict in what the bank 
does than in what it doesn't do. 
I. State Antitakeover Laws 
Most states have antitakeover laws that restrict shareholder voting 
power to some degree. A few have recently adopted statutes that 
sharply restrict shareholder power. This may reflect an emerging 
trend in the 1990s, as the states, with hostile takeovers fading and in-
stitutional voting power growing as a threat to local companies and 
their managers, turn their attention to proxy contests. This section 
surveys the principal types of statutes. 
From a shareholder voting perspective, freeze laws are the least 
troublesome of the major types of antitakeover laws. These statutes 
prohibit mergers and other business combinations with an "interested 
shareholder" for three to five years after the shareholder acquires 
stock above a threshold level, usually 10-15% of the outstanding 
shares. They provide a further reason for shareholders not to buy 
large blocks, but don't otherwise greatly affect shareholder voting. 122 
Disclosure laws, adopted by 21 states, require a shareholder or group 
that owns more than a threshold percentage (typically 5%) to file a 
disclosure form with the state in addition to the Schedule 13D federal 
filing. These laws add modestly to the disclosure and litigation risk 
burden created by the 13(d) Rules.123 
Control share laws, adopted in at least 27 states, have a greater 
chilling effect on shareholder action. They typically deprive a person 
or group that acquires a 20% stake from voting any shares over the 
20% threshold unless the other shareholders vote to restore voting 
rights at a special shareholder meeting. 124 The 20% holder must pay 
the company's expenses for holding the special meeting. Some statutes 
also prohibit acquisition of shares over the 20% threshold without the 
prior consent of the other shareholders;125 some limit which share-
holders can vote to restore voting rights in an effort to make a 
122. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 
(McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1990). 
123. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§§ 1600-1613 (McKinney 1986). Lieberman & Bartell 
(1990), supra note 97, at 150 n.4, compile the statutes. 
124. See, e.g., NASAA-ABA MODEL CONTROL SHARE Ac:r, reprinted in 20 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) 708 (1988); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (West 1989); Gruber, Patzik & 
Choate, The Model Control Share Statute of the North American Securities Administrators Associ-
ation, 44 Bus. LAW. 577 (1989). Sroufe & Gelband, Business Combination Statutes: A "Mean-
ingful Opportunity" for Success?, 45 Bus. LAW. 891, 891 n.3 (1990), compile the statutes. 
125. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(A) (Baldwin 1986). 
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favorable vote harder to obtain.126 
Control share laws typically adopt the broad 13(d) definition of 
"group," which covers voting groups.127 Thus, a shareholder consor-
tium can't cross the 20% threshold. Some states exclude voting ,power 
obtained through a proxy solicitation governed by the Proxy Rules, 
but others don't. Without this exclusion, a shareholder proponent 
could arguably lose voting rights if she gains more than 20% support, 
which - Catch 22 - will happen for any successful proposal.128 
A few states have recently adopted more extreme antishareholder 
laws. Massachusetts, for example, recently required public companies 
to have staggered boards.129 Employees also receive "tin parachute" 
severance benefits if terminated within one year after a proxy fight.130 
A new Pennsylvania "disgorgement" law requires any shareholder or 
group who acquires a 20% stake in a Pennsylvania company, or dis-
closes that it "may seek to acquire control ... through any means," to 
disgorge any profits from selling shares for 18 months thereafter, if the 
shares were bought up to 24 months before the attempt. "Control" is 
defined using the broad SEC definition discussed in section III.E. 
Thus, a shareholder effort to nominate and elect directors may fore-
close liquidity for 18 months, even if the effort fails! 131 Pennsylvania 
also has a "cash-out" law that requires any person or group which 
acquires 20% voting power in a public company to offer to buy all 
other shares at a court-determined fair price. The law has no excep-
tion for voting power obtained by soliciting proxies. In theory, anyone 
who receives 20% support in an election contest must offer to buy out 
all other shareholders!132 
126. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § l 701.0l(Z)(3)(CC)(2) (Baldwin 1986); 15 PA. CoNS. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 2562-2563 (Purdon Supp. 1990). 
127. See, e.g., NASAA-ABA MODEL CoNTROL SHARE ACT, supra note 124, § 3(a). Some 
statutes, such as IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 (West 1989), leave "group" undefined, but a re-
viewing court is likely to adopt the SEC definition. 
128. Compare NASAA-ABA MODEL CONTROL SHARE ACT, supra note 124, § 3(e)(3)(K) 
(excluding voting rights obtained through a proxy solicitation) with IND. CODE ANN.§ 23-1-42-2 
(West 1989) (no comparable exclusion); see NASAA-ABA MODEL CONTROL SHARE ACT, supra 
note 124, commentary to § 3(e)(3)(K) ("Without such an exclusion, ordinary proxy solicitations 
would regularly result in a control share acquisition by the soliciting person in acquiring th.e 
power to direct the exercise of voting power of 20% or more."). 
129. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 50A (West Supp. 1990). After January l, 1992, 
the shareholders can opt out, but only by an impossible-to-obtain vote of two thirds of the out-
standing shares. 
130. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 184 (West Supp. 1990). 
131. 1990 Pa. Laws 36 (to be codified at 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2573-2574); see also 
1990 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-222, 5-239 (Baldwin) (to amend OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 1707.043) 
(18-month disgorgement period; limited exception for bona fide attempt to acquire control). 
132. 1990 Pa. Laws 36 (to be codified at 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2541-2548); see also 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910 (1990) (cash-out law with 25% threshold). Pennwalt 
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Many states combine multiple antitakeover laws. For example, 
Pennsylvania has freeze, disclosure, control share, and tin parachute 
laws in addition to the disgorgement and cash-out laws discussed 
above; Ohio has freeze, disclosure, control share, and disgorgement 
laws. 133 Some laws nominally apply to companies incorporated else-
where that meet specified nexus requirements. These laws are proba-
bly unconstitutional, but the need to challenge them adds to a 
shareholder's litigation burden. 134 
In sum, state antitakeover laws further burden the process of 
shareholder collective action. They affect all types of shareholder ac-
tion, and make it especially hard for shareholders to nominate and 
elect directors, even to a minority of board seats. Moreover, if share-
holders gain power at the polls, the states - acting out of some combi-
nation of concern for employees and communities and accession to 
managers' lobbying and campaign contributions - may act to pre-
serve the managers' autonomy. The states can change structural rules 
(e.g., require a staggered board; reduce the vote needed to adopt a 
manager proposal135); create roadblocks for active shareholders; or cut 
back shareholder rights, such as power to call a special meeting or act 
by written consent.136 
J. Antitrust Concerns 
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act and accom-
panying Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rules requires large share-
holders to file a disclosure form with the FTC and the Department of 
Justice, pay a $20,000 filing fee, and receive FTC approval before buy-
Corp. v. Centaur Partners, 710 F. Supp. 111 (E.D. Pa. 1989) holds that the Pennsylvania cash-
out law is triggered by execution of shareholder consents to call a special shareholder meeting. 
133. See 1990 Pa. Laws 36 (amending 15 PA. CONS. STAT.§§ 2551-2567, 2581-2582); 70 PA. 
CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 71 (Purdon Supp. 1990); 1990 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-222 (amending OHIO 
REv. CooE. ANN. §§ 1701.831, 1704.01-07, 1707.043). 
134. See, e.g., Tyson Foods, Inc. v. McReynolds, 865 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding Ten-
nessee antitakeover law unconstitutional as applied to out-of-state corporation); TLX Acquisi· 
tion Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (holding Oklahoma antitakeovcr 
law unconstitutional as applied to out-of-state corporation). 
135. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1914(a) (Purdon Supp. 1990) (adopted 1988) 
(charter amendments can be approved by a majority of the votes cast; most states require a 
majority of the outstanding shares); Garrity, Some Distinctive Features of the New Pennsylvania 
Business Corporation Law, 45 Bus. LAW. 77 n.146 (1989) (observing that Honeywell's unsuccess-
ful antitakeover amendments would have passed under the Pennsylvania rule). 
136. On the political forces behind the passage of state antitakeover statutes, see Romano, 
The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 13 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987). On the shareholder 
wealth effects of the statutes, see, for example, Karpoff & Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of Sec-
ond Generation State Takeover Legislation, 25 J. FIN. EcoN. 291 (1989); Ryngaert & Netter, 
Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Ohio Antitakeover Law, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 373 (1988); 
Schumann, State Regulation of Takeovers and Shareholder Wealth: The Case of New York's 1985 
Takeover Statutes, 19 RAND J. EcoN. 557 (1988). 
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ing more than 15% or $15 million, whichever is less, of a public com-
pany's stock.137 There are exemptions for (i) purchases of up to 10% 
of a company's stock made "solely for the purpose of investment"; (ii) 
purchases by institutional investors solely for the purpose of invest-
ment and in the ordinary course of business, up to the greater of 15% 
or $25 million; and (iii) all purchases by public pension funds. 138 
The key term "solely for the purpose of investment" is defined so 
narrowly that anything a shareholder does, beyond passively voting 
shares, could require a filing. The purchaser must have "no intention 
of participating in the formulation, determination, or direction of the 
basic business decisions of the issuer."139 The FTC has listed, as activ-
ities that "could be ... viewed" as inconsistent with investment pur-
pose: "(1) Nominating a candidate for the board of directors of the 
issuer; (2) proposing corporate action requiring shareholder approval; 
[and] (3) soliciting proxies .... " 140 A senior FTC official recently 
warned that the FTC construes the exemption "very narrowly" to ap-
ply only to "passive investors," and is "closely scrutiniz[ing]" institu-
tional efforts to become active shareholders.141 The concept of an 
active investor, it seems, isn't in the FTC's vocabulary. 
For the moment, Hart-Scott-Rodino is only a minor barrier to 
large shareholder purchases or formation of shareholder groups. In-
stitutions that make shareholder proposals don't file the Hart-Scott-
Rodino forms, and the FTC hasn't yet prosecuted them. There is no 
private right of action for failure to file, nor a vague concept of group 
ownership to impede joint shareholder efforts. But the FTC could re-
quire active shareholders to file at any time, especially if the share-
holders begin to nominate director candidates. Compliance, if 
required, would still be a one-time event, and could become routine 
since institutional purchases only weakly implicate the antitrust con-
cerns underlying the filing requirement. But the $20,000 per company 
137. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1988); Act of 
Nov. 21, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 605, 103 Stat. 988, 1031 (filing fee); 16 C.F.R. §§ 801-803 
(1990) (FfC rules). 
138. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(9) (1988) (investment intent exemption); 16 C.F.R. § 802.64 
(1990) (institutional investor exemption); 16 C.F.R. § 801.l(a)(2) (exempting state agencies, 
which include public pension funds). The FTC proposed in 1989 to exempt all purchases of up 
to 10% of an issuer's voting stock without regard to intent, 54 Fed. Reg. 7960 (Feb. 24, 1989), 
but doesn't plan to adopt the proposal. 
139. 16 C.F.R. § 801.l(i)(l) (1990). 
140. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,450, 33,465 (1978). 
141. Prepared Remarks of John Sipple, Chief, FTC Premerger Notification Office, before the 
Antitrust Law Section of the New York State Bar Association 15, 16, 19 (Jan. 16, 1990). The 
FTC has set up a special project to examine the investment intent exception, including whether it 
should apply to active institutional shareholders. Telephone conversations with John Sipple 
(Aug. 24, 1990) and Kenneth Libby (an FTC attorney working on the project) (Dec. 20,. 1990). 
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filing fee is a significant deterrent for a large institution which might 
have to file for all portfolio companies. 
If institutional shareholders nominate and elect their own directors 
on a broad scale, the Clayton Act section 8 ban on any "person" being 
a director of two competing companies creates an additional antitrust 
hurdle. 142 It's easy for the same individual not to serve on the boards 
of competing companies. But the interlock ban may also prevent an 
institution from deputizing two individuals to represent it on the 
boards of competing companies.143 How deputization would be deter-
mined is unclear; the FTC wants to use the vague standards applied 
under Exchange Act section 16.144 
K. Tainted Votes 
In many proxy contests, corporate managers will receive votes 
from shares they don't personally own, for reasons unrelated to the 
merits of the proposal. The managers can often increase in midcontest 
the number of votes in their pocket, should the need arise. This sec-
tion catalogs the ways in which managers can obtain such tainted 
votes. First, managers can put pressure on institutional investors to 
vote promanager for reasons unrelated to the merits of the proposal. 
The conflicts of interest that make such pressure effective are explored 
in Part VIII. 
Second, under New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules, stockbro-
kers who hold shares in street name for their clients can vote those 
shares on routine matters unless the client gives them voting instruc-
tions at least 10 days before the meeting. They can't vote client shares 
if they know of a contest, nor on a merger or other matter "which may 
affect substantially the rights of privileges of such stock."145 Operat-
ing under this vague standard, the NYSE lists in a weekly bulletin the 
matters on which member firms may vote client shares. Brokers inva-
riably vote client shares promanager. 
142. See 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1988). 
143. The government made this argument to the district court in United States v. Cleveland 
Trust Co., 392 F. Supp. 699, 711-12 (N.D. Ohio 1974), ajfd., 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1975). The 
FTC repeated it in an advisory opinion, 97 F.T.C. 933, 935 (1981), and the Justice Department 
objected in 1981 to United Automobile Workers representatives sitting on both the Chrysler and 
American Motors boards, Letter from Assistant Attorney General Sanford Litvack to counsel 
for the UAW, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 50,425 (Feb. 26, 1981). Areeda & Turner endorse the 
government's view that the Clayton Act bars such indirect interlocks. 5 P. AREEDA & D. TUR-
NER, ANTITRUST LAW§ 1304 (1978). • 
144. See United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 392 F. Supp. 699, 711 (N.D. Ohio 1974). 
145. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL~ 402.06(0) (looseleaf 
1990); see also 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) ~~ 9528-9529; National Association of Securities 
Dealers, Rules of Fair Practice art. III,§ 1, Interpretation .05, NASD Manual (CCH) ~ 2151.05. 
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Usually, this rule simply pads the affirmative vote on routine mat-
ters. Unfortunately, the NYSE staff takes an expansive view of what 
matters are routine. Increasing authorized common stock is consid-
ered routine, as is eliminating director liability for violating the duty of 
care. A manager proposal to eliminate cumulative voting is routine; a 
shareholder proposal to reinstate it is not.146 The NYSE staff can also 
be incredibly ignorant; it has more than once authorized a promanager 
vote despite a well-publicized proxy fight. 147 Even when the NYSE 
instructs brokers not to vote client shares on a particular matter, en-
forcement is nonexistent, and anecdotal evidence suggests that brokers 
sometimes vote when they shouldn't. Moreover, abstaining on a 
shareholder proposal, as the NYSE requires, has the same effect as a 
promanager vote if the proposal requires a percentage of the outstand-
ing shares for passage or if the· company treats abstentions as "no" 
votes, as many do. 
Third, commercial banks, which also hold stock as nominees, can 
vote client shares on any matter, subject only to the bank's fiduciary 
duty to its clients. Banks, like broker-dealers, routinely vote 
promanager. 
Fourth, company proxy cards invariably provide that shareholders 
who simply sign the card have voted for the managers' choice on all 
issues presented. Some shareholders simply sign and return the card, 
never having read the proxy statement. The rational apathy that leads 
to such voting is hard to control, but legal rules tum apathy into a 
promanager vote. 148 
Fifth, the managers tabulate the ballots, or at least appoint the tab-
ulators. Even if the tabulators are basically honest, the complex sys-
tem of proxy voting, where shareholders vote through layers of record 
, holders and votes can be repeatedly cast and revoked, produces many 
ballots that can be either counted or thrown out as irregular, and some 
where the number of votes cast is unclear. The tabulators must exer-
cise discretion, and experience teaches that they exercise that discre-
tion in the managers' favor more often than not. 149 
146. Compare, e.g., New York Stock Exchange, Weekly Bulletin (Mar. 30, 1990) with INST. 
SHAREHOLDER SERVS., PROXY ANALYSIS INDEX: VOLUME V - 1990. 
147. See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange, Weekly Bulletin (Mar. 30, 1990) (authorizing 
promanager votes for American General Corp. and Armstrong World Industries despite ongoing 
proxy fights). 
148. See, e.g., Gavin, Changes in Corporate Control and Governance Communicated Through 
Proxy Power, in FIDUCIARY REsPONSIBILmES (forthcoming 1991), supra note 55 ("The primary 
objective in the timing of [proxy contest] mailings is to have the first and last proxy card in the 
mail. This deals with those shareholders who only sign the first card as well as those who sign 
every card, no matter who the sender."). 
149. Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988), provides a good example. 
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Sixth, managers can put blocks of stock in friendly hands, even in 
midcontest. Polaroid, for example, recently defeated a hostile bid by 
issuing a 14% block to an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) and 
selling a large block of voting preferred stock to Corporate Partners, a 
white squire fund, on terms highly favorable to Corporate Partners. 150 
Finally, managers can vote some shares that they don't own. Cor-
porate pension plans usually own at least some stock in the sponsoring 
company. Company managers usually can ensure that these shares 
are voted promanager; some vote the shares themselves. Contrast this 
with the usual rule that treasury shares and shares held by subsidiaries 
can't vote. 151 Similarly, ESOP trustees, who are often company man-
agers, can vote unvested ESOP shares. Unvested ESOP shares were 
an important factor in the 1990 Lockheed proxy fight. 152 Moreover, 
some companies have standstill agreements with large shareholders 
under which the shareholder agrees to vote promanager on all or at 
least some matters.1s3 
L. Cultural Factors 
Informal, cultural barriers compound the formal legal obstacles to 
shareholder action. Money managers don't keep on their desks an ex-
tensive description of the many relevant legal rules. A few have so-
phisticated legal counsel; many do not. They operate instead on a 
developed sense of proper and improper behavior. For most, trying to 
out-trade the next money manager is the norm; trying to improve per-
formance by being a good corporate monitor is not. Taking market 
The tabulators chose a procedure for interpreting multiple ballots by record holders that they 
had been told orally was incorrect by a representative oflndependent Election Corp. of America, 
which handles voting for many record holders. The chosen procedure swung the vote in the 
managers' favor. The court upheld the tabulators' choice as reasonable. 
150. See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989). A mid· 
contest issuance is likely to be upheld, the cases suggest, if the transaction is at arms-length and 
the voting power is reasonably related to the price paid for the stock. Compare, e.g., Shamrock 
Holdings, 559 A.2d at 278; British Printing & Communication Corp. v. Harcourt Brace Jova-
novich, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (upholding sale of stock to investment bank); 
and Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987) (same) with, e.g., Unilever 
Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (enjoining divi-
dend of supervoting stock which loses most of its votes upon transfer) and Packer v. Yampol, 
C.A. No. 8432 (Del. Ch. 1986) (enjoining company's sale of supervoting stock to its CEO). 
151. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(c) (1984); REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr 
§ 7.21 (1984). A non-ESOP pension plan can invest up to 10% of its assets in employer securi-
ties, and can own up to 25% of the employer's common stock. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2), (d)(5), 
(f)(l) (1988). 
152. See INST. SHAREHOLDER SERVS., Issue Alert, May 1990, at 6. 
153. Cummins Engine, for example, recently sold a 27% stake to three other companies 
under a six-year standstill agreement that binds the other companies to vote for Cummins' direc· 
tor nominees. See Cowan, Cummins Will Sell 27% Stake, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1990, at DI, col. 
6. 
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risk is the norm; taking legal risk is not. For index fund managers, 
keeping costs to a minimum is expected; spending money on corporate 
governance issues is not. For pension fund sponsors, being highly di-
versified is customary; taking concentrated positions is not. If the 
legal rules were changed, cultural norms might change too, but only 
slowly. 
Some money managers also believe that legal obstacles are stronger 
than they really are.154 Pension fund managers believe that owning 
more than 10% of a company's stock is highly risky, though they may 
neither need nor, given their size, even be able to use the liquidity that 
is foreclosed by short-swing profit forfeiture. Many believe that it is 
illegal to control an operating company; in this, they are simply 
wrong. Some believe that they ought to be massively diversified, 
though there are no decided cases to tell them so and the financial 
benefits are minimal. Mutual fund managers worry that they will lose 
access to the soft information obtained through analyst meetings and 
visits to company facilities if they become active, though it isn't clear 
how often this will happen, nor that the information does the manag-
ers much good. Possible causes of shareholder reluctance to own large 
stakes or otherwise do what they can within the existing rules include 
fear of a political backlash should institutions gain too much power, 155 
concern that large positions can lead to large, embarrassing losses, 156 
and simple fear of the unknown. No one has done it, whatever "it" is, 
therefore it must be risky or illegal. It's hard for a fiduciary to take the 
first, risky step. 
Money manager training reinforces the passivity norm. A genera-
tion of MBAs have grown up with modem portfolio theory, in which 
securities are fungible, characterized by risk and return at1.d no more. 
Finance texts teach, for example, that a properly constructed package 
of put and call options is equivalent to the underlying common stock. 
And so it is, except for voting rights - an exception that the texts don't 
deem worthy of mention.151 
The culture of passivity may be especially strong because it is con-
venient. A passive manager can ignore, for the most part, the conflicts 
154. The statements in text are based on a number of informal discussions with money man-
agers between 1988 and 1990. 
155. See Roe (forthcoming 1991), supra note 19. 
156. One public fund manager, when I asked why his fund didn't take large positions, noted 
that another fund - Wisconsin Investment Board - recently suffered considerable embarrass-
ment by being the largest shareholder in Prime Motor Inns when it went bankrupt. Telephone 
conversation (Nov. 5, 1990). 
157. See, e.g., R. BREALEY & s. MYERS (1988), supra note 112, at 469-90; T. CoPELAND & 
J. WESTON (1988), supra note 112, ch. 8; w. SHARPE, INVESTMENTS 507-08 (3d ed. 1985). 
564 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:520 
of interest discussed in Part VIII. She can convince herself that she is 
both doing well and doing good for others; that her high pay is de-
serv~d because she is making money for her beneficiaries. A manager 
who becomes active in corporate governance, in contrast, must con-
front more directly the tension between supporting management, 
which may be in her self interest, and doing what's right for her 
beneficiaries. 
M. The Political Economy of the Shareholder Voting Rules 
This section provides a rough outline of the political economy of 
the legal rules affecting shareholder voting; why the rules may have 
developed as they did. The discussion complements Mark Roe's anal-
ysis of legislative efforts to limit the power of large financial 
institutions.158 
To some extent, the promanager, antishareholder tilt of the rules 
affecting shareholder voting is deliberate: Congress, the SEC, and the 
states fully intended the rules to insulate corporate managers from too 
much shareholder oversight, by financial institutions or anyone else. 
The first federal foray into proxy voting, the adoption of Exchange 
Act section 14 in 1934, is usually seen___:_ with some justification - as 
an effort to protect shareholders. But one can find an intent to protect 
incumbents as well. One purpose of the Proxy Rules, a Senate Report 
explains, was to protect investors from proxy solicitations "by irre-
sponsible outsiders seeking to wrest control of a corporation away 
from honest and conscientious corporation officials."159 The 1956 ex-
pansion of the Proxy Rules, especially the disclosures required of dissi-
dents, came after a surge in proxy fights in the early 1950s, which led 
managers to pressure Congress and the SEC to act against the evil 
corporate "raiders."160 A promanager tilt can also be found in the 
broad reach of section 13(d). Congress authorized the SEC to exempt 
shareholders whose actions had neither the purpose nor the effect of 
changing or influencing control of the issuer. This was intended, the 
bill's sponsor said, to protect the "legitimate buyer" who was buying 
stock "strictly for investment purposes and with absolutely no interest 
in affecting management policy. "161 
158. Roe (forthcoming 1991), supra note 19. 
159. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1934). 
160. See J. POUND (1990), supra note 21, at 21-24. 
161. 111 CONG. REC. 28,259 (1965) (remarks of Senator Williams) (emphasis added). The 
Business Roundtable and the American Society of Corporate Secretaries have predictably op-
posed the recent proxy reform proposals by CalPERs and United Shareholders, and instead have 
asked the SEC to tighten the Proxy Rules even further. See Letter from Richard Troy, Chair-
man, Am. Socy. of Corp. Secretaries' Ad Hoc Comm. on the Proxy System, to Linda Quinn, 
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At the state level, lobbying and campaign contributions by corpo-
rate managers produce much of the impetus for antitakeover laws. 
The laws passed in 1990 in Pennsylvania (to protect Armstrong World 
Industries) and Massachusetts (to protect Norton Industries) suggest 
that legislatures are willing to protect incumbent managers from at-
tack through the proxy process as well as through a takeover bid. 
A conscious promanager tilt only partly explains the development 
of obstructive rules, however. Through much of the period from 1934 
to the present, SEC staffers genuinely believed that the Proxy Rules 
helped shareholders by ensuring complete and accurate information as 
a basis for voting. The costs of disclosure rarely were part of the equa-
tion. Some examples: former SEC staffers Frank Emerson and Frank-
' lin Latcham described the Proxy Rules as the "cornerstone of 
shareholder democracy";162 SEC Chairman Sinclair Armstrong 
pushed through the 1956 amendments that increased the burden of the 
Proxy Rules for dissidents, while believing that the rules "provided an 
enormous base for the thing called 'corporate democracy.' " 163 The 
same belief in the proshareholder nature of the Proxy Rules was uni-
versally held when I worked for the Commission in 1987 and 1988. 
The SEC's preference for extensive disclosure is also partly explainable 
in political terms. Congress is more likely to take the SEC to task for 
the scandal that more disclosure might have prevented than for the 
subtle costs of excessive disclosure. 164 
A third element of the political economy of shareholder voting 
rules, closely related to agency belief in the value of its own rules, is 
the bureaucratic tendency to construe jurisdiction broadly, without 
defining the outer boundaries of that jurisdiction, lest the definition 
leave an unintended loophole. The SEC has pushed, for example, for 
broad definitions of key terms in the Proxy Rules, the 13( d) Rules, and 
elsewhere. In some cases, the investor protection rationale for regula-
tion is thin, and the SEC seems oblivious to the costs of the expansive 
sweep of its rules. 165 The FfC has likewise never explained why it 
Director SEC Div. of Corp. Fin. (July 30, 1990); Letter from H.B. Atwater, Chairman, Business 
Roundtable Task Force on Corp. Governance, to Linda Quinn (Dec. 17, 1990). 
162. F. EMERSON & F. LATCHAM (1954), supra note 12, at 9. 
163. Armstrong, The Role of the Securfties and Exchange Commission in Proxy Contests of 
Listed Companies, Bus. LAW., Nov. 1955, at 110, 114; see also Cohen, The SEC and Proxy 
Contests, 20 FED. B.J. 91 (1960); Bernstein & Fischer, The Regulation of the Solicitation of Prox-
ies: Some Reflections on Corporate Democracy, 7 U. CHI. L. REv. 226 (1940). 
164. See Hetherington, When the Sleeper Wakes: Reflections on Corporate Governance and 
Shareholder Rights, 8 Hm=srRA L. REv. 183, 211 (1979). 
165. In the proxy area, see, for example, Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 695 n.2 
(2d Cir. 1966) (SEC supports Studebaker's attempt to treat dissident's effort to obtain 5% sup-
port required under state law to obtain a shareholder list as a proxy solicitation); Halstead v. 
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construes the investment purpose exemption from the Hart-Scott-
Rodino rules so narrowly, and there seems little antitrust reason for 
doing so. 
Sometimes, obstructive rules appear almost by accident, with the 
SEC showing no appreciation for their consequences. For example, 
the Commission added the critical word "voting" to the activities that 
cause shareholders to be considered a "group" under the 13(d) Rules 
with the casual explanation that: "Minor word changes have also 
been made from the predecessor [rule]' .... The Commission consid-
ered 'voting' to be subsumed within the term 'holding' but has decided 
to make this express to avoid any misunderstanding."166 Similarly, it's 
doubtful that the Commission has ever considered the impact on 
shareholder voting of its ultrabroad interpretation of control. 
Without more extensive research, which is beyond the scope of this 
article, we can't say how much of the promanager tilt of the rules 
affecting shareholder voting is an intended result of manager lobbying 
efforts; how much results from misguided beliefs by regulators in the 
beneficial effects of the rules they administer; how much from agency 
efforts to expand jurisdiction; and how much is an accidental by-
product of rules adopted for other purposes at a time when share-
holder voice was unimportant and thus not weighed in the regulatory 
balance. Most likely all four causes play a role. 
IV. COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS: EVIDENCE 
To recap where this article has been and where it is going, Part III 
developed my legal claim: Shareholder passivity may be partly a func-
tion of legal rules. Institutional shareholders who want to become ac-
tive face costs, legal limits, and legal risks wherever they turn. Legal 
barriers are especially great for the central shareholder task of nomi-
nating and electing directors. For the most part, no single rule is a 
show stopper; no single cost is prohibitive. But the accumulation of 
numerous obstacles and risks" imposes a substantial burden on share-
holder action. Even a small risk may be enough to dissuade a pension 
plan manager or other fiduciary, who sees the downside risk of activ-
SEC, 182 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (SEC argues that request for contributions by shareholder 
committee of bankrupt utility is a solicitation under the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 
and is prohibited by SEC rules). 
166. Exchange Act Release No. 14,692, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
~ 81,571 (Apr. 21, 1978), at 80,312-13. The courts had split on whether to read § 13(d) this 
broadly. Compare Bath Indus. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970) (§ 13(d) not triggered by 
formation of shareholder group until the group buys more stock) and Calumet Indus. v. Mac-
Clure, 464 F. Supp. 19, 30 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (§ 13(d) not triggered by agreement to solicit proxies) 
with GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971) (formation of group triggers§ 13(d); 
group planned proxy fight and additional stock purchases), cert denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972), 
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ism while her beneficiaries get the upside. Against this background, 
the failure of institutions to purchase large stakes in individual compa-
nies, form voting groups, or mount director election campaigns may 
reflect legal barriers as much as the collective action problems posited 
by the passivity story. 
This Part develops my factual claim: Shareholder passivity may 
also be historically contingent, a function of more dispersed and more 
conflicted ownership in the past than we have today. Section IV.A 
reviews the data on institutional share ownership, and its implications 
for shareholder voting. Section IV.B reviews recent shareholder activ-
ism on corporate governance issues. Parts V and VI develop my theo-
retical claim that collective action problems are not an insuperable 
barrier to shareholder action. Parts VII and VIII discuss, respec-
tively, two additional explanations for shareholder passivity: agenda 
control by corporate managers and institutional investor conflicts of 
interest. 
A. The Growth of Institutional Ownership 
The passivity story assumes a stylized model of the large public 
corporation as having thousands of shareholders, each owning a tiny 
fraction of its shares.167 Those stylized facts, never wholly true, are 
today simply false. Carolyn Brancato, using an incomplete definition 
of "institution," estimates that institutions owned 42.7% of all corpo-
rate equities in 1986, compared to 38.5% in 1981.168 Large companies 
typically have even higher institutional ownership, often over 60% 
and in some cases over 75%.169 Demographi~ trends ensure that these 
percentages will continue to rise for the foreseeable future. 
More importantly, individual institutions have grown to substan-
tial size, and own significant percentages of individual companies. At 
yearend 1989, the 50 largest institutions owned $925 billion in stocks, 
or 27% of the entire U.S. stock market. The 13 largest institutions 
167. See, e.g., Manne (1972), supra note 10, at 491 ("AT&T and others have too many share-
holders to conduct shareholders' meetings like a New England town meeting"); Easterbrook & 
Fischel (1983), supra note 10, at 402 (using an example with 1000 voters, each with a 0.1 % stake 
in the election outcome); Clark, Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 776, 
779-84 (1979) (using an example with 10,000 shareholders to illustrate rational apathy and free 
rider problems). 
168. Brancato, The Pivotal Role of Institutional Investors in Capital Markets: A Summary of 
Economic Research at the Columbia Institutional Investor Project, in FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILI-
TIES (forthcoming 1991), supra note 55. Brancato defines "institutions" to include pension 
funds, open and closed end mutual funds, insurance companies, bank-managed trusts, and foun-
dation and endowment funds. This definition excludes investment banks, bank holding compa-
nies, and nonbank, nonpension trusts. 
169. See Fromson, The Big Owners Roar, FORTUNE, July 30, 1990, at 66, 78. 
568 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:520 
held over half of this amount - an average of over 1 % of the U.S. 
market each.170 It's common for a single institution to hold 2-3% of 
the stock of a single company. A few institutions will cross the 5% 
threshold for filing a Schedule 13D or 13G, though usually not the 
10% threshold at which insider trading rules kick in. Institutional 
investors also aren't anonymous. SEC Form 13F filings provide a 
good picture of institutional holdings. 171 The biggest institutions are 
well known; some have widely recognized acronyms, such as 
CalPERS, CalSTRS, NYCERS, and CREF. 172 
No important financial barriers prevent a single institution from 
owning 5%, 10%, perhaps more of a single company. An institution 
that owns 1 % or more of the equity interest in corporate America, as 
the largest institutions do, would remain amply diversified if it owned 
5% stakes in 20% of the publicly traded companies, instead of 2% 
stakes in half the companies. Large stakes reduce liquidity, but that 
shouldn't matter much for an institution that is already too big to sell 
quickly an appreciable fraction of its portfolio. The smaller stakes 
that most institutions hold today may reflect less the need for diversifi-
cation or liquidity than the legal obstacles to such ownership stakes 
discussed in Part III. If the legal obstacles were reduced, ownership 
stakes might increase. 
Legal obstacles notwithstanding, institutions are talking about, and 
occasionally moving toward, owning substantial stakes individually, or 
forming groups to hold such stakes. Berkshire Hathaway has 
purchased stock representing roughly a 10-15% stake in several major 
companies, including Capital Cities/ ABC, Champion International, 
Gillette, Salomon Brothers, US Air, and Wells Fargo, and a Berkshire 
officer has become a director of some of these companies as part of the 
transaction. 173 CalPERS recently spent $400 million for a 20% stake 
in Santa Fe Realty. 174 The Council of Institutional Investors is en-
couraging its members to pool their funds to buy stakes of 15% or so 
in selected companies, and possibly seek board representation as 
170. See The Institutional Investor 300: Ranking America's Top Money Managers, INST. IN· 
VESTOR, July 1990, at 137, 173. Percentages are based on the Wilshire 5000 Index, which was at 
$3.42 trillion on Dec. 31, 1989. Wall St. J., July 16, 1990, at C2, col. 5. 
171. Institutions with over $100 million in stocks must report their stock positions to the 
SEC quarterly on Form 13F. The SEC tabulates and releases institutional ownership by com-
pany. See Exchange Act § 13(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f) (1988); Form 13F, 17 C.F.R. § 249.325 
(1990). 
172. CalPERS is the California Public Employees' Retirement System; CalSTRS is the Cali-
fornia State Teachers Retirement System; NYCERS is the New York City Employee Retirement 
System; CREF is the College Retirement Equities Fund. 
173. See Berkshire Hathaway Inc., 1989 Annual Report 15-16 (1990). 
174. See Clark (1990), supra note 83, at 70. 
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well. 175 These are small steps in a $3 trillion stock market, but they 
suggest an emerging trend. 
There were sharp changes in the 1980s in the relative sizes of dif-
ferent institutions. The table on the next page shows stock ownership 
growth from 1980 to 1988 for six major types of institutions. Public 
pension funds and mutual funds grew rapidly, from 7.0% of NYSE 
capitalization in 1980 to 16.7% in 1988. In contrast, corporate pen-
sion funds, nonpension bank trusts, and insurance companies shrank 
slightly, from 38.2% of NYSE capitalization in 1980 to 37.7% in 
1988. These trends have accelerated in the last few years, with private 
pension funds, insurers and nonpension bank trusts declining from 
38.5% of NYSE capitalization in 1986 to 37.7% in 1988, while public 
pension funds and mutual funds grew from 14.2% to 16.7%. 
The differences in growth rates are important. As discussed in 
Part VIII, public pension funds (a group in which, for convenience, I 
include CREF) and mutual funds have weaker direct conflicts of inter-
est in monitoring corporate managers than do corporate pension 
funds, banks, and insurers, who rely on corporations for new business, 
or foundations and endowments, who want to receive .corporate gifts. 
This suggests that public pension funds and mutual funds will be more 
likely to advance their own proposals and to oppose management pro-
posals. Indeed, public funds have been the leading actors in the recent 
increase in institutional activism described below. 
175. Telephone conversation with Sarah Teslik, Executive Director, Council of Institutional 
Investors (Nov. 13, 1990). 
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CHANGES IN INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY OWNERSHIP 
Panel A: NYSE Data for I980-I988:176 
Stock Owned in 1980 Stock Owned in I988 
As% of As% of Asset 
Institution $billions NYSE Cap. $billions NYSE Cap. Growth 
Public Pension Funds 44 3.6% 224 9.1% 405% 
Mutual Funds 42 3.4 188 7.6 342 
Private Pension Funds 224 I8.0 511 20.8 I29 
Insurance Companies 79 6.3 I64 6.7 108 
Bank Trusts 173 I3.9 ·252 10.2 46 
NYSE Capitalization I243 I00.0% 2458 I00.0% 98% 
Panel B: Brancato Data for 198I-I986:177 
Stock Owned in 198I Stock Owned in I986 
As% of As% of Asset 
Institution · $billions Mkt. Cap. $billions Mkt. Cap. Growth 
Mutual Funds 39 2.5% 20I 6.5% 420% 
Public Pension Funds 47 3.I 150 4.8 2I9 
Private Pension Funds 239 15.5 493 I5.9 I06 
Foundations/Endowments 28 1.8 58 1.8 107 
Insurance Companies 87 5.7 14I 4.5 62 
Bank Trusts I55 IO.I 293 9.4 89 
Market Capitalization 1542 I00.0% 3I09 I00.0% I02% 
Ownership concentration is especially high among public funds. 
In 1989, the 4 largest pension funds, and 14 of the 20 largest, ranked 
by total assets, were public funds. 178 The largest mutual fund groups 
- Fidelity, Vanguard, T. Rowe Price - rival the largest pension 
funds in size. This concentration facilitates joint action and reduces 
the incentives for passivity created by fractional ownership. 
B. The Rise in Shareholder Activism 
Institutional ownership is beginning to translate into significant 
voting power. Social responsibility proposals continue to struggle to 
meet the 3-10% thresholds for inclusion on next year's ballot. But as 
ownership by public pension funds and mutual funds grew in the 
1980s, so did shareholder activism on corporate governance, with the 
public funds as the leading players. Perhaps too, the takeover boom of 
the 1980s, which highlighted manager willingness to deprive share-
176. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR FACT BOOK I990, app. 
Al-A6, B (1990). The dollar amounts of stock owned include some non-NYSE companies, so 
total institutional ownership of corporate equities can't be determined by summing the 
percentages in the table. 
I77. See Brancato (forthcoming 1991), supra note 168, table 6. 
178. See Brancato (forthcoming 199I), supra note 168, table II. 
December 1990] Shareholder Passivity Reexamined 571 
holders of takeover premiums, increased shareholder sensitivity to the 
importance of governance issues. 
Charter amendments illustrate the change. in shareholder voting 
patterns. In the early 1980s, antitak.eover amendments passed rou-
tinely by the hundreds, usually with large margins. Today, most an-
titakeover amend~ents still pass, but they often just squeak by with 
50-60% approval, and occasionally fail. 179 Moreover, managers rou-
tinely seek a proxy solicitor's judgment about the chance of success 
before proposing an amendment. Many charter amendments never 
see the light of day because the proxy solicitor concludes that passage 
is doubtful. As takeover lawyer Martin Lipton recently advised cli-
ents: "If a company does not have a staggered board and has signifi-
cant institutional ownership, the odds are against being able to get 
one."180 Such judgments are reflected in the sharply reduced rate with 
which antitakeover amendments are proposed.181 Dual-class recapi-
talizations, a hot topic just a couple of years ago, are a nonissue today 
because they're unlikely to pass unless insiders already control the 
vote. 182 
Beginning with proposals by CalPERS, CREF, and the Wisconsin 
Investment Board in 1987, major public pension funds have gone be-
yond voting against management proposals, and are offering their own 
corporate governance proposals. For shareholder proposals on green-
mail, putting a poison pill to a shareholder vote, confidential voting, 
and other shareholder rights issues, affirmative votes of 30% or more 
are now common.183 Shareholders are winning occasional outright 
179. For review of the 1989 and 1990 proxy seasons, see L. KRAsNOW, VOTING BY INSTITU-
TIONAL INVESTORS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN THE 1989 PROXY SEASON (Inves-
tor Responsibility Research Ctr., Inc. 1989); Investor Responsibility Research Ctr., Inc., 
Corporate Governance Bulletin, July/Aug. 1990, at 93-94 [hereinafter IRRC 1990 Report]; H. 
SHERMAN, SPECIAL REPORT: THE 1990 PROXY SEASON (Inst. Shareholder Servs. 1990). In 
addition to the outright failures, some proposals are withdrawn in midvote because passage is 
doubtful. See, e.g., Quint, American Savings Delays Voting on a Shift in Charter, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 22, 1989, at D4, col. 5. 
180. M. Lipton, Memorandum to Clients: Takeovers Today, at 2 (Apr. 27, 1990). 
181. See, e.g., Pension Funds Join Private Holders to Snatch Last-Minute Victory from Honey-
well Board, CoRP. CoNTROL ALERT, June 1989, at 1, 4 (in 1989 proxy season, ten companies 
proposed staggered boards and seven sought to limit shareholder action by written consent; both 
figures are much lower than in prior years). The dropoff probably doesn't reflect saturation, 
because many companies lack these provisions. See INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH 
CTR., INC. (1989), supra note 98, at 1454, 1473. Part of the decline in proposals may reflect 
reduced need, given manager success at obtaining protection from the state legislature. But stag-
gered boards and dual-class capital structures remain important. Also, it's not clear which is 
cause and which is effect: managers may seek legislative protection because they don't expect 
shareholders to approve antitakeover amendments. 
182. Dual-class recapitalizations are possible in 1991 because a court invalidated the SEC's 
one-share, one-vote rule. The Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
183. In the 1990 proxy season, for example, poison pill proposals received 43% support and 
confidential voting received 34% support, on average. IRRC 1990 Report, supra note 179, at 93. 
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victories,184 as well as some negotiated settlements with managers who 
want to avoid a close contest and the possible embarrassment of de-
feat.185 In the recent Avon, Lockheed, and USX proxy fights, poison 
pill and confidential voting proposals won even though the dissidents 
otherwise failed or reached a compromise with management. 186 Occa-
sionally, institutions successfully voice their negative opinions on pro-
posed mergers.187 
The victories to date are small. Confidential voting can reduce 
coriflicted voting on other matters, but isn't a substantive change. 
Some companies have ignored shareholder resolutions seeking a share-
holder vote on a poison pill or made small changes that make the pill 
"chewable" - it won't apply, for example, to a fully financed, all-cash 
offer held open for at least 3 months - without seeking a shareholder 
vote on the chewable pill.188 Moreover, proxy fights are still rare, and 
incumbents still win most of the time. But in the recent Texaco, Lock-
heed, and National Intergroup fights, the incumbents, to gain institu-
tional support, agreed to nominate one or more representatives of the 
large institutions to their boards. A cynic might say that chewable 
pills and a few institutional representatives on boards are token 
changes. On the other hand, until recently, managers didn't feel the 
need to throw even a few tokens to their institutional shareholders. 
Large institutions are increasingly abandoning the "exit" alterna-
tive to voice- the "Wall Street Rule" that investors should sell their 
stock if they don't like the managers. They're too big to sell large 
184. Victories on shareholder proposals to ask the directors to redeem poison pills or put 
them up for a shareholder vote include Armco, Avon Products, Champion International, Con· 
solidated Freightways, K Mart, and Ryder Systems. See Franklin, Economic Health Test: Bill 
Seeks Further Accountability by Public Pension Funds, N.Y.L.J., May 18, 1989, at 5 col. 3; INST. 
SHAREHOLDER SERVS., Issue Alert, June 1990, at 3. 
185. Negotiated agreements include: Exxon's agreement to add a scientist to its board, see 
Wald, Exxon Head Seeks Environmentalist to Serve on Board: Pension Fund Pressure, N.Y. 
Times, May 12, 1989, at Al, col. 4; National Intergroup's agreement to let its poison pill expire 
in three years, see Franklin (1989), supra note 184; the weakening of poison pills by many Cana· 
dian companies to "appease institutional investors," see Power of the Press Transforms Canada's 
Pills from Poison to Placebo, CORP. CONTROL ALERT, Apr. 1990, at 1; and the adoption of 
confidential voting by at least 48 companies, see IRRC 1990 Report, supra note 179, at 97-100. 
186. See INST. SHAREHOLDER SERVS., Issue Alert, June 1990, at 3. 
187. See Novell Says Big Holders Killed Merger with Lotus, Wall St. J., May 22, 1990, at AlO, 
col. 3. 
188. For example, Lockheed and USX adopted chewable pills and Champion International 
plans, I understand, not to respond to the shareholder resolution seeking a vote on its pill. See 
Investor Responsibility Research Ctr., Inc., Corporate Governance Highlights, Nov. 2, 1990; see 
also Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Memorandum to Clients: Proxy Resolutions (Nov. 8, 
1990) ("We •.. advise clients that ..• even if a majority of shareholders vote in favor of the 
resolutions, the pill need not be redeemed, the golden parachutes need not be rescinded and the 
takeover law opt-out need not be exercised."); Stevenson, Director Responses to Precatory Stock-
holder Resolutions, in 1 PRACTISING LAW INST. (1990), supra note 62, at 277. 
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portions of their portfolio, and know it. As James Martin of CREF 
recently put it, "We're the quintessential long-term investors."189 
Further evidence that institutional shareholders are interested in col-
lective voice comes from their financial support of trade groups. Such 
groups can help institutions cooperate to achieve collective goals. The 
Corporate Governance Service of the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center provides data on corporate takeover defenses and how institu-
tions vote.19° The Council oflnstitutional Investors, founded in 1985, 
is an umbrella organization for public and union pension plans that 
are interested in expanded shareholder voice. Institutional Share-
holder Services, also founded in 1985, offers voting advice on proxy 
issues involving individual companies, lobbies for expanded share-
holder rights, and was a prime mover in the 1989 defeat of antitake-
over charter amendments proposed by Honeywell and the passage of 
corporate governance proposals in the 1990 Lockheed proxy fight. 191 
The Institutional Voting Research Service of Analysis Group, begun 
in 1988, also provides voting advice. The founding dates of these 
groups testify to the recency of shareholder interest in corporate 
governance. 
Indirect shareholder cooperation through trade groups is espe-
cially important because legal rules make direct cooperation difficult. 
Institutions become a 13(d) group if they cosponsor a proposal, but 
they safely can belong to a trade group which endorses the proposal. 
Also, money managers who face political or client pressure to be pas-
sive can fund a trade group that is less constrained. Thus, Robert 
Monks, the founder of Institutional Shareholder Services, describes 
himself as a "lightning rod" for clients who find it "difficult ... to take 
a high visibility position."192 . 
News stories also attest to newfound interest in shareholder voting. 
They carry titles like "Institutions' Proxy Power Grows"; "The Big 
Owners Roar"; "Big Holders Resolve to Flex Their Muscles"; and 
189. Pauly, Wall Street's New Musclemen, NEWSWEEK, June 5, 1989, at 46, 46; see also, e.g., 
Wallace, Institutions' Proxy Power Grows, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1988, at Dl, col. 3 (quoting 
CalPERS General Counsel Richard Koppes as saying "[w]e don't have the luxury of withdraw-
ing and going somewhere else"). 
190. See, e.g .. L. KRASNOW (1989), supra note 179; P. MCGURN, CONFIDENTIAL PROXY 
VOTING (1989); INVESTOR REsPONSIBILITY REsEARCH CI'R., INC. (1989), supra note 98; 
J. HEARD & H. SHERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE PROXY VOTING SYSTEM (1987); 
R. SCHRAGER (1986), supra note 2. 
191. I have, on occasion since 1988, acted as a consultant to ISS and to its founder, Robert 
Monks. 
192. Wayne, A Fervent Advocate of the Proxy Battle, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1990, at Dl, col. 3. 
Mr. Monks recently left ISS to form a new venture, Institutional Shareholder Partners, which 
will take a more active role than ISS in seeking changes at particular companies. Wayne, A 
Shareholder Advocate Plans More Active Role, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1990, at D4, col. 5. 
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"Wall Street's New Musclemen."193 Their common message: institu-
tional shareholders are waking up. They're winning a few votes, com-
ing close in others, seeking representatives on boards of directors, 
supporting proposals for confidential voting and against poison pills 
and greenmail. 
Institutional shareholders are starting to become a significant lob-
bying force at both the state and federal levels. The institutions failed 
to defeat the recent Pennsylvania and Massachusetts antitakeover 
laws, but they succeeded in weakening the laws and obtaining opt-out 
rights not offered in the original bills. 194 The institutions then lobbied 
Pennsylvania companies to opt out, and many companies did so. 195 
And institutional support was important in the SEC's adoption of its 
short-lived one share, one vote rule. 196 We also know that bondhold-
ers, who don't face legal obstacles to substantial ownership or to col-
lective action, commonly organize in response to bankruptcies or to 
workout-related exchange offers. Some "vulture funds" purchase a 
large percentage of a company's debt in order to influence the workout 
process. 197 Shareholders might also organize, at least for some issues, 
if legal rules allowed. 
In sum, the model of public companies as owned by thousands of 
anonymous shareholders simply isn't true. There are a limited 
number of large shareholders, and they know each other. Moreover, 
shareholders care about governance issues. They don't passively sup-
port management proposals, nor automatically oppose proposals by 
other shareholders. They form organized groups to facilitate lobbying, 
information gathering, and information sharing. Sometimes, despite 
legal obstacles, they win. We don't know how much more sharehold-
193. Wallace (1988), supra note 189; Fromson (1990)~ supra note 169; Jacobs, Big Holders 
Resolve to Flex Their Muscles, Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1989, at Cl, col. 3; Pauly (1989), supra note 
189; see also, e.g., Perry, Who Runs Your Company Anyway?, FORTUNE, Sept. 12, 1988, at 140; 
Dobrzynski, Shareholders Unfurl their Banner, Bus. WK., June 11, 1990, at 66; White, Gia/It 
Pension Funds' Explosive Growth Concentrates Economic Assets and Power, Wall St. J., June 28, 
1990, at Cl, col. 3. 
194. For Pennsylvania, see, for example, Controversial Pa. Bill Would Make Takeovers More 
Difficult, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 474 (1990). For Massachusetts, see Durgin, Massachu-
setts Enters Takeover Fray: Bill Would Mandate Classified Boards, Pensions & Investments, Apr. 
16, 1990, at 1, col. 2. 
195. Wayne, Many Companies in Pennsylvania Reject State's Takeover Protection, N.Y. 
Times, July 20, 1990, at Al, col. 1. 
196. See Exchange Act Release No. 25,891, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 11 84,247, at 89,212 (July 7, 1988) (noting that "institutional investors supported adoption 
of a minimum voting rights standard"). 
197. See, e.g., Benham, Bondholders Get Tough and Tum Down Sweetened Debt-Swap Offers, 
TURNAROUNDS AND WORKOUTS, Oct. 15, 1988, at 1; Johnson, Farley May Have to Fight Bond-
holders Over Control of West Point-Pepperell, Wall St. J., May 30, 1990, at AS, col. 1; Schifrin, 
Pay Up .•. or Else, FORBES, Aug. 6, 1990, at 74. 
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ers would do under a more facilitating legal regime. But shareholders 
have shown that they care about voting, which means that legal re-
forms may well affect shareholder behavior.198 
V. THE INCENTIVES OF SHAREHOLDER PROPONENTS 
Part III developed my legal claim: Shareholders who want to be 
active in corporate governance are hampered by legal rules at every 
tum. Part IV developed my factual claim: Within the confines of 
these rules, institutional shareholders are becoming increasingly active 
in a variety of ways. Taken together, Parts III and IV suggest that 
shareholder passivity is not inevitable but is instead legally and histori-
cally contingent. 
This Part and Part VI develop my theoretical claim: The collec-
tive action problems facing active shareholders are important but not 
overwhelming. Under a more facilitating, less obstructive legal re-
gime, institutional shareholders could find it in their self-interest to 
take an active interest in corporate governance. They are most likely 
to become active for process and structural issues that exhibit econo-
mies of scale; less likely to become active for company-specific issues. 
Moreover, institutions that don't offer proposals themselves may find 
it in their interest to be informed voters and not automatically vote 
promanager, as long as there is a critical mass of other informed 
voters. 
This Part develops a simple model of shareholder incentives to 
sponsor a voting proposal. A similar analysis would apply to share-
holder response to a management proposal. Readers who are not 
mathematically inclined can skip the equations without losing the flow 
of the argument. 199 The model focuses on the formal act of voting. 
The stilted dialogue of a proxy campaign is hardly a sensible way for 
shareholders to talk to or oversee managers. Proxy campaigns can, 
however, establish a base of shareholder power from which informal 
communication will flow. 
Section V.A considers the shareholder proponent's decision 
198. For more pessimistic views of the emerging shareholder activism, see, for example, 
Longstreth, Takeovers, Corporate Governance, and Stock Ownership: Some Disquieting Trends, 
J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Spring 1990, at 54, 58 ("If CREF and CalPERS had not existed, corpo-
rate managers might wish to have 'invented' them, because they give a vestige of reality to the 
notion that shareholders continue to have a voice over corporate affairs."); Koether (forthcoming 
1991), supra note 55 (remarking on "the continued passivity of most institutions" in proxy 
fights). 
199. The model focuses solely on shareholder actions and treats the manager response as 
fixed and known in advance. A fuller, game-theoretic model would also consider manager incen-
tives to oppose shareholder proposals, and the interaction between shareholder and manager 
actions. I plan to develop such a model in future work. 
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whether to make a proposal. Section V.B analyzes the proponent's 
separate decision on how much to spend to solicit support. Section 
V.C shows how economies of scale can increase proponents' incentives 
both to make proposals and to wage vigorous campaigns. Part VI 
models the incentives of nonproponent shareholders, who must vote 
on proposals made by others, and have to decide whether to become 
informed about the issues or remain uninformed. 
A. The Decision Whether To Make a Proposal 
I begin the collective action analysis with a simple model of the 
decision faced by a shareholder proponent who is considering whether 
to make a proposal that the managers are expected to oppose. The 
proponent owns a fractional interest in a corporation, and seeks to 
maximize her own wealth. She must decide whether to make the pro-
posal in the first place, and if the proposal is made, how much to spend 
promoting it. I assume that all shareholders share pro rata the benefits 
. from success. This assumption seems reasonable for a noncontrol con-
test, but will not hold for a proxy fight where the proponent can real-
ize private benefits from control.200 
Let: 
B 
C; 
Co 
Cc 
p 
Fi 
Fo 
= 
= 
-
-
-
the expected benefit to all shareholders as a group if the 
proposal is adopted. 
the proponent's cost to make the proposal. 
the nonproponent shareholders' cost to consider and vote 
on the proposal. 
the cost to the corporation of shareholder and manager 
action on the proposal. 
the probability that the proposal succeeds, which P depends 
on the proponent's spending level Ci. 
the proponent's fractional share ownership. I assume for 
convenience that the firm has one share outstanding. 
the share ownership of all other shareholders: F0 + F1 = 
1. 
The proponent's expected private benefit from making a proposal 
equals the probability of success P, times the corporate benefit from 
success B, times her fractional ownership stake F;. Her private cost is 
her own cost C; plus her share of corporate cost F; *Cc. The propo-
nent will make the proposal if there is a cost level C, where expected 
benefit exceeds expected cost. 
200. The model developed below generalizes Olson's model of collective action to obtain a 
pure public good. M. OLSON (1971), supra note 5, at 22-'23. It would reduce to Olson's model, 
apart from notational differences, in the special case where Cc = C0 = 0 and there are no econo· 
mies of scale. E. RocK (forthcoming 1991), supra note 27, applies Olson's model to shareholder 
voting. 
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Make Proposal If: (P * B * F;) - (F; * Cc) - C; > 0 (1) 
It would be socially optimal, however, for the proponent to make a 
proposal whenever the expected total benefit to all shareholders (P * 
B) exceeds the total cost of the proposal C; + Cc + C0 • 
Proposal Socially Beneficial If: (P * B) - Cc - C; - C0 > 0 (2) 
Some socially beneficial proposals will not be made because the 
proponent's private gain is negative. To see when this will happen, 
note that the nonproponent shareholders' gain from a proposal equals 
the probability of success P times their share of the benefit F0 * B, less 
their share of corporate cost F0 * Cc, less their own cost C0 : 
Nonproponents' Gain = F0 * [P * B - Cc - C.,/F0] (3) 
By comparison, from equation (1), the proponent's gain is: 
Proponent's Gain = F; * [(P * B) - Cc - C;/FJ (4) 
The proponent's per share cost C;/F; to make the proposal will be 
much greater than the· per share cost C/F0 for other shareholders to 
consider it. Thus, the proponent's gain per share, given by the brack-
.eted term in equation ( 4), will be smaller, and sometimes much 
smaller, than the nonproponents' gain per share, given by the brack-
eted term in equation (3). 
Shareholders' collective action problems are usually framed in 
terms of the proponent's ability to capture only a fraction of the bene-
fits from success, and other shareholders' ability to free ride on the . 
proponent's efforts. This is too simple. Other shareholders can free 
ride on the proponent's efforts, as shown by the absence of a term 
involving C; from Nonproponents' Gain. But the proponent can also 
free ride, in a sense, on the cost to the other shareholders of consider-
ing a proposal, as shown by the absence of a term involving C0 from 
Proponent's Gain. The social loss from proponents' failure to make 
socially desirable proposals depends on the relative size of the free rid-
ing terms C;/F; and C/F0 • 
Regulation can affect both proponent's cost C; and share owner-
ship F;. Consider proponent's cost first. Legal rules that increase that 
cost will discourage proposals. Conversely, cost-decreasing rules, such 
as rules that shift costs from the proponent to the corporation, will 
encourage proposals. The shareholder proposal rule is such a cost-
shifting rule, though a feeble one. Expense reimbursement for success-
ful proposals would also reduce the proponent's expected cost. For 
many issues, the expected benefit B will increase proportionately with 
firm size, while the proponent's cost will increase less than proportion-
ately. Thus, if ownership percentage F; is constant, a proposal will 
look more attractive for a large firm than for a small one. 
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Consider next proponent's share ownership F;. An increase in F1 
reduces the proponent's per share cost and thus encourages proposals. 
Conversely, legal rules that prevent large individual stakes and joint 
shareholder action discourage proposals. Legal rules that limit indi-
vidual stakes also reduce the concentration of nonproponent holdings. 
This indirectly increases campaign cost C; and reduces the chance of 
campaign success because more nonproponents need to be convinced 
and smaller holders are more likely to be apathetic. And, of course, 
the larger the proponent's own stake, the fewer nonproponents need 
convincing. 
Several additional factors are not captured in the model. First, 
shareholders might be passive not because of legal obstacles, collective 
action problems, or conflicts of interest, but because the benefit from 
activism is small. Detailed exploration of the benefits of shareholder 
activism is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that (i) 
shareholders vote on a variety of issues that affect stock prices by a 
percentage point or two, and even a few percentage points are signifi-
cant in a $3 trillion stock market; (ii) recent empirical studies suggest 
that the presence of a large but not controlling shareholder may im-
prove corporate performance;201 and (iii) although cultural differences 
make international comparisons difficult, German and Japanese banks, 
which are less hobbled by statute, hold substantial stakes in industrial 
companies and seem to play a positive role.202 Thus, there is certainly 
the potential for shareholder action to produce major benefits. 
Second, the model assumes that shareholders seek to maximize the 
value of their shares. That assumption is only a crude approximation 
of the real world, for several reasons. A central theme of this article is 
that money managers face important conflicts of interest - private 
incentives that lead them not to maximize the value of managed assets. 
Moreover, many large institutions are heavily indexed. Index fund 
managers may see their role as matching the index at minimum cost, 
without regard to whether the index does well or poorly. If Wells 
Fargo (a major index fund manager) acts that way, the pension funds 
that hire Wells Fargo can still try themselves to improve portfolio per-
formance (as some do), or another manager may compete with Wells 
201. See, e.g., J. McCONNELL & H. SERVAES, EQUITY OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE 
VALUE (Working Paper 1990); Morck, Shleifer & Vishny (1988), supra note 8. But cf. Wruck, 
Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value, 23 J. FIN. EcoN. 3 (1989) (finding negative 
abnormal returns from private equity sales where the purchaser ends up with 5-25% ownership). 
202. See, e.g., Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. EcoN. LIT. 1 
(1990); Cable, Capital Market Information and Industrial Performance: The Role of West Ger-
man Banks, 95 EcoN. J. 118 (1985); The American Corporation and the Institutional Investor: 
Are There Lessons from Abroad?, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 739. 
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Fargo by offering indexing plus monitoring, but only time will tell to 
what extent that will happen. Cultural factors also limit the extent to 
which money managers look to governance as a way to improve port-
folio performance. These caveats, however, don't affect the model's 
value in assessing whether collective action problems dictate passivity. 
Instead, they strengthen my case that we also need to consider other 
factors, including cultural norms and conflicts of interest. 
Third, the model doesn't take into account the relative advantages 
of becoming a proponent versus supporting someone else's proposal. 
Even if a proponent can gain from making a proposal, she may be 
better off waiting for someone else to make the proposal instead. 
There are several potential solutions to this problem, none perfect. 
There may be obvious leaders, due to size, lack of a direct conflict of 
interest, or both. They will know that if they don't act, no one else is 
likely to. Also, for recurring issues, the major institutions can divide 
up the universe of companies, with tit-for-tat enforcement. Trade 
groups can facilitate such coordination. Something like this happens 
now. The active institutions coordinate their efforts so that one com-
pany isn't targeted for action by several institutions. Moreover, if 
legal rules allowed, the largest shareholders could combine forces and 
present joint proposals. 
B. The Decision on How Much To Spend 
The divergence between private and social benefits from making a 
proposal is, though in oversimplified form, part of the standard collec-
tive action critique of shareholder voting. But there is a second, less 
well understood problem. The divergence between private and social 
benefits affects not only whether a proposal will be made, but how well 
it will be funded. The proponent will spend an amount C/ that maxi-
mizes her private gain. Private gain is maximized when the marginal 
gain from spending an additional dollar is zero. From equation (1), 
this will occur when: 
d[P*Fi*B - C/F; - CJ/dC; = 0 => dP/d~ = 1/(F;*B) 
In contrast, total net benefit is maximized when the marginal social 
gain from spending an additional dollar is zero. From equation (2), 
this will occur when: 
d[P*B - Cc - C; - Co]/dC; = 0 => dP/dC; = 1/B 
The disparity between privately and socially optimal spending can 
be quite large. The proponent will stop spending at a level C/ where 
the marginal social gain from spending an extra dollar spent is 1/F; -
1. If the proponent owns 2 % of a company's shares, a reasonable 
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number for a large company with no dominant shareholder, she will 
stop spending at a point where the marginal social gain is {l/.02 - 1) 
= $49. Underspending arises because the proponent keeps only a pro 
rata share of the gains from success, but bears the entire marginal cost 
of more vigorous solicitation. Her best strategy involves accepting a 
reduced chance of success in return for lower solicitation costs. Thus, 
even if a proposal is made, it may fail because the proponent rationally 
spends too little to offer a strong chance of success. 
Reducing the proponent's cost won't solve the underspending 
problem. Whatever the proponent's cost, she will only spend until the 
marginal social benefit from spending an extra dollar is 1/F1 - 1. 
Cost-reducing and cost-shifting rules will lead proponents to make 
more proposals, but many of these proposals will still fail because they 
won't be strongly pushed. 
The simplest way to bring the proponent's incentive to spend 
closer to optimum is through higher share ownership. Thus, the need 
for incentives to wage a vigorous campaign increases the importance 
of legal barriers to joint shareholder action and to individual holdings 
of large blocks. Legal rules that required companies to reimburse 
some of the proponent's costs would also help. For example, reim-
bursement of expenses for successful proposals would make expected 
marginal cost from spending an extra dollar less than a dollar, which 
would increase the proponent's privately optimal spending level. 
C. Economies of Scale 
An important aspect of shareholder collective action is economies 
of scale. Institutional shareholders own shares in many companies, 
and some monitoring issues cut across a number of companies. A pro-
ponent who offers the same proposal at a number of companies will 
face a lower proposal preparation cost per company. Also, other insti-
tutions are likely to own stock in many of the same companies as the 
proponent. This reduces the proponent's per-company solicitation 
cost. Scale economies can lead an institution to offer more proposals, 
and promote them more vigorously, than an individual who owns the 
same percentage stake in a single company. 
Scale economies imply that shareholder voice holds greater prom-
ise for process and structural issues than for company-specific issues. 
Examples of such issues include confidential voting; choice of state of 
incorporation; whether shareholders should vote to approve various 
actions (poison pills, golden parachutes, large new stock issuances); 
capital structure (should a company have blank check preferred or a 
class of nonvoting common); cumulative vpting; antitakeover charter 
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amendments of various sorts; the value of growth through diversifica-
tion; and the structure of management compensation. 
In contrast, shareholder passivity is more likely for company spe-
cific issues, such as whether to recapitalize; whether to fund a new 
project by borrowing or by selling stock; whether to make a particular 
acquisition or divestiture; whether to vote for the incumbent directors 
or for a dissident slate. 
Director nominations might seem a paradigm company specific is-
sue, but in fact involve important common issues. Institutional share-
holders could decide that some of the board members of a public 
company should be nominated by major shareholders, develop a list of 
acceptable directors, and then nominate and try to elect several direc-
tors from that list at each of a number of companies. ISS and 
CalPERS are developing a director database for exactly that pur-
pose.203 The process issue is who should select the candidates -
shareholders or managers - with the specific identity of the directors 
a secondary concern. Board design also raises structural issues, in-
cluding staggered or nonstaggered board; board size; the desirability of 
an independent chairperson; whether a former CEO should remain on 
the board; and whether insiders other than the CEO should be 
directors. 
Even issues that are largely company specific, such as the merger 
of two companies or the level of CEO compensation, have some com-
mon elements. Shareholders might, for example, begin with a pre-
sumption against diversification, or a preference for compensation that 
is sensitive to company performance. More generally, corporate gov-
ernance jssues can be seen as lying along a continuum from common 
issues like confidential voting to company-sp.ecific issues like whom to 
vote for in a proxy fight, with most issues falling somewhere in be-
tween. Where a given issue falls along the continuum depends partly 
on the gains from more individualized analysis. Shareholders can, for 
example, nominate directors at a large number of portfolio companies, 
or they can do so only for poor performers. They will subclassify com-
panies as long as the perceived benefit from doing so outweighs the 
lost scale economies. ' 
Closely related to economies of scale is the deterrent value of a 
successful or near-successful campaign targeted at one or a few com-
panies. ·A director election campaign targeted at underperforming 
company A may lead other poor performers to change their ways, lest 
203. See White, Business Roundtable, Ca/PERS Declare a Truce Over Director Questionnaire, 
Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1990, at B6B, col. 5; see also Gilson & Kraakrnan (forthcoming 1991), supra 
note 25 (making a similar proposal). 
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they face a similar campaign. A proponent may wage a more vigorous 
campaign at company A than would be cost-justified looking at A in 
isolation, because of the campaign's deterrent value. Also, a propo-
nent who makes proposals at companies A through Y may not offer 
one at company Z because the marginal gain is negative given that Z 
will already be partially deterred by the proposals made at A through 
Y. Thus, deterrence effects imply that proposals will be targeted at 
fewer companies, and supported more vigorously, than the model be-
low suggests. 
Institutional practice confirms that scale economies and deterrence 
are important. The institutions have focused their efforts on process 
and structural issues, disclaiming intent or ability to micromanage in-
dividual companies. They commonly offer the same proposal at a 
number of companies during a proxy season. They support trade 
groups which advocate process and structural reform. And propo-
nents target a limited number of companies for action in any given 
year, often companies with poor financial performance or demon-
strated indifference to shareholder concerns. 204 
We can model a proponent's incentives in a world with economies 
of scale by generalizing the one-company collective action model 
presented above. Assume that an institutional proponent can make 
the same proposal at n identical companies. Let: 
B = the expected per company benefit to the shareholders if the 
proposal is adopted. 
q - the proponent's cost to make the proposal at one company. 
e the fractional decrease in proponent's per company cost is 
reduced due to economies of scale. 
C0 = the nonproponent shareholders' cost to consider and vote 
on the proposal, if made at only one company. 
o the fractional decrease nonproponents' per company cost 
due to economies of scale. 
Cc - the per company cost of shareholder and manager action on 
the proposal. 
P = the per company probability that the proposal succeeds. 
The one company model can be seen as a special case of this model in 
which there are no economies of scale. 
Consider first the proponent's incentive to make a multicompany 
proposal. Her one-company solicitation cost per share was C/F1• Her 
per share cost fot making n similar proposals is reduced by scale econ-
204. See, e.g., Investor Responsibility Research Ctr., Inc., Corporate Governance Highlights, 
Nov. 2, 1990 (CalPERS is "focusing on 'poor performers'" in choosing companies for its 1991 
corporate governance proposals). 
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omies to C;(l - e)/F;. Thus, her gain from making the proposals, by 
comparison with equation ( 4), is: , 
n-Company Gain = n * Fi * [P*B - Cc - C;(l - e)/FJ (5) 
The proponent will make more proposals because the benefit from do-
ing so will be positive in some cases where one-company benefit would 
have been negative. 
The nonproponents' per share cost to consider the proposal was 
C,/F0 in the one-company case. This too is reduced by scale econo-
mies to Cll - o)/F0 • Since both proponents and nonproponents' 
gains increase, more proposals become socially beneficial once econo-
mies of scale are taken into account. The disparity between propo-
nent's and nonproponents' net benefit per share, and thus the number 
of socially beneficial proposals that are not made, is reduced but not 
eliminated by scale economies. It now depends on the relative magni-
tude of then-company free-riding terms C;(l - e)/F; and C0 (1 - o)/ 
Fo. 
The introduction of scale economies into the model suggests an 
additional way that legal rules affect shareholder incentives. Costs 
that don't exhibit scale economies will be especially effective in dis-
couraging shareholder action. Some costs, like deciding what proposal 
to make or drafting a proxy statement, have strong economies of 
scale.205 Others, like the risk of a company lawsuit or insider trading 
liability, do not. Thus, safe harbors that reduce legal risk do much to 
facilitate shareholder action. The cost of complying with the safe har-
bor is likely to exhibit scale economies, while the risk of violating the 
underlying rule may not. 
Scale economies also increase a proponent's incentive to spend 
once a proposal is made, and bring the proponent's spending level 
closer to the socially optimal level of spending by the shareholders of 
that company seen in isolation. The proponent will again choose a 
spending level at "'.hich her private marginal return from more spend-
ing is zero. From equation (5), that will occur when:206 
d[P*B - Cc - C;(l-e)/FJ/dC; = 0---+ dP/dC; = (1-e)/(B*Fi) 
At that spending level, the marginal per-company social benefit from 
spending is (1-e}(l/F; - 1). 
205. The potential economies are reduced because different SEC staffers review the proxy 
materials for the same proposal made by the same proponent at different companies. The staffers 
predictably raise different and sometimes inconsistent objections, and may also object to wording 
that had been cleared by someone else the year before. See CalPERS Proposal, supra note 62, at 
8, 22, in 1 PRACTISING LAW INsr. (1990), supra note 62, at 305, 319. 
206. The derivation assumes that e is independent of C;. If e depends on C1, the equation in 
the text will still hold if we use the local scale economy factor e that applies at the optimal 
spending level. 
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If scale economies are large (e close to 1), most of the social gain 
from additional spending that was lost in the one-company case will be 
captured. In the extreme case where (1 - e) is less than F;, the propo-
nent will spend more than would seem socially optimal if we look at 
one company at a time.207 A reasonable scale economy factor for, say, 
a poison pill or confidential voting proposal might bee = 0.75 or 0.80. 
With changes in legal rules, this could plausibly climb to 0.90 or so. 
The combination of group action and an issue with strong econo-
mies of scale can lead to strong incentives for shareholder action. As-
sume, for example, that five 2 % shareholders combine forces to make 
proposals at a number of companies, on an issue where common costs 
are 75% of total solicitation costs. The proponents' per share solicita-
tion cost will be only one twentieth of the cost incurred by a 2% share-
holder making a proposal only once. And where the 2% shareholder 
will stop spending when the marginal social gain from spending an 
extra dollar is $49, the 10% group will spend until the marginal gain 
per company is (1 - e}{l/F; - 1) = $2.25. 
In sum, collective action problems reduce both the frequency with 
which proponents make proposals, and the vigor with which the pro-
ponents lobby for the proposals they make. But at current levels of 
ownership concentration, collective action problems are not the enor-
mous barrier to shareholder action that the passivity story makes them 
out to be, especially for issues with substantial scale economies. We 
need to look elsewhere - especially to legal obstacles and conflicts of 
interest - to understand why shareholders so rarely make proposals, 
and why the proposals they make so rarely succeed. I tum next to the 
second major collective action problem posited by the passivity story: 
the supposed apathy of nonproponent shareholders. 
VI. THE INCENTIVES OF NONPROPONENT SHAREHOLDERS 
If the managers or a shareholder proponent make a proposal, how 
will the nonproponent shareholders react? One possibility is that they 
won't react at all. Becoming informed takes time, which is a scarce 
resource, and a shareholder who holds a tiny stake knows that her 
vote probably won't be decisive anyway. Thus, shareholders will stay 
uninformed. Perhaps they won't vote at all; perhaps they'll adopt a 
crude rule of thumb like "always vote with management"; what they 
won't do is vote intelligently. If such rational apathy were universal 
and the natural default rule was "vote with management," the propo-· 
207. The proponent will not in fact overspend. Instead, the socially optimal level of spending 
will also increase, to a level that maximizes the social gain from additional spending: 
d[P*B - C. - C;(l - e) - C0(l - o)]/dC; = 0 ~ dP/dC; = (1 - e)/B. 
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nent's position would be hopeless, the managers' control of the vote 
absolute. Apathy is consistent with evidence that various antitakeover 
actions - dual-class recapitalizations; some types of antitakeover 
amendments; poison pills - have a significant negative impact on 
stock price, but shareholders nonetheless approve them (or, for poison 
pills, vote against proposals seeking a shareholder vote on the pill). 208 
Apathy is not automatic, however. Shareholders have a choice: 
remain apathetic or become informed. This Part presents a simple 
model of the factors that affect that choice. To state the results first: 
shareholders can't entirely free ride on the efforts of others. If there is 
a critical mass of other informed shareholders, so that a shareholder's 
vote might matter, her ride is not free, merely cheap. 209 Indeed, apa-
thy becomes exponentially less attractive as shareholdings grow. A 
shareholder who owns 100 shares has an incentive to become informed 
10,000 times greater than a shareholder who owns a single share. 
Institutions can also realize strong economies of scale when they 
evaluate similar proposals at a number of portfolio companies. 
NYCERS might see 50 poison pill resolutions a year, with only minor 
variations. It has a far greater incentive to make an informed voting 
decision than a shareholder who owns the same stake in a single com-
pany. The combined effect of large holdings and economies of scale 
can be staggering: If NYCERS owns a million shares and sees a pro-
posal 50 times, it has five billion times more incentive to become in-
formed than a 100-share holder! 
One possible conclusion: Rational apathy may be less important 
than commonly believed in explaining how large institutions vote. We 
may need to look elsewhere - to agenda control and especially to 
conflicts of interest - to understand why many institutions vote 
against apparent self-interest on, say, antitakeover amendments and 
dual class recapitalizations. 
A. The Decision To Become Informed 
I assume that a proponent makes a voting proposal, that nonpro-
ponent shareholders seek to maximize their private wealth, and that 
208. On antitakeover amendments, see, for example, Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, The Market 
for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980. 2 J. EcoN. PERSP. 49, 59-62 (1988) 
(collecting studies). On dual-class recapitalizations, see, for example, Jarrell & Poulsen, Dual-
Class Recapitalizations as Antitakeover Mechanisms: The Recent Evidence, 20 J. FIN. EcoN. 129 
(1988). On poison pills, see, for example, Malatesta & Walkling, Poison Pill Securities: Stock-
holder Wealth, Profitability, and Ownership Structure, 20 J. FIN. EcoN. 347 (1988); Ryngaert, 
The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J. FIN. EcoN. 377 (1988). 
209. Stigler, Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regula-
tion, 5 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 359 (1974), makes a similar point for firm decisions to join 
an industry lobbying effort. 
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each nonproponent must choose between two possible information 
states: informed and (relatively) uninformed. This obviously oversim-
plifies the continuum of possible levels of information. In particular, a 
totally uninformed shareholder wouldn't be able to make the crude 
estimates that the model assumes an uninformed shareholder can 
make. Total ignorance does not seem a good description oflarge insti-
tutions, though it may describe some individual shareholders who dis-
card their proxy statements unread. Let: 
b' the shareholder's uninformed estimate of the expected 
change in per share firm value if a proposal is adopted. 
b = the shareholder's informed estimate of the expected change 
in per share firm value if a proposal is adopted. 
P± - the probability that b and b' will have different signs, as 
estimated by an uninformed shareholder. 
b± - the expected difference lb - b'I between the uninformed and 
informed value estimates, given that they have different 
signs. 
c0 - the shareholder's cost to become informed. I assume that 
the cost of making the crude estimates b', p±, and p0 is 
negligible, as is the cost of voting. 
p0 = the likelihood that the shareholder's vote will affect whether 
the proposal succeeds, as estimated by an uninformed 
shareholder. 
f0 - the shareholder's fractional ownership of the company's 
shares. I assume, as above, that the firm has one share 
outstanding. 
The shareholder will vote "yes" if the expected benefit from the 
proposal b orb' is positive, and "no" if the expected change is nega-
tive. The expected gain from becoming informed, evaluated while un-
informed, equals the probability p ± that more information will change 
the shareholder's vote, times the probability p0 that the shareholder's 
vote will affect the outcome, times the expected gain lo * b ± from a 
change in outcome. The shareholder will become informed if this gain 
exceeds the cost c0 of becoming informed. 
Become Informed If: p± * p0 * b± * f0 > c0 (6) 
The likelihood p0 that a shareholder's vote will affect the outcome 
will depend on the nature and importance of the proposal, the exist-
ence of other large shareholders, how those shareholders are expected 
to vote, and the shareholder's ownership stakefo. For a small percent-
age stake fo, which is the norm for even a large institution, we can use 
a linear approximation: p0 = A' * fo. 
Here A' incorporates the other factors on which p0 depends. The 
intuition behind this approximation is simple: the vote of a share-
holder who owns ten shares is ten times as likely to affect the outcome 
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as the vote of a shareholder who owns one share. 210 We can now mod-
ify equation (9) to read: 
Become Informed If: A * b± * f02 > c0 (7) 
where A = A' * P.± is a modified background term. 
The shareholder's decision to become informed thus depends on 
four factors: the background term A ; the expected benefit from be-
coming informed b ... ; the shareholder's ownership levelJ.,; and the cost 
c0 to become informed. Consider first the shareholder's ownership J.,. 
The potential gain and the probability that the shareholder's vote will 
change the outcome both increase with ownership level, so the incen-
tive to become informed increases as lo squared. A large shareholder 
may still remain uninformed if the background term A is very small or 
the issue unimportant. But other things being equal, rational apathy 
makes exponentially less sense for a large shareholder than for a small 
shareholder. If legal rules that keep ownership percentages low and 
discourage joint action are important for proponents, they are doubly 
so for nonproponents. 
The background term A reflects a probabilistic assessment of the 
decisions that other shareholders are expected to make. If manage-
ment has a favorable vote essentially locked up, because it holds a 
dominant stake or because all other shareholders are small and ex-
pected to vote promanager, then A will be small, and even a large 
shareholder may decide to remain uninformed. Institutional owner-
ship can, however, reach a critical mass where becoming informed 
makes sense. As total institutional ownership grows, it makes more 
sense for each institution to become informed, because it knows that 
other institutions will face the same choice, and will probably also de-
cide to become informed. Similarly, as ownership becomes more con-
centrated, each shareholder's incentive to make an informed choice 
becomes stronger.211 
Large shareholders can also talk to each other; assess with a few 
phone calls whether a vote is likely to be close and therefore worth 
210. Cf Chamberlain & Rothschild, A Note on the Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote, 25 
J. EcoN. THEORY 152 (1981) (in election with n voters, each of whom will vote yes with 
probability p, where p has a probability distribution/<PJ that is nonzero near p= 1/2, the likeli-
hood that any given vote will affect the outcome is of order l/n). 
211. In theory, the background term A could decline again if institutional ownership was 
extremely high. Conflicts of interest aside, all shareholders have the same interest in increasing 
company value, and thus are likely to vote the same way if informed. Knowing this, institution I 
may decide to remain uninformed, and rely on institutions 2-50 to vote the right way. This 
scenario seems unlikely, however. Institutions don't all vote alike, whether due to conflicts of 
interest or for other reasons, which makes it important for each institution to vote. Moteover, 
institutions can share information. Institution I can cheaply call up informed institution 2, and 
follow its lead on how to vote. 
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careful attention; discuss how they plan to vote or what it will take to 
change their vote. Such informal coordination, which is feasible for 
large nonproponent shareholders, both increases the chance that a 
shareholder's vote will matter and makes it easier to assess that 
chance. Nonproponent shareholders must stop sort of explicit agree-
ments on how they will vote, lest they become a 13(d) group, and they 
face some legal risk just for talking to each other, but limited coordi-
nation is better than none. 
The data presented in Part IV suggest that if a critical mass must 
be reached before informed voting makes sense, we have reached or 
are close to reaching that mass for many large companies. Some 
shareholder proposals win; some manager proposals lose; other man-
ager proposals are never made because a loss seems likely. Moreover, 
proxy campaign participants act as if the votes of large holders matter. 
The small holders get the mass-mailed proxy statement; the big hold-
ers also get letters, telephone calls, and personal meetings. Some 
shareholder proponents take institutional ownership levels into ac-
count in deciding whether to offer a proposal - the higher the bet-
ter. 212 Major shareholders also act as if their votes count. Legal risk 
notwithstanding, they talk to each other about how to vote; sometimes 
they cut deals with one side or the other in return for a favorable vote. 
Indeed, conflicts of interest arise in large part because the big holders' 
votes matter. Otherwise, corporate officers wouldn't need to twist 
money managers' arms for favorable votes. 
The per share benefit b ± is straightfonvard. The more important 
the proposal, the more likely the shareholder is to become informed. 
Since the firm, by assumption, has only one share outstanding, b ± in-
creases with firm size. Thus, the larger the firm, the greater the incen-
tive to become informed, holding percentage ownership constant. 
Since other nonproponent shareholders will have similar incentives, 
the background term A will also be higher for an important proposal, 
or a proposal at a large company. 
Finally, the lower the cost c0 , the greater the nonproponent's in-
centive to become informed. Here, the Proxy Rules both help and 
hurt. They help because the proxy statement conveys some informa-
tion about the proposal; to vote, a shareholder need only sign and mail 
the accompanying proxy card. Purchase of information and advice 
from third-party providers would also reduce c0 , but the Proxy Rules 
largely bar this source of information. Preclearance, by increasing the 
212. Telephone conversation with Richard Koppes, CalPERS General Counsel (Nov. 1, 
1990). 
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proponents' cost to provide information, may also decrease at the mar-
gin the amount of information provided. 
Even beyond the proxy statement, much of the spending by share-
holder proponents and managers involves an effort to inform nonpro-
ponent shareholders. Some of that information will affect the 
perceived importance b ± of a voting issue; some will facilitate the non-
proponent's information gathering, thus reducing the cost c0 • 
Though the nonproponent's ride on the efforts of others is not free, 
it is still cheap; each shareholder's incentive to become informed is less 
than socially optimal. The shareholder will become informed when 
the private benefit from doing so b ± *lo, times the likelihood A *lo 
that becoming informed matters, exceeds private cost c(J' Shareholders 
as a group will benefit if an individual shareholder becomes informed 
when the total benefit to all shareholders (which I will denote B±), 
times the likelihood that becoming informed matters, exceeds the 
shareholder's cost: 
B± *A* f0 > Co 
In the simple case where the shareholder's benefit estimate b± 
equals the average estimate B ± made by all shareholders, social gain 
exceeds private gain by a factor of J/lo. 213 Thus some shareholders 
will stay uninformed when it would be socially optimal for them to 
become informed. Legal rules that allow large shareholdings, or facili-
tate shareholder coalitions, will increase lo and thus make it more 
likely that nonproponents will become informed when that's the so-
cially desirable result. 
B. Economies of Scale 
Scale economies increase nonproponent incentives to become in-
formed. To model this, let: 
c0 - the shareholder's cost to become informed about a proposal, 
if made at only one company. 
o - the fractional reduction in the nonproponents' per company 
cost due to scale economies. 
The per-company cost to become informed is then reduced to 
ell - o). The shareholder will become informed if, from equation 
(7): 
[A * b± * fo2]/(1 - o) > Co (8) 
For nonproponents the scale economy factor o can be very close to 
one. Some of the proponent's costs to present a proposal are common, 
213. B± is both an estimated total benefit to all shareholders and an ownership-weighted 
average benefit because the firm has one share outstanding. 
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but others are not. In contrast, for many process and structural pro-
posals, virtually all of the nonproponent's costs will be common. 
Thus, where a proponent may achieve scale economies of e = 0. 75 or 
so; a nonproponent who sees many similar proposals a year can 
achieve scale economies of o = 0.95 or higher. Also, though not di-
rectly reflected in the model, nonproponents who own stock in the 
same companies and see the same issues over and over again will find 
it easier to talk informally to each other, which can increase the back-
ground term A.· 
A numerical example can illustrate the combined effect of large 
size and strong economies of scale. Suppose that a staggered board 
reduces company value by 1 % on average, that 80% of all public com-
panies would adopt staggered boards if they could get shareholder ap-
proval, and that staggered board proposals will pass if institutions 
remain uninformed. The expected loss to an institution with a $25 
billion stock portfolio if these companies all adopt staggered boards is 
$25 billion X .8 (fraction of portfolio companies that adopt staggered 
boards) X 0.01 (fractional loss in value) = $200 million. With a cost 
to become informed of a few thousand dollars, can apathy be rational? 
Even one chance in ten thousand that one's vote will matter provides 
ample reason to become informed. In today's environment, the 
chance that the vote of an institution of that size will matter is far 
higher than that. 
Several additional poiµts are not reflected in the model. First, pen-
sion funds, under Department of Labor rules, must vote and establish 
procedures to ensure that the vote is informed. Such antiapathy rules 
can force dispersed shareholders to make a collectively desirable in-
vestment in informed voting. They may also mitigate conflicts of in-
terest, because informed shareholders may find it harder to paper over 
their conflicts. 
Second, to make good trading decisions, money managers need in-
formation about corporate governance proposals that affect share 
prices, just as they need information about financial performance. 
Thus, managers who trade actively should become informed if the vot-
ing benefits plus the trading benefits exceed the cost of becoming in-
formed. Trading benefits depend not on the relatively low chance that 
the trader's vote will matter, but instead on the probability that the 
proposal will succeed. That probability is high for manager proposals, 
and, as institutional holdings grow, may become significant for some 
shareholder proposals as well.214 Indeed, the price impact of corpo-
214. Private trading benefits can, in theory, lead to institutions spending more than is socially 
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rate governance issues is in tension with the claim that institutions are 
uninformed. Someone must be informed, or else prices wouldn't 
change. In the usual explanation for efficient markets, institutions 
form most of the cadre of well-informed investors who set prices at the 
margin.215 If they aren't informed, who is? 
Third, uninformed shareholders won't always vote promanager. 
Small shareholders might use such a default rule because the manag-
ers' recommendations are often (though not always) wealth-increas-
ing.216 But a large shareholder, even one who remains poorly 
informed, can adopt a more sophisticated default strategy, in which 
the uninformed estimate b' is positive for some types of proposals and 
negative for others. Finally, some smaller shareholders will become 
informed, rationally or otherwise. Perhaps they enjoy voting; perhaps 
. they read the proxy statement to learn about the business they've in-
vested in; perhaps they think their vote counts. Whatever the reason, 
some small shareholders seem to make informed judgments.217 
The analysis above suggests that large institutiolls already have sig-
nificant incentives to become informed voters in many situations. If 
so, we need an explanation other than rational apathy for why many 
institutions vote promanager even against self-interest as measured by 
stock price. Parts VII and VIII explore two possible explanations: 
agenda control by corporate managers and money manager conflicts 
of interest. 
VII. AGENDA CONTROL BY CORPORATE MANAGERS 
Legal and collective action obstacles to shareholder action are only 
part of the managers' advantage in a voting contest. Managers also 
have important agenda control advantages, especially for their own 
proposals. Some of these advantages are created by legal rules, others 
are not, but legal rules could produce a more level playing field. This 
Part describes the managers' agenda control advantages, and the ex-
optimal to become informed. See generally s. GROSSMAN, THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF 
PRICES (1989). 
215. See Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549 
(1984). 
216. See Bebchuk (1989), supra note 17, at 1839. 
217. See K. VAN NUYS, MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL: EVI-
DENCE FROM THE 1988 PROXY SEASON (University of Rochester Working Paper, 1990). Van 
Nuys estimates that in the 1988 proxy season, 53% ofnoninstitutional, noninsider shareholders 
voted for blank check preferred stock proposals, 59% voted for proposals to limit shareholder 
power to act by written consent or call a special meeting, and 61 % voted for proposals to require 
supermajority approval of a merger. The rest voted no, abstained, or didn't vote. Many small 
shareholders simply didn't vote, but the differences between types of proposals suggest that some 
small shareholders make informed judgments. 
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tent to which those advantages derive from legal rules. Section A dis-
cusses the managers' control over proposal packaging and timing for 
their own proposals. Section B discusses the managers' partial control 
over proposal timing for shareholder proposals. Part VIII will discuss 
the managers' further advantages from being able to pressure some 
institutional investors to remain passive or vote in ways that decrease 
share value. 
A. Agenda Control for Managers' Proposals 
Corporate managers have important advantages in seeking share-
holder approval for the managers' proposals. Managers control what 
the shareholders get to vote on, when they get to vote, what order 
proposals are offered in, and when the shareholders learn what's on 
the agenda. The managers can, among other things, tie a "good" 
(shareholder wealth increasing) proposal to a "bad" (shareholder 
wealth decreasing) one, offer a proposal that increases but doesn't 
maximize shareholder wealth, or threaten to take bad actions (or forgo 
good actions) if shareholders don't approve a change. Managers can 
also spend corporate funds, essentially without limit, to lobby for a 
favorable result. Such agenda control matters. In the political arena, 
scholars are starting to unravel the ways in which agenda affects sub-
stantive outcome. A fair summary of recent research is that agenda 
matters more, and in more different situations, than we used to think it 
did.218 
First, the managers control what the shareholders vote on. Some 
examples may illustrate why this matters. First, the rare proxy fight 
aside, shareholders vote for or against a slate of directors selected by 
the managers. Shareholders can't propose their own nominees, or 
even choose among more candidates than there are positions to be fil-
led. The managers' candidates win routinely, with an overwhelming 
percentage of the vote. But that no more shows the voters' true prefer-
ences than the equally overwhelming support enjoyed by political can-
didates in one-party "elections." Even in a proxy fight, the managers 
can change the number of directors and the qualifications for directors 
in midcontest. 
A second example is blank check preferred stock. Blank check 
preferred is a useful financing tool, but also has antitakeover value. In 
particular, it's an essential component of most poison pills. Managers 
218. See, e.g., Levine & Plott, Agenda Influence and its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561 
(1977); Hammond & Thomas, The Impossibility of a Neutral Hierarchy, 5 J.L. EcoN. & ORO. 
155 (1989). For discussion of managers' agenda control for charter amendments, see, for exam-
ple, Bebchuk (1989), supra note 17, at 1836-40; Gordon (1989), supra note 17, at 1573-80. 
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ask for and normally receive complete blank check authority, even 
though the shareholders might prefer to limit the uses to which the 
blank check stock can be put. Similarly, companies routinely seek au-
thority to issue many more shares of common stock than are currently 
outstanding, without limiting the purposes for which the shares can be 
used. 
A third example illustrates some of the complexities of agenda con-
trol. In 1987, Holiday Corporation asked its shareholders to vote on a 
single proposal encompassing: (i) a massive special dividend; (ii) 
grants to Holiday managers of restricted stock representing 10% of 
the company's equity; (iii) an amended stock option plan that quin-
tupled the number of shares issuable upon the exercise of outstanding 
options; and (iv) a "capped voting" charter amendment that, for five 
years, limited any shareholder or group to 10% of the total voting 
power.219 To no one's surprise, the shareholders approved the propo-
sal. Some shareholders thought the managers were being greedy, but 
they weren't given the chance to vote for, say, a dividend with less 
generous stock grants. Within three years, the managers' restricted 
stock was worth over $200 million and the stock options were worth 
multimillions more. 220 
A company's managers control not only what the shareholders 
vote on, but when. Managers routinely engage proxy solicitors to esti-
mate the chance that a proposal will pass. If a favorable vote seems 
doubtful this year, the managers can wait for a more propitious mo-
ment. Managers can also count the votes as they come in and with-
draw or modify in midvote a proposal that seems likely to fail, or 
adjourn the shareholder meeting to allow more time to gather support. 
The managers also control the order in which matters appear on 
the shareholders' agenda. If proposals 1 and 2, taken together, might 
produce strong opposition, they can be offered and adopted one at a 
time. If proposal 2 would be voted down if offered first, but approved 
if proposal 1 has been previously adopted, then ordering will affect 
outcome. Proxy solicitors can advise managers what probably will 
and won't pass. Blank check preferred stock again provides an exam-
ple. A blank check preferred proposal may succeed if the managers 
place it in an otherwise plain vanilla proxy statement and stress its 
219. Proxy Statement of Holiday Corp., Jan. 29, 1987, at 1-2; see also, e.g., Proxy Statement 
of Morton Thiokol, May 24, 1989, at 1-2 (single proposal for spinoff of subsidiary, antitakeover 
amendments, and new stock bonus plan). 
220. See Loeffelholz, Death Song, FIN. WORLD, Feb. 7, 1989, at 18, 19 (some Wall Streeters 
think the stock grant "really reflects management's greed"); Cowan, Holiday's Plan to Cut Incen-
tives, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1989, at D2, col. 1 (restricted stock worth over $200 million at 
current prices). 
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value as a financing tool, but may fail if placed on the same ballot with 
three other antitakeover amendments. Next year, the managers can 
propose the other antitakeover amendments. 
The managers also control when the shareholders learn what's on 
the agenda. The shareholders usually have no notice of matters to be 
voted on until they receive the proxy statement, about a month before 
the meeting. This makes it extremely hard for shareholders to develop 
a counterproposal or an opposing solicitation, get it cleared by the 
SEC, and then lobby against management's proposal. The 30-day pe-
riod is already the practical minimum for reaching individual share-
holders through layers of nominee holders and getting votes back. 
Thus an opponent must rely almost exclusively on institutional sup-
port. The harder it is for shareholders to offer alternatives to manager 
proposals, the greater the managers' control over the outcome. A 
political analogy is to floor amendments in the House or Senate: rules 
that restrict floor amendments increase committee control over the fi-
nal bill.221 
Moreover, managers have superior information about the votes as 
they come in. A shareholder who solicits votes against a management 
proposal without using a separate proxy card won't see the ballots, 
and thus won't know the outcome until after the meeting. If success 
seems doubtful, the managers have various options, including in-
creased campaign efforts, targeted lobbying of shareholders who have 
voted against them, strategic withdrawal of a proposal, and compro-
mise on favorable terms with a shareholder proponent who is less well-
informed about the likely outcome, and thus disposed to compromise. 
Shareholder tendency to accept a compromise is compounded by 
reimbursement rules that permit but don't require the company to re-
imburse the shareholder's expenses. As part of a compromise, the 
company can agree to pay the proponent's expenses; even if it doesn't, 
settlement reduces the overall cost of the contest. In contrast, success 
at the polls carries no likelihood of reimbursement. 
B. Managers' Timing Control for Shareholder Proposals 
For shareholder proposals, managers lose their proposal packaging 
edge, but retain a significant procedural edge. For shareholder pro-
posals included in the company proxy statement, like the managers' 
own proposals, the managers have superior information about the 
votes as they are cast, with concomitant ability to increase campaign 
221. J. ROBINSON, THE HOUSE RULES CoMMfITEE 44-46 (1963), discusses the importance 
of House Rules Committee control over when and in what order bills are voted on, and of House 
rules limiting floor amendments. 
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efforts, resolicit shareholders who cast antimanager votes, or reach a 
favorable compromise with a less-informed shareholder proponent. 
And, of course, 'the managers retain their funding advantage. 
Shareholder proponents must send proposals that will be included 
in the company proxy statement to the company a full five months 
before the annual meeting, ample time for the managers to prepare 
their opposition. Increasingly, advance notice bylaws give the manag-
ers ample time to defend against shareholder proposals not included in 
the company proxy statement as well. In contrast, the managers 
needn't show their hand until they mail the company proxy statement. 
The managers can also manipulate the date of the shareholder 
meeting. State law gives the managers substantial though not unlim-
ited power to postpone or adjourn a meeting to allow more time for 
lobbying, or move up the meeting date to give the proponent less time 
to solicit support. Such tactics are routinely used in proxy fights, and 
may become common for other matters if shareholders begin to win 
more often. 222 Delaying the meeting has the fringe benefit of running 
up the proponent's tab, since the delay allows more time for solicita-
tion, countersolicitation, and legal battles. 
Agenda control and collective action issues interact. The more 
costly it is for shareholders to offer alternatives, the stronger the man-
agers' agenda control. Collective action factors, in tum, reduce share-
holder willingness to bear the cost of offering alternatives. There is a 
common, though only partial solution to both problems - make it 
easier for shareholders to oppose manager proposals and make their 
own proposals, especially alternatives to management proposals. 
Managers also have a critical substantive edge for many share-
holder proposals. Apart· from director elections, bylaw amendments, 
and a few other matters, shareholder proposals don't bind the manag-
ers. If the managers adopt a poison pill and the shareholders ask that 
it be redeemed, the managers can simply refuse, and the shareholders 
have little recourse short of a proxy fight. 
VIII. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
Discussions of shareholder voting often treat the "shareholder" as 
a simple entity that maximizes return on investment. The real story is 
222. See, e.g., ER Holdings Inc. v. Norton Co., 735 F. Supp. 1094 (D. Mass.), ajfd., 901 F.2d 
142 (1st Cir. 1990); Terrell, Can Stockholders' Annual Meetings Be Postponed in the Midst of a · 
Proxy Contest?, INSIGHTS, Oct. 1990, at 12 (collecting Delaware cases). Lockheed used the less 
common strategy of accelerating the meeting date in its 1990 proxy fight with NL Industries. See 
Gavin (forthcoming 1991), supra note 148. For an example of adjournment for an antitakeover 
proposal, see Quint (1989), supra note 179. 
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far more complex. Institutional investors, like the companies whose 
shares they own, are managed by managers who need watching and 
appropriate incentives. Moreover, the single phrase "institutional in-
vestor" obscures important differences between institutions. 
This Part examines institutional money manager incentives and 
conflicts of interest, and the evidence on how these conflicts alter pat-
terns of voting and activism. Conflicts can strongly skew the decision 
to become visibly active on corporate governance issues. They can 
also skew, though less strongly, how institutions vote on someone 
else's proposal. It's no accident that public funds are in the forefront 
of the nascent institutional shareholder movement, mutual funds are 
somewhere in the middle, and bank trust departments and insurers 
remain mostly promanager.223 
A. Corporate Pension Funds 
Corporate pension funds are the largest category of institutional 
investor; they own almost one sixth of all stocks. Most companies rely 
on outside money managers to invest their pension fund assets; a mi-
nority manage pension assets in-house. Most companies delegate vot-
ing authority along with investment authority, but some delegate only 
investment authority.224 Thus, there are three patterns to be evalu-
ated: investment and voting by an outside money manager; invest-
ment and voting in-house; and investment by an outside manager with 
in-house voting.225 
Consider first the most common pattern: outside money managers 
who both purchase and vote pension plan shares. These managers 
have a duty to their beneficiaries to cast votes that enhance share 
value.226 The first prerequisite for a money manager, though, is 
money to manage. Existing corporate clients must be kept happy, new 
223. The best survey of the explicit and implicit pressures on money managers to vote in 
particular ways is J. HEARD & H. SHERMAN (1987), supra note 190; see also, e.g., Rock (forth-
coming 1991), supra note 27; B. KRIKORIAN (1989), supra note 110; U.S. DEPARTMENT OP 
LABOR, PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION, PROXY PROJECT REPORT (Mar. 
2, 1989) [hereinafter LABOR DEPARTMENT REPORT]; EMPLOYEE BENEFIT REsEARCH INST., 
VOTING PRIVATE PENSION PROXIES: SOME NEW EVIDENCE AND SOME OLD QUESTIONS (Is-
sue Brief No. 70, 1987); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, ABUSE ON WALL STREET: CONFLICTS 
OF INTEREST IN THE SECURmES MARKETS (1980). 
224. See J. HEARD & H. SHERMAN (1987), supra note 190, at 12-14. 
225. Partial delegation of voting power is also possible: the corporate sponsor can delegate 
voting power only for routine issues; retain the right to override the money manager's decision; 
require in-house review of antimanager votes; or delegate voting power to some money managers 
but not others. Companies typically use partial delegation schemes to ensure promanager votes, 
much as other companies, with like intent, delegate investment power but not voting power. 
226. For a well-funded defined-benefit plan, the residual gains from better performance go 
primarily to the corporate sponsor (and indirectly to its shareholders) rather than to plan benefi-
ciaries. See Fischel & Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit 
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clients attracted. When the plan's interests counsel a promanager 
vote, no conflict arises. The interesting case is when the plan's inter-
ests counsel an antimanager vote. 
At one level, the need to attract business is consistent with fiduci-
ary duty. Better performance means more money to manage. But 
there are powerful countervailing incentives. Pension managers face 
pressure from corporate officers to vote promanager. Sometimes, the 
pressure is explicit: the CEO of the sponsoring company orders or 
urges a money manager to vote promanager, either in general or on a 
particular issue. Or a CEO of one company writes to other CEOs, 
urging them to ask their fund managers to vote promanager. Such 
pressure is especially effective when the fund manager must vote for or 
against a client company's own proposal. 
Most money managers have felt such explicit pressure on occasion. 
In a 1987 survey, half of all corporate pension officers thought it "ap-
propriate" to advise pension money managers how to vote proxies on 
. other companies' proposals; 75% thought this appropriate for their 
own company's proposals. Half of those who thought such action ap-
propriate had taken it. The money managers overwhelmingly took the 
advice; only 7% did not vote the corporate party line.227 
Overt pressure has become less common since the Labor Depart-
ment began to scrutinize pension plan voting practices in 1988.228 But 
the pressures haven't gone away, they've just become less explicit or 
gone underground. 229 A phone call asking how the manager intends 
to vote will convey the message nicely. Even money managers who 
haven't been overtly pressed to change their votes feel implicit pres-
sure to vote promanager. Current clients will know, and some pro-
spective clients will ask, about voting policies, and money managers 
know the answer those clients want to hear. 
Despite these pressures, some money managers will cast anti-
manager votes, whether from concern for legal liability or desire to 
improve performance. Voting, after all, is usually a low visibility mat-
ter. It's an order of magnitude harder, though, to take the highly visi-
ble step of presenting one's own proposal, and spending plan assets to 
support that proposal. That might scare off corporate pension officers 
Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1105 (1988). This distinction, however, isn't important for an outside 
money manager, whose task is simply to increase plan assets. 
227. Pension/arum: Taking the Offensive, INST. INVESTOR, Dec. 1987, at 101. 
228. See, e.g., Avon Products Letter, supra note 116; Monks Letter, supra note 116; LABOR 
DEPARTMENT REPORT (1989), supra note 223. 
229. And maybe not that far underground. See, e.g., Gavin (forthcoming 1991), supra note 
148 (proxy solicitor John Gavin explains that: "a call from the client ... can sometimes swing a 
[money manager's] negative vote to a positive"). 
598 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:520 
who wouldn't ask about the manager's voting policies, or who prefer 
to hire money managers who vote the plan's economic interests as 
long as those votes can be taken quietly. The fiduciary role provides a 
second, strong inducement for money managers to do no more than 
vote plan shares on whatever proposals happen to be made. The gains 
from activism go mostly to the pension plan's beneficiaries, while the 
fiduciary risks personal liability for the losses. 
Consider next the company that keeps both investment and voting 
power in-house. In-house money managers have only one client, and 
will obviously do that client's bidding. That probably means voting 
promanager, but not always, because of the countervailing incentives 
to increase returns and avoid ERISA liability. In-house managers are 
highly unlikely, though, to make waves by offering their own propos-
als. If company A owned a large stake in underperforming company 
B, A's managers might decide to seek change on a quiet, informal ba-
sis. But the large stakes that would justify such action don't often 
exist. 
The third alternative - delegating investment power and retaining 
voting power - is potentially the most conflict-ridden. The corporate 
pension officer can happily vote promanager, free of the countervailing 
incentive to increase returns, which remains the money manager's 
task. As Labor Department scrutiny has made it harder for compa-
nies to control how money managers vote, more corporate managers 
are choosing this course. Often, the conscious purpose is to ensure 
promanager· votes. 230 
In sum, some corporate pension fund managers, some of the time, 
will vote the plan's interests even when that requires an antimanager 
vote. But we can't expect corporate pension managers to become visi-
bly active in the best of circumstances, and some corporate officers are 
trying to limit antimanager votes by bringing voting power in-house. 
B. Public Pension Funds 
Public pension funds have been the principal players in the recent 
movement toward greater institutional activism. They have two im-
portant characteristics not shared by most corporate pension funds: 
size and independence. Fourteen of the twenty largest pension funds, 
230. See Pension Fund Sponsors Urged to Retain Control of Proxy Voting, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) 979 (1990); Business Roundtable: Bring the Vote Inside, INSTITUTIONAL SHARE· 
HOLDER SERVS., INC., Issue Alert, Dec. 1989, at 3. Clifford Whitehill of General Mills has sug-
gested to me the more hopeful possibility that corporate managers, once they bring voting in-
house, will realize that not all manager proposals deserve support. He believes that this has 
happened at General Mills. 
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for example, are public funds.231 Public fund managers don't solicit 
business from corporate managers, so they aren't directly concerned 
with whether corporate managers like how they vote. Their incentives 
for maximum effort on their beneficiaries' behalf are still limited, since 
the beneficiaries get the upside, but at least those incentives aren't per-
verted by direct conflicts. Public funds are also governed by the com-
mon law of trusts rather than ERISA, which gives them somewhat 
more legal maneuvering room. Moreover, public fund managers may 
be less deeply imbued with the prevailing passivity norm than their 
private-sector counterparts.232 
Public funds do have conflicting incentives. Public fund managers 
need to be good political operators as well as good money managers. 
Some even have to run for election. They may become active share-
holders partly to generate good publicity for themselves. Politicians, 
who ultimately control public funds, may want to support popular 
causes, control how the fund votes on antitakeover measures, or use 
the fund's voting power for political ends (trading, say, a promanager 
vote for a promise of local investment). Corporate managers will sup-
port political moves to restrict fund power.233 A public fund will hesi-
tate before voting against antitakeover measures proposed by a local 
company, even if it opposes such measures generally.234 
The ultimate political outcome is uncertain, but thus far, these 
conflicts have been manageable. Politicians aren't shy about calling 
fund managers to express their views, but they don't receive knee-jerk 
obeisance. 235 Some public funds support social responsibility propos-
als, but many others don't. Many states try to get their pension funds 
231. See Brancato (forthcoming 1991), supra note 168, table 4. 
232. Multiemployer pension plans are also substantially independent of corporate managers. 
But these plans aren't very large. Multiemployer plans currently own about $42 billion in stocks, 
or about 1.2% of U.S. equities. See Employee Benefit Research Inst., Quarterly Pension Invest-
ment Report, June 1990, at 9. 
233. See, e.g., Our Money's Worth: Report of the Governor's Task Force on Pension Fund 
Investment (New York State Indus. Cooperation Council, June 1989) (advocating reforms that 
would decrease the independence of state pension funds); Franklin (1989), supra note 184 (Busi-
ness Council of New York State pushes bill to limit state pension fund power); Bartlett, Life in 
the Executive Suite After Drexel, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1990, § 3, at 1, col. 4 (political pressure 
caused Massachusetts public funds not to invest in the RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout). 
234. The makeup of a fund's board of trustees can also affect its willingness to be an active 
shareholder. Some CREF trustees are corporate officers, who argue for less activism (per anec-
dotal evidence). Similarly, half of the CalPERS trustees represent employers, and some oppose 
its activist posture. See White, Calpers' Chief Wields Big Stick for Institutional Shareholders, 
Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 1990, at Cl, col. 4. 
235. See, e.g., White, Pension Funds Stake Out New Territory, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1989, at 
Cl, col. 4 (public fund manager reports getting "pressure constantly from politicians, like any 
other state, but that usually is beaten off by people with better sense"). 
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to invest in local enterprises, even if investment returns suffer a bit.236 
But the funds oppose such efforts,237 and have limited local investing 
to a small fraction of their portfolios. State employees will support 
fund independence because, as pension beneficiaries, they want the 
funds to earn the best possible return on investment.238 
C. Banks 
Banks and bank holding companies own little stock for their own 
account. But they hold large amounts of stock as fiduciaries through 
their trust business and as money managers for corporate pension 
plans. In either capacity, banks have been relentlessly passive. Even 
more than independent managers of corporate pension money, they 
routinely vote promanager.239 
Several factors combine to explain bank passivity. Banks that 
manage corporate pension funds face the same conflicts as other man-
agers of such funds. Bank trust officers, in both their pension and 
trust business, also have a fiduciary's usual incentives for passivity. A 
further source of bank conflicts is their commercial lending business. 
Sometimes, banks manage pension money for their commercial bank-
ing clients. Often, a bank will hold stock in the companies to which it 
lends. Even without such overlaps, the bank won't want to develop a 
reputation for casting antimanager votes, lest it lose current or pro-
spective banking clients. Many banks have Chinese walls between 
their loan and trust departments, but this doesn't stop trust officers 
from knowing what votes the lending officers prefer. Trust officers 
also receive some overt pressure for a promanager vote, wall or no 
wan.240 
For the bank's noncorporate trust accounts, many clients are look-
ing for stability and are willing to accept less than stellar performance, 
so the countervailing desire to maximize returns may be weaker than 
for independent money managers. Indeed, active monitoring may in-
terfere with the bank's desired reputation as safe and stolid. 
236. See, e.g., Hinds, Public Pension Funds Tempt States in Need, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1989, 
at 1, col. 1; The Rise of Local Investing, INST. INVESTOR, Mar. 1990, at 79. 
237. See, e.g., White, Pension Funds to Politicians: Hands Off, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1989, at 
Cl, col. 3. 
238. See, e.g., Berss, One Hand Dirties the Other, FORBES, June 25, 1990, at 63 (Wisconsin 
Federation of Teachers supports Wisconsin Investment Board's active role on corporate 
governance). 
239. For an example of the conventional wisdom that banks vote promanager, see Could 
Girard Have Won the Proxy Fight?, CORP. CONTROL ALERT, Sept. 1990, at 11 {proxy solicitor 
Morrow & Co. describes banks and insurers as "the two groups most likely to support 
management"). 
240. See, e.g., J. HEARD & H. SHERMAN (1987), supra note 190, at 50. 
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The conflicts, while real, would not be insurmountable were the 
profit lure strong enough. In the 1980s, for example, money center 
banks made loans to hostile takeover bidders despite client objections 
and occasional client lawsuits. For plain vanilla commercial loans, re-
lationships matter because everyone's price is about the same, but such 
loans aren't a very profitable business. For voting, though, where the 
benefits go mostly to the beneficiaries, the profit lure has thus far been 
too weak to override the conflict. Habit and culture may also matter. 
Bankers who grew up when commercial lending was the heart of the 
bank's business may believe that antimanager votes cost them valuable 
business, even if the business is no longer that valuable. And the bene-
fits from active monitoring of corporate managers may appear nebu-
lous to conservative trust officers. 
D. Insurance Companies 
Insurance companies own significant amounts of stock for their 
own accounts, and have corresponding incentives to increase share 
value. But they also face important conflicts if they become too active 
on corporate governance. First, they may lose insurance business. 
Life and health insurers sell group and executive. policies to compa-
nies; property and casualty insurers insure companies against various 
risks. Also, insurers, like banks, are major lenders to corporations and 
manage large amounts of corporate pension money. Like banks, they 
may lose loan opportunities and pension business if they develop an 
antimanager reputation. Some insurers, such as Prudential and Equi-
table, own investment banks, and face the investment banks' own 
conflicts. 
On balance, insurers' conflicts seem similar in strength to bank 
conflicts. Some types of insurance - property and casualty in particu-
lar - are more complex products than bank loans. The pricing and 
terms of the insurance are likely to dominate client concerns about 
voting practices. And insurance company loans usually don't involve 
the same close working relationship between lender and borrower that 
bank loans do. On the other hand, insurers are less able to rely on 
fiduciary duty as a defense to corporate pressure, since much of their 
portfolio is held for their own account. 
E. Mutual Funds 
Mutual funds compete, in substantial part, on the basis of invest-
ment return. They consist mostly of pooled individual money, and 
thus should face less direct conflicts of interest than institutions that 
depend on corporate business. Some are controlled by investment 
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banks, which have strong incentives to keep clients happy, but many 
are independent. Some independent mutual funds will vote an-
timanager, but none have taken the next step and offered their own 
proposals. 
Possible explanations for why even independent mutual funds have 
been mostly passive to date, none perfect, include: (i) mutual funds 
often invest 401(k) and defined contribution pension plan funds for 
corporations, and thus face some of the same pressures as other corpo-
rate pension fund managers; (ii) mutual fund managers care about re-
ceiving soft information through analyst meetings and phone calls to 
company financial officers, and an activist posture may reduce that 
access; (iii) their marketing-based incentive to outperform the fund 
down the street may not be congruent with the long term, improve the 
company instead of sell the stock, orientation of an activist institution; 
and (iv) both shareholder activism and the large holdings of mutual 
fund groups may simply be too new for monitoring to have come to 
the forefront yet. 
The conflict of interest explanation is illustrated by episodes such 
as the decision by Armstrong World Industries, a principal supporter 
of the recent Pennsylvania antitakeover law, to switch its $180 million 
employee savings plan to Fidelity Investments from Vanguard Group, 
after Fidelity withdrew its opposition to the new law.241 Fidelity is a 
leader among mutual funds in opposing antitakeover laws, and 
changed its position in return for a significant weakening of the law's 
provisions. I have no reason to doubt Fidelity's public statement that 
its decision on the antitakeover law wasn't affected by its pending bid 
for Armstrong's business. But were Armstrong's motives so pure? 
Will other mutual funds remain silent, the better to compete with 
more outspoken funds? 
The access to soft information explanation is hard to evaluate. 
Companies often cut off access for stock analysts who issue negative 
reports. 242 But it's easier to cut off a "sell-side" analyst whose advice 
isn't selling anything than a "buy-side" manager who may. still buy. 
Companies may cut off access for a fund that sponsors a proposal, but 
seem less likely to do so based on antimanager votes without more. 
The historical explanation, that mutual funds aren't yet very active 
because, until recently, they were much smaller and activism seemed 
241. See Cooney, Pennsylvania Delays Takeover Vote Amid Disputes, Reuters Bus. Rep., Apr. 
17, 1990 (available on NEXIS); see also J. HEARD & H. SHERMAN (1987), supra note 190, at 51 
(reporting pressure from corporate clients on mutual fund managers). 
242. See, e.g., Galant, The Hazards of Negat(ve Research Reports, INST. INVESTOR, July 
1990, at 73. 
December 1990] Shareholder Passivity Reexamined 603 
futile, receives some support from the recent moves by Fidelity Invest-
ments and Mutual Shares to remove investment limitations from their 
funds. Fidelity funds are now able, for example, to own more than 
10% of a single company or seek changes in the board of directors.243 
How much Fidelity and Mutual Shares will do with this new freedom 
remains to be seen, however. The self-imposed restrictions are gone, 
but the legal barriers remain. And other large fund groups haven't 
taken similar steps. 
On balance, mutual funds, with their strong incentives to maxi-
mize return on assets, are likely to be relatively willing followers on 
corporate governance matters, especially if assured anonymity 
through confidential voting rules. Corporate officers can still inquire 
into a fund's voting record, but some may not ask, for fear of fiduciary 
liability. Mutual funds, however, will be reluctant to lead. 
F. Investment Banks 
Investment banks and their broker-dealer subsidiaries don't own 
much stock directly, but do hold many shares in street name for cli-
ents. In theory, brokers could offer voting advice to small sharehold-
ers, or even vote client shares. This would be a way of pooling the 
resources of small shareholders and overcoming their usual apathy. 
In practice, however, brokers almost invariably vote promanager. 
No broker offers its clients independent voting advice on a regular ba-
sis, despite a special Proxy Rules provision that permits them to do so 
without being deemed to be soliciting proxies. This is understandable: 
they face strong conflicts in opposing corporate managers, from whom 
they get underwriting and merger advisory business. Their stock ana-
lysts also have a strong need for access to corporate officials, access 
that can be cut off for an obstreperous broker. 
Regulatory concern has focused not on brokers' possible role as 
informed voters, but instead on their actual role as automatic yes 
votes. The New York Stock Exchange, under SEC oversight, allows 
member firms to vote client shares, but only on routine matters and 
only if the client is sent a proxy card and given the opportunity to vote 
herself. 244 I have suggested above that the limits on broker power to 
243. See Wallace, Fidelity is Freeing Its Funds to Be Assertive Investors, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 
1989, at Dl, col. 1. 
244. These rules are discussed in Part 111.K supra. All major broker-dealers are NYSE 
members. The SEC has the power to regulate when broker-dealers can vote client shares under 
Exchange Act§ 14(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(b) (1988), but hasn't done so, presumably because it is 
satisfied with the NYSE rules. 
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vote client shares may not go far enough, but the rules point in the 
right direction. 
Investment banks, like commercial banks, can go against their cor-
porate clients' preferences if the stakes are high enough, as they are for 
hostile takeovers. But even there, too much visibility is bad for busi-
ness. Most investment banks will advise and lend money to hostile 
bidders, but taking an equity stake is going too far, as Shearson Leh-
man discovered when it invested in Beazer PLC's bid for Koppers.245 
And the gains from voting street-name shares against corporate man-
agers are small given the apathy of many individual shareholders. 
Investment banks' conflicts affect not only how they vote client 
shares, but also how they manage captive mutual funds. Here, 
though, the conflict is more attenuated. The mutual fund has a sepa-
rate board of directors and owes a fiduciary duty to its investors. This 
makes it harder, though not impossible, for a company to pressure an 
investment bank to force a captive fund to vote promanager. Captive 
mutual funds, even more than other mutual funds, are unlikely to take 
the lead on corporate governance issues, but they may be able to be 
moderately independent voters. 
G. Foundations and Endowments 
Foundations and endowments are the last major category of insti-
tutional investors. They own about 2% of all corporate equities. To 
date, they've occasionally been active on social responsibility issues, 
but have been entirely passive on corporate governance. This is easily 
understood: gifts from corporations and their often wealthy top man-
agers are an important source of funds for these institutions. The risk 
of discouraging corporate donors may outweigh the possible increase 
in portfolio returns from being active. 
It is too much to expect foundations and endowments to take a 
visible, leading role on corporate governance issues. But they are at 
least free of direct oversight from conflicted watchers. Thus, given the 
anonymity of confidential voting, foundation and endowment manag-
ers seem likely to vote in the institution's economic self-interest. This 
makes them likely followers on corporate governance issues, if some-
one else takes the lead. 
H. The Need for More Data 
We know who the shareholder proponents are: primarily public 
funds. We know how some institutions vote. We can speculate about 
245. See Eichenwald, Takeover with a Twist, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1988, § 3, at 1, col. 2. 
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the strength of the conflicts faced by different institutions. But we lack 
direct evidence on how different types of institutions vote. We don't 
know, for example, whether corporate pension funds are more or less 
likely than banks or insurers to vote antimanager in general, or on 
particular issues. Nor do we know whether corporate pension funds 
that are managed in-house vote differently than externally managed 
funds. 
There have been only a few attempts to determine how different 
institutions vote. James Brickley, Ronald Lease, and Clifford Smith 
report that ownership by banks, insurers, and nonbank trusts (treated 
as a single "pressure sensitive" group) correlates with promanager 
votes on antitakeover amendments, while ownership by public pension 
funds, mutual funds and endowments (treated as a single "pressure 
resistant" group) correlates with "no" votes. All institutions become 
more likely to vote against a proposal as the expected shareholder 
wealth loss from passage increases.246 Karen Van Nuys reports that 
public pension funds were significantly more likely than bank trusts 
and insurers to vote against Honeywell's 1989 proposals to adopt a 
staggered board and limit shareholder power to act by written 
consent.247 
Other work doesn't subclassify institutions. Karen Van Nuys esti-
mates that during 1988, institutions voted for various manager propos-
als between 56% and 74% of the time, depending on the issue; the rest 
voted no or abstained. Proposals to adopt blank check preferred 
stock, require supermajority approval of a merger, or limit share-
holder rights to act by written consent or call a special meeting re-
ceived lesser support; proposals to eliminate director liability under 
the duty of care, increase authorized common stock, adopt a stock 
option plan, or eliminate cumulative voting received a more positive 
response.248 Georgeson & Co. reports that institutional ownership 
correlates with support for shareholder poison pill and confidential 
246. Brickley, Lease & Smith, Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments, 
20 J. FIN. EcoN. 267, 276-79 (1988); see also J. BRICKLEY, R. LEASE & c. SMITH, RATIONAL 
VOTING: EVIDENCE FROM CORPORATE CHARTER AMENDMENTS table 1 (University of Roch-
ester Working Paper, 1990). 
247. K. VAN NUYS (1990), supra note 56, at 2. The Investor Responsibility Research Center 
conducts an annual survey of how public pension funds, private pension funds, investment man-
agers and foundations and endowments "generally" vote on various corporate governance issues. 
See, e.g., L. KRASNOW (1989), supra note 179, at 9-10, 31. The survey suffers, however, from 
severe self-selection bias in the survey respondents (for example, only four private pension funds 
responded in 1989), and the "generally" qualifier can conceal a fair amount of case-by-case varia-
tion in voting. 
248. K. VAN Nuvs (1990), supra note 217. 
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voting proposals.249 In contrast, John Pound reports that institutional 
ownership correlates with manager success in proxy fights, but he re-
lies on data from the early 1980s, before the recent trend toward insti-
tutional activism. 250 Moreover, institutions may vote promanager in 
proxy fights, which involve intense management pressure and don't 
exhibit economies of scale, yet vote against the managers on some 
structure and process issues. 
I. The Effects of Institutional Conflicts 
All major institutions have significant conflicts of interest; all but 
public pension funds have incentives to keep corporate managers 
happy. For each, conflicts of interest will tilt the voting calculus to 
some extent away from maximizing share value. But institutions are 
not alike. How an institution votes will depend on the importance of 
the issue, the strength of the conflict and of the countervailing incen-
tives to maximize share value, how readily corporate managers can 
find out how the institution voted, and the likelihood that its vote will 
make a difference, which in tum depends on how other shareholders 
are expected to vote. 
For a conflicted institution, crossing the street in a crowd is safer 
than crossing alone. Thus, for a particular type of proposal, there can 
be a tipping point in institutional support. Once enough institutions 
vote antimanager, others are likely to do so as well because fiduciary 
duty, combined with the example of what others are doing, offers an 
effective defense to pressure. The likelihood that managers will re-
spond to the threat of defeat by stepping up their pressure increases 
the level of antimanager sentiment needed to reach that tipping point. 
Nevertheless, we may be near such a tipping point today for some 
antitakeover proposals, which once won routinely but are now rarely 
offered and when offered sometimes lose. 
Conflicts of interest affect both how institutions vote and which 
institutions will take a lead role on corporate governance issues. The 
first conflict is less severe than the second. Some conflicted institu-
tions will vote promanager against their beneficiaries' interests but 
others will vote antimanager, and some institutions who vote 
promanager on a less important matter will switch their vote when a 
management win means a large loss. With regard to taking the lead, 
only public pension funds, and perhaps mutual funds, are potential 
249. Georgeson & Co., Shareholder Proposal Statistics: 1990 Proxy Season (July 6, 1990), 
reprinted in 2 PRACTISING LAW INST. (1990), supra note 62, at 537, 542-43. 
250. Pound, Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight, 20 J. FIN. EcoN. 237 
(1988). 
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shareholder proponents. They are also likely to be the major support-
ers of trade groups that promote shareholder activism. Other institu-
tions will vote yea or nay, and a few may join trade groups, but they 
can't be expected to do more. 
As discussed in Part IV, institutional ownership of most major 
companies continues to grow. But institutional ownership has been 
substantial for decades, and the institutions have been quiet until very 
recently. The conflicts analysis suggests that activism may have 
grown as much because of changes in who the institutions are as be-
cause of continued growth in total institutional holdings. Public pen-
sion funds and mutual funds have grown three to four times as fast as 
.the market as a whole, and that apparently matters. 
Conflicts of interest analysis can also help to explain why focused 
lobbying of institutions for a shareholder proposal or against a man-
ager proposal makes a difference. Why, for example, did a formal op-
posing proxy solicitation lead to defeat of Honeywell's staggered board 
proposal, when Honeywell had expected passage? Partly, the solicita-
tion may have focused attention on Honeywell's weak business per-
formance. But the solicitation may have also made it safer and more 
important for conflicted institutions to vote no. Safer because others 
were doing so; more important because of the greater chance that their 
vote would matter. 
J. The Role of Legal Rules 
Legal rules can never perfectly control conflicts of interest, but 
they can reduce the impact of conflicts on voting decisions. The Labor 
Department's insistence that voting rights are a pension plan asset is a 
modest step in that direction. The Department, however, has done 
little to enforce its rules and has only insisted that shares be voted and 
encouraged development of formal voting guidelines. Merely requir-
ing that a pension plan vote its shares, without challenging apparently 
conflicted voting decisions, won't ,help much. 
The Labor Department's efforts could even backfire. Suppose that 
a money manager would like to vote against staggered boards as a 
general rule, but vote yes when pressured to do so. If required to 
adopt a formal voting policy, she might decide to vote for staggered 
boards. It may be easier to concoct a reason why staggered board 
proposals are acceptable than to explain mixed yes and no votes. And 
always voting no may put her at risk of developing an antimanager 
reputation. 
Legal rules that allow managers not only to see the ballots, but to 
resolicit shareholders who vote against them, facilitate corporate pres-
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sure for favorable votes. In contrast, rules such as confidential voting 
that shield the institutions' votes from corporate scrutiny could in-
crease the institutions' willingness to cast antimanager votes. Rules 
that keep institutions' stakes in individual companies low indirectly 
enhance the effectiveness of corporate pressure by decreasing the 
strength of the countervailing incentives to increase portfolio value. 
To be sure, companies will lobby large shareholders more strongly, but 
this seems only a partial counterweight to the enhanced incentives that 
would flow from owning a large stake. 
CONCLUSION 
This article is long but its message is simple: Shareholder passivity 
is not inevitable even in large public companies. Instead, legal barri-
ers, manager agenda control, and conflicts of interest may be impor-
tant reasons why shareholders do as little as they do. Shareholders 
who would purchase large stakes, join forces with others to present 
voting proposals, or nominate and elect their own directors, face a 
complex web of legal barriers and risks. Many also face strong con-
flicts of interest, which are only weakly controlled by legal rules. 
History matters too. Until recently, institutional ownership was 
heavily weighted toward strongly conflicted institutions. Institutional 
holdings, while large, may not have been large enough to produce 
meaningful voting power, once conflicts are taken into account. The 
recent surge in institutional activism suggests that institutional hold-
ings, especially holdings by less-conflicted institutions, may finally 
have reached a critical mass where such activism begins to make sense. 
In contrast, collective action problems, while important, seem man-
ageable for the large institutions who are today the dominant share-
holders. Especially for issues with strong economies of scale, apathy 
may not be rational after all. 
We can't answer the counterfactual question of how much share-
holders would do under a less obstructive, more facilitating legal re-
gime. Nor have I addressed in this article the extent to which more 
shareholder monitoring of corporate managers is desirable. Some 
monitoring is needed, because corporate managers need to be watched 
by someone, but how much, and by which institutions, is a complex 
matter that I will pursue in a separate article. It is enough here to 
raise the possibility: Shareholder monitoring might work, might be-
come an important part of the larger web of legal and market con-
straints on corporate managers, if legal rules permit. Shareholder 
voice is an idea that hasn't been tried, not one that has failed. It de-
serves our renewed attention. 
